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This thesis erects and defends the proposition that Jacques Derrida's readings of 
'metaphysics in deconstruction' and his raising to theoretical consciousness of the 
'differential matrix', have the capacity to inaugurate a 'brave new world' in this 
postmodern 'age of the aporia'. Beginning with an examination ofDerrida's 
readings ofHusserl and Saussure, it is argued that the radical historicity uncovered 
here qua an originary synthesis of language, time and the other, opens the 
possibility for greatly more democratising and emancipating self-creations and 
human solidarities to be thought. In terms of 'self-creations', and borrowing from 
the work of Elizabeth Deeds Ermarth, Chapter Two follows Derrida as 
modernity's sovereign subject and its 'History' are dis-placed by an absolutely 
affirmative postmodern subjectivity whose axiom might be 'I inherit, therefore, I 
am ... yes, yes ... ' Construed through his deconstructive reading of Kant, Derrida 
shows the way in which this postmodern subjectivity without alibi, makes of us all 
(like it or not, know it or not) resistance fighters, so many singularities existing in 
constant tension with all normalisingltotalising tendencies (social, economic, 
techno-scientific, political, legal etc ... ) which profess to know the secret. Turning 
to co-extensive 'human solidarities', Chapter Three subsequently demonstrates the 
way in which Derrida's call for a 'New International', orientated through a 'new 
figure of Europe' , enables us to imagine new polysemic communities (local, 
national, international) founded on the 'aporia of the demos', a 'foundation' that 
construes its hyper-relativity as a positive (ethico-political) condition of decision in 
terms of a radical responsibility (on an individual and communal level) for the 
moral/aesthetic decisions we make. It is thus that I will argue that Derrida's vision 
for a 'new world order' is born out of an aporetic condition which is both a risk 
and a chance of both the best - and the worst - happening; as someone who shares 
Derrida's desire for a fairer, freer, more peaceful world, one respectful of 
difference and otherness, I believe this to be a 'poker like gamble' well worth 
taking. Chapter Four offers a comparative analysis between the work of Jacques 
Derrida and Jean Baudrillard, two theorists counter-signing differently many of the 
'same' discourses/ traditions/cultures/languages, etc ... to which they are both heirs. 
The chapter examines their respective 'quasi-philosophies of the limit', together 
with their differing conceptions of the issues surrounding globalisation and 
universalisation, as well as Baudrillard' s elevation of America (as opposed to 
Europe) as the exemplary site of resistance against the dangers of totalisation in 
'postmodem' societies. The central argument here, in line with my previous 
remarks, is that Derrida's thought arguably remains 'the best' way to navigate the 
postmodern condition and the challenges it produces. 
The originality of this thesis lies in two main areas, the first having to do with my 
presentation and conception ofDerrida's oeuvre and the second having to do with 
the comparisons made in this study between Derrida and Ermarth and Derrida and 
Baudrillard. In terms of the former, I offer what I consider to be a unique, 
sustained, in-depth analysis of the 'development' (on a theoretical and practical 
level) of the thematics of 'radical historicity' and of 'post-historical man' -
effectively the development ofDerrida's quasi-philosophy of history - from his 
earliest works so that they can be seen to inform his later intervention(s) in what 
are conventionally understood as ethical and political matters; transforming this 
understanding in the process and, after the end of history's ends (upper case, lower 
case and the totalising 'history of meaning' per se), quite literally and radically 
changing the way we see what we call 'the world'. F or while in the conventional 
literature Derrida's politics come late, I argue here that his indeed later political 
work is but an emphasis of constant political thematics acting as a leitmotif from 
beginning to end. Turning to the latter, in terms of the comparisons I make - first 
between Derrida and Ermarth in Chapter Two and more especially between 
Derrida and Baudrillard in Chapter Four - the claim to originality lies in the fact 
that there is no comparison of any note or depth in the literature between these 
thinkers; nothing that compares Derrida's 'affirmative postmodem subjectivity' 
and its 'inheritance' with Ermarth's 'rhythmic time' and 'multi-level 
consciousness', and nothing comparing Derrida's corpus - specifically his 
optimistic emancipating and democratizing hopes for the future - with 
Baudrillard's more pessimistic conceptualization of' simulation society' and the 
loss of our European universal values under the hegemonic, globalising movement 
of the' American model'. The aim of these two comparisons is to support my 
claim that Derrida's historico-political position is the 'best' way of essaying the 
quasi-ground of an in(different) politics in such a way that it keeps the future open 
to what he calls a 'better world' to come, a world without ends. 
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Introduction 
Philosophy came into existence to answer the question: First of all, how to 
handle one's life and live well together - which is also politics. This is what 
was addressed in Greek philosophy and from the beginning philosophy and 
politics were deeply intertwined. We are living beings who believe we have 
the capacity to change life, and we place ourselves above other animals ... we 
have the ability to make decisions and organise our lives. Philosophy poses 
the question: what should we do to have the best possible lives? 1'm afraid 
we haven't made much progress in arriving at an answer to this question. 
Jacques Derrida 1 
To some, writing a thesis on Derrida and 'postmodemity' might seem to be like 
trying to hit a square peg into a round hole, given his inherent dislike of terms such 
as the 'post' with its linear connotations of the 'new', and even greater disquiet 
about terms such as postmodemism, poststructuralism, and the like. However, and 
despite the huge 'Derrida industry' which admittedly made me feel uncertain as to 
whether I could say anything 'new' or 'original' about either the man or his work, 
I felt that Derrida' s corpus remains largely unappreciated and misunderstood -
especially outside of a relatively limited radical theoretical community - in terms 
of the kind of grand-epochal change I believed it to give voice to and the kind of 
'post' modem subjectivity I believed him to espouse; albeit one heavily qualified 
so far as the 'postist' phenomenon goes. This belief was increased when, halfway 
through the writing of the thesis, Derrida succumbed to pancreatic cancer, giving 
rise to a flurry of hastily written obituaries in the Autumn of 2004 and various 
1 Quote taken from an interview conducted by Kristine McKenna for LA Weekly (November 
2002). subsequently re-published in the book Screenplay and Essays on the Film: Derrida. 
Directed by Kirby Dick and Amy Ziering Kofman. Manchester University Press, Manchester: 
2005, p.119 
1 
contemplations thereafter on the Derridean legacy. For I was shocked and 
disappointed (for Derrida himself in the first place) that his deconstructive thought 
remained so poorly comprehended and so little engaged with at anything more 
than a cursory level by so many (supposedly) eminent academics who repeated the 
stereotypical drivel of journalists such as Jonathan Kandell whose libellous article 
in the New York Times drew much derision from Derrida' s friends and admirers 
(even those who did not share his precise intellectual or moral ethos).2 
I also felt, despite the excellent work in attempting to come to terms with Derrida' s 
work on Philosophy, Literature, Religion, Science, Ethics and so on - which often 
took the familiar form of 'Derrida and X' - that what was lacking was a really 
wide-scale understanding ofDerrida's thinking which addressed how what often 
seemed his more abstract theoretical investigations translated into a textual praxis 
which could enable us, on an individual and collective level, to come to terms 
with, and go beyond, our 'postmodern condition' politically. For while I by no 
means regard post-modernity as an absolute break with either modernity or 
metaphysics per se, Derrida's reading of 'metaphysics in deconstruction' does give 
2 Of Kandell's article Yve-Alain Bois, Professor of Modem Art at Harvard University "rote to The 
New York Times 'Topping the usually philistine relationship of the Times to just about everything 
academic, and its habit of entrusting the composition of obituaries to overt opponents of the 
deceased supposed to be memorialised, the article by Jonathan Kandell on Jacques 
Derrida ... reaches a peak of populist anti-intellectualism - not to speak of the countless distortions 
it contains - that I thought only possible in a Murdoch publication'. (The New York Times, October 
lOth,2004). This view was endorsed by a range of hostile polemics to Kandell's article by the likes 
of Judith Butler, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak and Samuel Weber. A summary of the yarious 
arguments can be found in my (soon to be published) article 'On Jacques Derrida: The Politics of 
Mourning'. This article is due for publication in the June 2007 issue of Re-Thinking History 
(Routledge, London). 
2 
voice to a grand-epochal change wherein we have the 'risky' chance to transfonn 
our self-creations and human solidarities in more democratising and emancipating 
ways which have real relevance for the way we live our lives and the economic, 
political, social, cultural, technological and religious structures which (help) form 
them. While, of course, this involves a degree of historical generalisation through 
an ironical historical consciousness working things out in postist ways beyond 
history's ends (upper and lower case and the history of meaning per se3), it is 
argued here that this is necessary today in order to keep in mind the scale of the 
reformation in consciousness involved and the ethico-political terrain upon which 
we are now left to make our moral and aesthetic choices without foundations. If 
we do not keep this in mind, there is a danger that the long, hard, but rewarding 
task of the Derridean postmodem 'resistance fighter' will too easily give way to 
political apathy. 
3 I use these three tenns as follows: 'Upper case history' is taken to be meta-narrative history, the 
genus of those 'modem' speculative quasi -philosophies of history prevalent in the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries which, as lean-Francois Lyotard argues, seek to organise the whole mass of 
events into various narratives whose end(s) tend to be universal freedom or the fulfilment of 
humanity; these 'grand-narratives' being founded on the meta-narrative of history qua the 
rationalisation and homogenisation of time and consciousness definitive of 'modernity' as such. 
'Lower case history' is here taken to be the kind of 'common sense', 'own sakist' history which 
populates most schools, colleges and universities, and which takes what is only a species of history 
(a bourgeois, conservative species) to be history itself (and this 'history' too often taken to be 
identical with the past itself, as if 'the past' and 'history' were the same phenomenon). This kind of 
'academic' history is just as foundational(ist), just as 'endist', as its upper case system variant, and, 
crucially, just as vulnerable to the kind of postist theorising Derrida et al "ill espouse. Finally, by 
the 'history o/meaning per se', I mean to refer to all attempts in the Western metaphysical tradition 
(viewed "ith an ironical historical consciousness) to constrain the meaning of being to presence up 
to (and including) our own historical episteme which, as I argue, gives itself to think not only the 
fallacy of its O"TI ends (hence the irony), but ends as such. The argument being (one which "ill be 
developed in the course of Chapter Two in particular) that we cannot (and indeed need not) simp(v 
give up this 'history' in order to challenge it but must think through it. 
3 
Undoubtedly my own interest in Derrida's raising to consciousness of what I term, 
in Chapter One, 'The Differential Matrix' 4 is motivated by my own moral/aesthetic 
sensibilities. Being of the political 'left' certainly makes me pre-disposed to 
Derrida's theorisations and his own political position (he was, he insisted, 'always 
a man of the left') in that they seem to offer a more plural, flexible, tolerant 
approach to a range of (contemporary and perennial) ethical and political issues 
than practically anyone else. To give just a few examples at this point: my 
concerns regarding the legal and moral status of the current war on terror, my 
worries regarding our media (hype) driven societies and the models they promote, 
and all of those inequalities and injustices (economic, social, gender, racial) which 
go all too often un-remarked or are ignored (or simply paid lip service to), are all 
theorized and (in my eyes) addressed practically, sympathetically and (morally) 
responsibly throughout the entire course ofDerrida's oeuvre. But of course at this 
early stage it is also vital to point out that 'deconstruction' - if there is such a thing 
- can go with anyone, and that outside the raising to consciousness of this matrix 
in postmodernity (as that within which consciousness itself is inscribed) I have to 
take my chance and make out my case based on my own beliefs as to what are 
'good', 'just' and 'right' in each new situation/context.5 As I don't believe that 
4 Qua what will come to be identified as the non-originary origin of language, time and the other, 
constitutive of our made meaningful world. 
5 A 'fact' of course, that detractors such as Richard Wolin and the late Professor Allan Bloom (to 
name just two at this juncture) can only abhor in a profound mis-reading of Derrida's ·politics'. 
While Wolin will speak of the 'corrosive nihilism' of deconstructive thinking, Bloom spoke in a 
lengthy polemic contained in his book The Closing of the American ~\1ind (Simon and Schuster Inc. 
1987) of deconstruction's propensity for attack moral fibre and lending itself all too easily to 
'proto-fascist currents'. 
4 
anyone - anyone else - can seriously make their own cases rest on foundationalist 
premises any more, the sentiments of others are, in principle, just as valid as my 
own. Consequently I have to hope that, after Derrida6, my own more searching, 
critical, liberal, inclusive 'friendship-based' approach is (Rorty-like) just more 
'attractive' to readers than many other readings and that intolerant arguments will 
fail to appeal to those educated to the shifting, foundationless nature of our 
'meaningful' world - hence Derrida's advocation of departments, colleges and the 
like devoted to philosophy (and hence all disciplines) rendered other-wise.7 
Before I go on to explain how this thesis is structured and developed, there are two 
points that must be made in this introduction which follow from my just 
'footnoted' approach and which I re-iterate in the opening remarks of Chapter One 
6 When this tenn 'after Derrida' is used, and frequently flagged up, I mean (in a sense coined by 
Nicholas Royle) both 'after Derrida' chronologically and 'after Derrida' in spirit (see Royle's After 
Derrida. Manchester University Press, Manchester: 1995). 
7 In the first chapter of Contingency, Irony and Solidarity Richard Rorty explains that, because 
knock-down, logical argmnents that definitely establish a position that is held to be the truth are 
unavailable (indeed impossible), then all we can do is to try and make one's position look 
appealing; attractive. He writes that this sort of philosophy does not work piece by piece, analysing 
concept after concept, or testing thesis after thesis. Rather it works holistically and pragmatically. 
It says things like 'try thinking of it this way' - or more specifically, 'try to ignore the apparently 
futile traditional questions by substituting the following new and potentially interesting questions' . 
Consequently, Rorty goes on: 'Confonning to my own precepts, I am not going to offer arguments 
against the vocabulary I want to replace. Instead, I am going to try and make the vocabulary I 
favour look attractive by showing how it may be used to describe a variety of topics' . (Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge: 1989, p.9). 
In this thesis I will, on occasion, argue logically; I shall on occasion try to demonstrate things - as 
Derrida did himself. But I think he knew, like Rorty knows, that 'in the end', one can only hope-
in these 'postist' days after foundationalism(s) - to make one's own thesis (position, reading, 
'axiomatically based' gaze) look attractive, and thus to be taken as having (whilst being neither 
'true or false') 'at least a certain appearance in its favour'. For Derrida's own comments see 
'Deconstructions: The Impossible', in, S. Lotringer and S. Cohen (eds) French Theory in America, 
Routledge, London and New York: 2001, pp.13-32. p.22, from whence the phrase 'at least a certain 
appearance in its favour' is taken, and where Derrida is painting a position of his own involvement 
in 'deconstruction in America' tentatively, attractively. 
5 
- for they are crucial to this thesis. First, and perhaps most importantly, my 
reading ofDerrida's theorisations is, of course, precisely that, it is a reading: it is 
my reading - the same being true for my construal of Elizabeth Deeds Ermarth and 
Jean Baudrillard - and thus is both positioned with regard to my own 
interpretation(s) ofDerrida's work and in respect to the relevant literature. 
Second, while I have attempted to simplify some difficult language in this thesis 
and to keep postmodernist jargon at a minimum so as to present the arguments as 
coherently and transparently as possible, it must be recognised that this attempt is 
ultimately imperfect (radically im-possible) and that the use of sometime specialist 
and 'technical' terminology8 comes with the territory and for which I make no 
more apologies. 
With these comments in mind, the thesis as presented is organised as follows. 
In Chapter One I follow Derrida's reading of' metaphysics in deconstruction' as he 
demonstrates the way in which all phono-Iogo-centric gestures are necessarily and 
radically undercut by an 'originary' structure of language and existence which 
makes all attempts to fix meaning in a determinate figure impossible. In other 
words, I follow Derrida's path as he demonstrates that foundationalist acts of 
8 I would like to underline the fact that "specialist' and "technical' is not to confused with "obscure' 
and other such adjectives used by (amongst others) Noam Chomsky who argues that the simplicity 
of Derrida's ideas are "obscured' with "pretentious rhetoric'. Not only is much of Derrida's 
tenninology a re-invention and re-elaboration of existing terms/terminology. but it seems odd that if 
scientists, mathematicians and the like are permitted to make use of specialist and (yes) sometimes 
difficult terminology, that a philosopher-theorist such as Derrida is not. 
6 
closure of whatever type are always and necessarily imperfect due to a certain, 
irreducible, absent other(ness) unable to be incorporated into even the most 
rigorously circumscribed of contexts - everything always remains 'to be thought'. 
For Derrida will show, through his deconstruction of the 'sign' ( a deconstruction 
not least enabled by his 'double reading' of Edmund HusserI and Ferdinand de 
Saussure) that the origin of language, reason and history is not located in an 
originary presence as he argues the mainstream of West em philosophy 
predominantly asserts, but is instead the product of a greatly more radical 
historicity or plurivocality referred to in this study by way of the neologism: the 
'Differential Matrix' 9, a phenomenon which makes the metaphysical 
(foundationalist) gesture simultaneously both necessary and impossible, and which 
re-inscribes the empirico-transcendental difference in accord with a new quasi 10_ 
philosophy of the limit. Without an understanding of this abyssal quasi-logic (as 
non-originary origin) which forms the ethico-political space of the decision - of all 
decisions of whatever kind - it is impossible to grasp either the full impact of 
Derrida's work for transforming our self-creations and human solidarities in our 
9 I use this neologism the 'Differential Matrix' to refer to the non-originary origin of language, 
time and the other because, in a quite exemplary fashion giyen its etymological roots (coming from 
the Latin: womb), it re-marks the way in which the matrix or matrices of Western metaphysics -
matrices cast variously in tenns of origins, fonns, (en)closures - are themselves the product of a 
monstrous conception which undercuts all first causes, all determinate forms, all closures of 
whatever type. 
10 The tenn 'quasi' is used here, as elsewhere in this study, to mark the paradox of a philosophical 
account which seeks to demonstrate why we cannot have a final account of how things are or will 
be. I am indebted to Mark Mason for reminding me of the need to eX"plicate the quasi in this way. 
and for his useful summary contained in his essay 'Exploring 'the impossible': Jacques Derrida, 
John Caputo and the Philosophy of History'. Re-Thinking History, op.cit, Volume 10, NoA. 
December 2006, pp.501-522. 
7 
current postmodem condition, or his co-extensive (and possibly) pathological fear 
of closure. For if it just is the case that everything (logically) can be described and 
re-described in infinitum, if meanings remain always and forever structurally 'to 
come', to be made and re-made in accord with our own moral and aesthetic 
sensibilities alone, then everything changes, everything is different. A new world 
can be imagined, an arguably 'better' world, for those who still believe that the 
twin discourses of democracy and emancipation have some 'mileage' left in them 
- even if this means rendering them (to repeat) other-wise: Derrida's politics begin 
here. 
In Chapter Two I argue that, with this quasi-philosophy of language/'the limit' in 
mind and recognizing ourselves to be in the 'post' - modem 'age of the aporia' 
(aporia being the im-possible passage of meaning and decision making), Jacques 
Derrida gives voice, with increasing urgency, to an absolutely affirmative 
postmodern subjectivity whose axiom might be: 'I inherit, therefore, I am ... yes, 
yes ... '; re-figuring our modem metaphysical inheritance beyond the 'ends of 
history,ll by way ofa new 'politics of memory' which makes of us all postmodem 
resistance fighters against the attempt(s) - 'modem' or 'postmodern' - to execute 
what Baudrillard calls 'the perfect crime'. In this chapter I use the work of 
Elizabeth Deeds Ermarth not only to contextualise postmodemity in relation to 
modernity (and metaphysics per se) by way of an ironical historical consciousness 
11 To repeat: upper and lower case history and the 'history of meaning per se', as these terms are 
defined on page 3, footnote 3 of this thesis. 
8 
which is working itself through in 'postist' ways, but also to juxtapose Ennarth's 
rhythmic time and multi-level consciousness against the messianic time and 
affirmative postmodem subjectivity I consider Derrida espouses. I argue that 
while Ermarth's experimental anthematics and parapraxis provide us with some 
interesting imaginaries to work with, Derrida operates in terms of a more effective 
textual praxis which, working within and through existing structures and working 
in and through our metaphysical inheritance, has a heightened understanding of the 
need to work in torsion between metaphysics and the differential matrix (within 
which it is inscribed) in a less outright 'Joycean' style, while conversely aiming at 
a more radical reading of the 'politics of morality'. No such comparison of 
Derrida and Ermarth - which casts them both into productive relief - has 
previously been made. 
In Chapter Three, I seek to show that Derrida's later thought, characterised as it is 
by a more overt intervention - a more vigorous stress - in ethical and political 
matters, is entirely consistent with and indeed a working out of and through his 
very earliest work on Husserl and Saussure which inaugurates his thinking of the 
beginning of historicity and of post-historical man: this continuity is, I think, in the 
detail of its 'tracing' in this thesis, a major contribution to 'Derrida studies' and an 
answer to critics such as Allan Bloom, Jean Luc Ferry, Alan Renaut and Richard 
Wolin (among others) who argue variously that Derrida's deconstructive thinking 
9 
leads to 'political irresponsibility' and/or 'moral bankruptcy' .12 For having 
brought to theoretical consciousness the construction of meaning in and through 
the differential matrix, whereby all meaning remains always and forever 
structurally 'to come', Derrida uncovers the ethical relation to the other (always 
more than one) which opens the ethico-political space of the decision constitutive 
of our made-meaningful world. Thus it is that the concept of the political is 
simultaneously broadened to cover all conceptual/discursive meanings and is 
transformed in its conventional sense insofar as political theory has generally 
relied on the notion of a certain 'sovereignty' - variously located in the 
body/politic - practiced in the security of the logos. With this in mind, I argue in 
this chapter that Derrida' s thinking has the potential to have a profound, 
deconstructive impact on our Western liberal democratic societies which, after the 
12 In The Closing of the American Mind Cop.cit, 1987) Allan Bloom argues deconstruction is the 
last, predictable stage in the 'suppressing of reason and the denial of truth in philosophy'. Linking 
Derrida's work, mistakenly, to a suppression of Marx to the benefit of Nietzsche and Heidegger, 
Bloom argues that the 'proto-fascist currents' in deconstructive thinking encourage the nihilism and 
relativism which have come to 'infect' the humanities, social sciences and popular culture, thereby 
threatening American culture and its 'moral fibre'. 
Also concerned with Derrida's specific use of Heidegger Alan Renaut and Jean Luc Ferry 
collaborated to produce the book French Philosophy of the Sixties: An Essay on Antihumanism 
(University of Massachusetts, Cambridge: 1990) where they argued Derrida's was paradigmatic of 
'68 thought which was characterized by a concern with style over substance and a denial of 
meaning at all costs. 
In a similar tone to Bloom, Richard Wolin has argued that Derrida's work represents a 'corrosive 
nihilism' (a view re-iterated in the recent edition of The &duction of Unreason, Princeton: 2004) -
a description to which Derrida has taken great exception. The antagonistic relationship between 
Derrida and Wolin was exacerbated when Derrida took issue with what he regarded to be a wilfully 
malicious mistranslation of an interview of his on Heidegger which appeared in Wolin's book The 
Heidegger Controversy (ed. R Wolin. University of Massachusetts, Cambridge: 1993); a book 
Derrida judged to be 'weak, simplistic and compulsively aggressive'. In the light of what he 
regarded to be the intentional mis-reading of his work Derrida subsequently refused permission for 
the inteniew to be republished in later editions/reprints of Wolin's book, and the debate which 
followed between the two men was played out in the American media, only intensifying the 
animosity between them. 
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end of modernity's history, are faced with the rampant omnibus of modem-style 
globalisation much shorn of its sometime' older' emancipatory and democratic 
content. For Derrida insists that, after Marx, we must work today to intervene in 
concrete and urgent situations and to ask questions about the future of our liberal 
capitalist democracies in a juridico-political space increasingly shaped by the 
powers of the tele-techno-media and dominated by the rhetoric of the world's 
strongest nations (the United States exemplarily) which auto-immunise themselves 
against the very democracy they are meant to uphold in the name of an 
international justice they cannot help but betray. In particular I will follow 
Derrida's arguments as he calls for the creation of new forms of struggle to counter 
the inequalities and manifest injustices of a paradoxical globalisation orientated 
through his suggestions for a 'New International'; for a movement of intellectuals 
and activists who might develop new concepts of state, sovereignty, citizen, 
international institutions and international law which stretch old political 
vocabularies to breaking point. As we will see, for Derrida 'Europe' is to have a 
central role in this scenario given that its common experiences, traditions and 
achievements have endowed (us Europeans) with what he takes to be a unique 
political consciousness and sense of duty to think 'reason'; to think new ways of 
'being' other-wise. Derrida argues that the birth of a European public/identity-
which constitutes itself out of respect for difference and otherness - is vital in 
fostering a more democratising and emancipating civic solidarity mindful of the 
need for continual revision and improvement of all laws, institutions, organisations 
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(political, economic, social, religious) in the face of infinite justice~ a Europe with 
the military force and diplomatic powers necessary in the service of such new 
international institutions and international law to regulate the manifest injustices 
and paradoxes of globalisation in the international order. Following on from the 
analysis in Chapter Two, the final point being made in this chapter is that we can 
all take a more active role in terms of the decisions we make and the pressure we 
bring to bear on our governing codes/rule systems. It will not be easy, 
unfortunately for the more 'fundamentalist mind' like Alan Bloom's et al there are 
no guarantees for tactics and strategies are emergent for this 'political ethics': it is 
a task forged in aporia (the very condition of the demos). But we all have the 
power to counter-sign differently, and we can try to literally change the world for 
what I will argue, in line with Derrida, is something much the better. 
In the Fourth and final chapter I offer a comparison of Derrida' s work with that of 
fellow French philosopher-theorist Jean Baudrillard - arguably one of (or perhaps 
the) other most radical thinker of our time(s). After a relatively brief but enabling 
examination of the central themes/arguments that can be read as running 
through( out) Baudrillard' s work - simulation, reversibility, the' hell of the Same', 
the aestheticisation of culture to mention here just a few - I proceed to argue that 
while both men begin from an understanding of the phenomenon of differance (the 
'differential matrix' as it is presented here) they arrive at very different 
conclusions in terms of their respective hopes, their political desires. For while in 
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some senses it is a slightly reductionist and thus over-simplistic statement to make, 
it just does seem to be the case that Derrida generally remains much more 
optimistic in tone, and Baudrillard much more pessimistic in tone, so far as their 
hopes for a more radically democratising and emancipating future for our self-
creations and human solidarities are concerned. And I will argue that nowhere is 
this more in evidence than in their respective views on Europe and America as 
potential sites of resistance (or not) to present day, foundationalist enterprises. For 
while Derrida holds out the hope for a Europe led/inspired new world order opened 
in the political aporia of the demos, to a large extent Baudrillard concedes victory 
to a banal, technicized, upholstered way of life - what he calls the' American 
model' - which has been drip fed to the rest of the world and against which he sees 
only momentary, largely singular bouts of resistance; resistance all too easily 
folded back into more of 'the same old thing' (or what Baudrillard refers to as the 
'hell of the Same'). Thus I argue (in a similar vein to my conclusions vis a vis 
Derrida's comparison with Ermarth in Chapter Two), that while Baudrillard's 
strategies of resistance and his writing style, can appear more flamboyantly radical 
than Derrida's, ultimately it is Derrida who allows us to intervene most 
productively in concrete situations to change the world more radically - that is 'for 
the better' from a post-modernlpost-structuralist, left wing, generally more 
optimistic point of view: Derrida's viewpoint. 
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The conclusion to be drawn in this chapter is that if 'the best' is here defined as the 
most empowering radically democratising and emancipating way(s) of reading this 
'age of the aporia', such as it (always potentially) keeps the future open to new 
and unforeseen possibilities for our self-creations and human solidarities - then 
Derrida's left-wing, optimistic, deconstructive approach, as it is deployed at a 
theoretical and practical level and which runs as the leitmotif of his work from 
'end to end', just is 'the best' way to navigate our current postmodern condition 
with a view to what he hopes will be a new, more free and equal world without 
beginnings and without ends: an open quasi-conclusion endlessly awaiting much 
more to be said. And it is this 'conclusion' that is re-turned to (in my final pages, 
in my own inconclusive conclusion) in ways rendered slightly otherwise. For this 
'tentative conclusion' is that to which I have been working from the beginning of 
this thesis, the tentative conclusion that has indeed informed and thus constituted 
it. There is, let me be clear, no teleology at work here, but rather a 'movement' of 
the differential matrix traced throughout in ways which, to re-iterate, might have, 
as a reading, at least 'a certain appearance in its favour'. 
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Chapter One: 
The Differential Matrix. 
[We] begin with the problem of signs and writing - since we are already in 
the midst of it. 
Jacques Derrida 13 
In this first chapter I intend to trace the early development ofDerrida's reading of 
'metaphysics in deconstruction' which, co-extensive as it is with his quasi-
philosophy of language, undercuts the onto-theologicaP4 tradition's founding 
gesture in the form of the Platonic ethico-theoretical decision to oppose the 
sensible and the intelligible through the 'Law' of the bar (I); de-stabilising all 
foundationalist pretensions across the Western discursive formation. Derrida will 
show, through a deconstruction of the very 'sign' which endows the world with 
meaning for 'us', that the origin of language, Reason and history is not located in 
an originary presence - as he considers the mainstream of Western philosophy 
would have us believe - but is instead a product of a greatly more radical 
historicity or plurivocality referred to in this study as the political and politicising 
'differential matrix', a phenomenon which makes the metaphysical gesture both 
necessary and impossible. 
13 Derrida, Jacques, Speech and Phenomena and Other essays on Husserl 's Theory of Signs, 
Northwestern University Press, Evanston: 1967, 1973, p.l38. 
14 In The Death and Return of the Author: Criticism and Subjectivity in Barthes, Foucault and 
Derrida (Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh: 1992, 1998) Sean Burke traces the genealogy of 
the tenn 'onto-theology' through Nietzsche and Heidegger respectively, as he argues: 'Following 
upon Nietzsche's identification of all metaphysical systems with the theological question, 
Heidegger came to conceive of metaphysics as onto-theology, the determination of being as 
presence. From Parmenides and Plato onward, says Heidegger, being has been conceived as a 
simple unity, a full self-present origin and ground'. (p.117). 
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In two ofDerrida's earliest publications - namely his translation and 'Introduction' 
to the philosopher Edmund HusserI's The Origin oJGeometry15 (1962) and Speech 
and Phenomend 6 (1967) (where he begins with the 'sign' or 'sign-language' and 
its peculiar aporetic logic), Derrida seeks to demonstrate that the whole historico-
metaphysical 'epoch' has always been menaced by what he calls the 'problem of 
language'; a problem which he argues - in his contemporaneous publication (in 
English) of OJ Grammatology17 (1967) - can no longer be ignored. For while 
Derrida understands that the 'history of meaning' has been predicated on a 
presence which (understandably) originated from hearing oneself speak through 
the phonic substances - and which underlay the Platonic separation of the 
empirical and transcendental in binary opposition - he nevertheless argues that, 
particularly in the light of the phenomenological and structuralist 'moments' in the 
twentieth century (considered as the 'twin poles' of twentieth century thought), 
this difference and the speech/writing binary upon which it is predicated can no 
longer be maintained. Indeed, it is in these early texts that the Derridean notions of 
'differance' and 'arche-writing' can be traced, irrespective of whether they are 
explicitly 'present' in lexical form. For these neologisms and their thematic and 
syntactic precursors point to a re-inscription of the empirico-transcendental 
difference (in terms of an interminable movement of delimitation and excess) 
15 Derrida, Jacques, Edmund Husserl 's Origin of Geometry: An Introduction By Jacques Derrida. 
Translated and with a preface and afterword by John P.Leavey Jm. University of Nebraska Press, 
London and Lincoln: 1962, 1989. 
16 Derrida, Jacques, Speech and Phenomena, op.cit, 1973. 
17 Derrida, Jacques, Of Grammatology. Translated and with a preface by Gayatri Chakravorty 
Spivak. The Jolm Hopkins University Press, Baltimore and London: 1967, 1998. 
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which Derrida draws out through the point at which both Husserlian 
phenomenology and Saussurean linguistics fail. 
It is important to emphasise at this point that I am not claiming here to add 
anything to Husserlian or Saussurean scholarship - the readings I proffer are 
'Derrida's' in so far as I understand them - nor am I essentially adding anything 
'new' to existing Derridean scholarship surrounding these deconstructive readings 
- Christopher Norris, David B. Allison or Christina Howells, for example, all offer 
compact summaries. 18 Rather, in coming to terms with my Derridean 'inheritance' 
I have made the (ethico-theoretical) decision to 'begin' with Derrida's reading of 
Husserl and Saussure in some detail because I think that the originary synthesis of 
language, time and the other which he uncovers here (and the ethico-political space 
of the 'decision' opened therein) forms the political framework within which 
Derrida's later more overtly edifying work can best be understood. For I will 
subsequently seek to demonstrate that what may seem to be simply abstract, 
theoretical arguments, actually and decisively inaugurate a new kind of (textual) 
praxis which enables us, in our current postmodem condition and our 
understandings of it, to conceive of greatly more radical' democratising' and 
'emancipating' self-creations and human solidarities than have henceforth been the 
case in the totalising 'history of meaning'. Indeed, through his readings of Husserl 
18 See particularly Christopher Norris's Deconstruction: Theory and Practice (Routledge, London 
and New York: 1982, 1999), David Allison's Introduction to Speech and Phenomena (op.cit, 1993) 
and Christina Howells Derrida: From Phenomenology to Ethics (polity Press, Cambridge: 1999). 
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and Saussure, Derrida is taking us beyond the end of ( a certain) history ( of ends) 
whereupon we must seek to forge our own path - a never uncomplicated, 
differentiating one: setting things straight is not the name ofDerrida's game. 
Part One: 
Derrida and Husserl: At the Limits of Phenomenology. 
As I have already suggested in my opening remarks, the importance of 
understanding Derrida's reading of the 'phenomenological vision' of Edmund 
HusserI cannot be under-estimated in any attempt to understand the political 
development of his thought and, most importantly, its impact on our epistemo-
ontological and ethico-political economies of knowledge. Indeed it is arguably 
through his encounter with HusserI that his conception of' deconstruction' initially 
developed its rig our and subtlety beyond the reach of any immanent criticism 19, 
and enveloped for the first time the entire edifice of Western foundationalist 
thinking. In an interview with Richard Kearney, 'Deconstruction and the other' 
(1984), Derrida says retrospectively: 
I have never shared HusserI' s pathos for and commitment to, a 
phenomenology of presence. In fact, it was HusserI' s method that helped me 
to suspect the very notion of presence and the fundamental role it played in 
all philosophies. 20 
19 As defined by Theodore Adorno, 'immanent criticism' of intellectual and artistic phenomena 
seeks to grasp, through the analysis of their fonn and meaning, the contradiction between their 
objective idea and their presentation. 
20 Kearney, Richard (Ed), 'Deconstruction and the other'. InStates ofJ\find: Dialogues with 
Contemporary Thinkers 011 the European Mind. Manchester University Press, Manchester: 1995, 
p.160; this paper is the publication of a dialogue which originally took place in Paris in 1981. 
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For Derrida, Husserlian phenomenology is essentially a 'phenomenology of 
signification' 21 , the most rigorous attempt to separate the sign and presence in 
order both to secure the primacy of the latter over the former in ways 
subordinating meaning to Truth (Logos) as the te/os of language, and in ways 
rescuing philosophy from the sceptical doubt he saw pervading Western thought 
while denouncing the adoption of an unreflective positivism or mere subjective 
pensivity (aiming to sail a path between empiricism and idealism). As Husserl 
argues in The Cartesian Meditatio~2: 
We must place ourselves above this whole life and all this cultural tradition 
and, by radical sense-investigations, seek for ourselves singly and in 
common the ultimate possibilities and necessities, on the basis of which we 
can take our position toward actualities in judging, valuing and acting. 23 
Husserl's hyper-metaphysical intention, then, is nothing less than a repetition, 
restoration and completion of the Greek origin (Greek metaphysics), a re-calling to 
be achieved through the excavation, from beneath 'degenerate' metaphysics, of 
what Husserl will term the 'authentic mode of ideality' which he believes will 
21 Paul Ricoeur notes in the introduction to his own Husser/: An Analysis of His Phenomenology 
(Northwestern University Press, Evanston: 1967) that 'the first question of phenomenology is: 
What does signifying signify? Whatever the importance subsequently taken on by the description 
of perception, phenomenology begins not from what is most silent in the operation of 
consciousness but from its relationship to things mediated by signs as these are elaborated in a 
spoken [my italics] culture. The first act of consciousness is designating or meaning (Meinen). To 
distinguish signification from signs, to separate it from the word, from the image, and to elucidate 
the diverse ways in which an empty signification comes to be fulfilled by an intuitive presence, 
whatever it may be, is to describe signification phenomenologically'. (p.26). 
22 Husserl's Cartesian Meditations, J-JVwere first presented in Paris as a lecture series in German 
in 1929 and were translated into French by Gabrielle Pfeiffer and Emmanuel Levinas as 
,\1editations Cartesiennes, Paris 1931...1-7. English translation by Doris Cairns as Cartesian 
Meditations, The Hague, 1968. 
23 Ibid, p.2617 (Cairns). 
19 
serve to establish a (primordial) unity of objective and subjective presence2.\ of 
form and matter, mediated through the medium of the voice in the most classical of 
onto-theological gestures (that instituting the separation of the intelligible and the 
sensible) which might serve as an ultimate foundation for knowledge. Thus 
HusserI draws his founding concepts from, and is faithfully inscribed within, what 
Derrida will come to call the 'history of metaphysics' of which he says: 
Its matrix ... is the determination of Being as presence in all the sense of this 
word. It could be shown that all the names related to fundamentals, to 
principles, or to the center have always designated an invariable presence -
eidos, arche, telos, energeia, ousia (essence, existence, substance) aletheia, 
transcendentality, consciousness, God, man, and so forth.25 
It is thus that Rudolphe Gasche perceptively argues in Inventions of Difference 
(1994), that the contradictions Derrida will draw out through his deconstructive 
reading of the key axioms of the HusserIian corpus come to be determined 'as 
contradictions constitutive of philosophical discourse in general, and ofHusserl's 
philosophy in particular' .26 
24 In the Introduction to Speech and Phenomena (op.cit, 1973), its translator into English, David B. 
Allison, states: <For Husser! and the tradition, the sense of being has always been interpreted as 
presence, and this interpretation assumes two forms: something is insofar as it presents itself or is 
capable of presenting itself to a subject - as the present object (ob-jectum) of a sensible intuition or 
as an objectivity present to thought. Second, we may say that a subject (sub-jectum) or self in 
general is only insofar as it is self-present, present to itself in the immediacy of a conscious act. 
The former marks the interpretation of being as objectivity (ousia, physis, etc ... ), the latter as 
subjectivity (parousia, nous etc ... ). The interpretation of being as presence and self-presence 
entails a series of philosophical consequences and conceptual oppositions that persists to the 
present day, and nowhere are these consequences more strikingly evident than in the thought of 
Husserl'. (p.xxxii). 
25 Derrida, Jacques, Writing and Difference. Translated and "ith an Introduction and Additional 
Notes by Alan Bass. Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd, London and New York: 1978, 1990, 1993, 
1995, 1997 (Routledge),p.279. 
~6 Gasche, Rudolphe, Inventions of Difference: On Jacques Derrida. Harvard UniYersity Press. 
Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England: 1995 (second printing), p.36. 
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Of course it is important to grasp from the very outset that it is not Derrida's 
intention to contest this presence, either as it is delineated within Husserlian 
phenomenology or as it is articulated in Western Metaphysics per se; a fact which 
is frequently overlooked by many commentators on Derrida's work who argue 
variously (and often conflictingly) that his deconstructive reading leads to nihilism, 
anarchism, scepticism, historicism and all the other 'isms' which Derrida himself 
so dislikes (and which is why he so pointedly avoids talking of 
decosntructionism).27 Rather, it is Derrida' s intention to show that the decision(s) 
taken in both Husserl's project in particular and in the 'history of meaning' per se 
to determine the meaning of being as presence (subjective, objective, or as in 
HusserI, their unity) effaces, in their respective elidings of the 'problem of 
genesis'28 that archi-synthesis of language, time and the other, whose movement of 
difference and deferral allows being as presence to be thought as such in its 
simultaneous possibility and impossibility. It is this that Derrida will refer to as 
that 'unheard of thought' in 'Violence and Metaphysics'29 as the 'non-Greek non-
foundation' . 
27 The most famous example of such a (collective) mis-reading being the infamous 'Derrida' or 
'Cambridge affair' which saw a group of co-signatories - including Wilfred Van Orman Quine -
contesting Derrida's awarding of an honorary degree at Cambridge University citing his 'semi-
intelligible attacks upon the values of reason, truth, and scholarship'. Their letter was published in 
the London Times on May 9th, 1992. 
28 Which is ultimately the 'problem of the sign' - what I call, after Derrida, the 'differential 
matrix'. 
:C9 The essay 'Violence and Metaphysics' is contained in Derrida's Writing and Difference, op.cit 
1997, pp.79-153. 
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Consequently, in order to show the above and its 'politico' lhistorico significance 
here, I shall first proceed to examine the arguments surrounding Derrida's reading 
of Husserl 's The Origin of Geometry (henceforth in the main to be referred to 
simply as The Origin), not merely because of its chronological priority (for as 
Derrida himself says, The Origin and Speech and Phenomena can be considered 
two sides of the same coin) but because, as Derrida himself puts it in his 1980 
thesis defence: 
Naturally, all the problems worked on in the Introduction to the Origin of 
Geometry have continued to organize the work I have subsequently 
attempted in connection with philosophical, literary and even non-discursive 
corpora, most notably that of pictorial works: I am thinking for example, of 
the historicity of ideal obj ects, of tradition, of inheritance, of filiation or of 
wills and testaments, of archives, libraries, books, of writing and living 
speech, of the relationships between semiotics and linguistics, of the 
question of truth and of undecidability, of the irreducible otherness that 
divides the self-identity of the living present, of the necessity for new 
analysis concerning the non-mathematical idealities. 30 
Accordingly (as Marian Hobson has exactingly pointed out) the articulating 
patterns in his writing (syntax), the circuits of argument and words like 
'differance' and 'deconstruction' - words (or as they are termed lexemes) which 
represent for readers 'points of accumulation of an argument' - find their 
awakening in Derrida's lengthy Introduction to The Origin. In particular, 
Derrida's very conception of the 'history of meaning' as a Western metaphysical 
tradition of presence, and the centrality of the speech/writing binary and the 
philosophy of language common to it - developed more thematically in Speech 
30 Quoted by John P.Leavey in Derrida, Jacques, op.cit, 1989, p.186 (pp.39-40 in the thesis defence 
itself). 
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and Phenomena and more extensively in Of Grammatology - have their 
'grounding' in this proto-deconstructive reading of Husserl 's 1962 text. Despite 
the sometime difficult vocabulary which I shall attempt to render more transparent 
(though never totally: that particular miracle being unachievable), it is always the 
movement of delimitation and excess engendered through the (originary) synthesis 
in the production of meaning without foundation which Derrida seeks to raise to 
theoretical consciousness through what Critchley calls his' double reading'. This 
will, I hope, soon become clear. 
Ditferance at the Origin: Derrida's Introduction to The Origin of Geometry. 
Although Jacques Derrida had not yet coined the neologism 'deconstruction' - a 
neologism whose etymological roots are usually traced back to Heideggarian 
thought (his project of the 'destruction of metaphysics' ) - it is evident from his 
introductory remarks on The Origin that what Geoffrey Bennington calls Derrida's 
'deconstructive reading' is already operating in this text. Indeed, as John P.Leavey 
remarks - though not without some qualification as regards the openness of 
translation and the disruption of the rhythm of anything like 'a' Derridean corpus-
From 1963 to 1968, after the Introduction to The Origin of Geometry, after 
the first thesis on 'The ideality of the literary object' (Jean Hyppolite 
directed), and after the Memoire on 'the problem of genesis in the 
phenomenology of Husserl' ... there is the working out of' a sort of strategic 
device ... an unclosed, unenclosable, not wholly formalisable ensemble of 
rules for reading, interpretation and writing' .31 
31 John P.Leavey in Derrida, Jacques, Ibid, p.186 and including a quote from Derrida's thesis 
'defense': 'The Time ofa Thesis: Punctuations' (in Philosophy in France Today, ed. Alan 
Montefiore, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: 1983). 
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We can see this 'working out' when, after speaking ofHusserl's attempt in his 
1962 appendix to The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental 
Phenomenology to reconcile empirical development (history) with those 
(transcendental) structures which seem to be built into the way we think the world 
- here geometry (but also philosophy) - Derrida states: 
The Origin of Geometry has both a programmatic and exemplary value. 
Consequently, our reading of it must be marked by the exemplary 
consciousness proper to all eidetic attention and be guided by this infinite 
task, from which phenomenology alone can make its way. In this 
introduction we now attempt, our sole ambition will be to recognise and 
situate one stage of Husserl' s thought, with its specific presuppositions and 
its particular unfinished state. Though this moment of Husserl's radicalness 
is ultimate according to the facts, it is perhaps not so de jure. HusserI 
repeatedly appears to agree with this. Therefore, we will always try to be 
guided by his own intentions [ my italics], even when we get caught up in 
certain difficulties. 32 
This 'statement of intent', whereby Derrida will follow Husserl's eidetic (essential) 
descriptions - and the way the principles guiding Husserl in his quest point beyond 
the factual accomplishment in The Origin - is a clear 'methodological' pre-cursor 
for what will become known, on reflection, as 'deconstruction,?3 The so-called 
'difficulties' which Derrida will identify - and which will later be called (among 
other things) aporias and which Husserl himself sets up in his delimiting historical 
reflections - reveals a certain tout autre which transgresses these same limits from 
within: the outside is inside. Thus we might say that Derrida's Introduction 
32 Ibid, p.27. 
33 As Christina Howells concurs 'Derrida studies phenomenology in Paris with Emmanuel Levinas 
and Paul Ricoeur. He considers Husser! to have been one of the major influences on his 
philosophical fonnation ... Indeed, Derrida's whole philosophical programme seems to spring from 
his tussle with phenomenology'. This quote is taken from her excellent book Derrida: 
Deconstruction from Phenomenology to Ethics, op.cit, 1998, 1999. 
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• supplements' The Origin, grafting on to the name of phenomenology something 
'new' which nevertheless seems to write itself - has been 'waiting to be written' -
within the Husserlian text. Consequently I argue that if Derrida can in any sense 
be called 'postmodern' then this can only make sense in terms of his position as a 
quasi-philosopher of the limit, a liminal thinker who reveals an irreducible 
contamination which bifurcates (divides) presence from within whilst at the same 
time allowing presence to be thought. This is what Derrida shows us through 
Husserl, not simply despite him and, in so doing, points to a certain experience of 
the impossible; that is, an experience of the impossibility of establishing a 
foundational ground for meaning. 
More specifically, the 'stage ofHusserl's thought' which Derrida is dealing with 
here is his historical tum which, not unfortuitously, appeared at a time when the 
question of history had taken on added significance for German philosophy. As 
Paul Ricoeur states in his excellent chapter 'Husserl and the Sense of History' : 
The political situation in Germany at that time is visibly in the background of 
this whole course of thought, and in this sense one can surely say that it was 
the very tragedy of history which inclined Husserl to think historically. 
Suspected by the Nazis as a non-Aryan, as a scientific thinker, and more 
fundamentally as a man of Socratic and questioning spirit, the ageing 
Husserl, retired and condemned to silence, could not fail to discover that the 
spirit has a history which is of importance to all history, that the spirit can 
become ill, that history is even a place of danger for the spirit and a place of 
possible failure. This discovery was inevitable, since the sick themselves -
the Nazis - were the ones who were to impose new biological criteria for 
political and spiritual health. In any event, it was through awareness of the 
crisis in the time of National Socialism that Husserl actually entered into 
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history. Out of respect for rationalism, someone had to say who was ill and 
hence to point to the sense and senselessness of man. 34 
Against this background, Husserl perceived in Galileo's inauguration of modern 
science the root of what he termed the general 'crisis' of European sciences and 
more particularly the crisis of philosophy as the universal science (the science of 
science). In Galileo's 'mathematisation of nature', reality is conceived as a 
rational universe accessible to a totally rational - that is mathematical - science. 
In response, modem philosophy had developed along two antithetical lines -
namely objectivism35 and transcendental idealism36 - neither of which Husser! 
regarded as capable of providing an absolute foundation for knowledge since he 
thought they remained within an 'inauthentic' dualistic attitude. In this way 
Husserl takes Galilean geometry as symptomatic of the manner in which 'Western 
man' has lost sight of the 'idea' which makes him what he is; uncoupling science 
from the philosophical aspirations out of which it was born. It is in this connexion 
that Husserl asks: 
Who can still maintain that science has the function of enabling Western man 
to renew himselfunder the idea of his rationality, to lead an authentic 
existence as a rational being, to order freely and reasonably his relations to 
his environment, his fellow-men, and himself. 37 
34 Ricoeur, Paul, Husserl: An Analysis of His Phenomenology, op.cit, 1967, p.l4-4-. 
35 Objectivism is the philosophical doctrine that reality is objectively there and that sense data 
corresponds with it. 
36 Transcendental idealism is a tenn fonnulated by Kant, and is a position which argues that the 
objects of the world have their ordinary properties (their causal powers and their spatial and 
temporal position) only because our minds are so structured that these are the categories we impose 
upon the manifold of experience. 
3 Gurwitsch A, 'The Last Work of Edmund Husserl'. In Studies in Phenomenology and 
Psychology. Northwestern University Press, Evanston: 1966, pp.399-4-4-7. 
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Through the specialisation and technicisation of instrumentalist positivistic 
sciences, human reason - which HusserI reminds us is but a name for' eternal' or 
atemporal ideas and norms (true knowledge, authentic value, good action, etc ... ) -
is excluded from the sciences, whether natural or human. Consequently, it is as a 
result of this exclusion (whereby the status of such ideal obj ects as geometrical 
objects are severed from their origin in the Life-world as products and creations of 
the human mind) that science threatens to lose its significance for human 
existence, spawning umpteen sceptical relativisms or historicisms which deny the 
existence of any and every absolute truth. It is thus HusserI's concern to avoid 
both objectivist and historicist fallacies which, Derrida argues, combine in The 
Origin to form a new schema; revealing on the one hand a new type/profundity of 
historicity in connection with ideal objects and, on the other, the new tools and 
original direction of historical reflection. This is the schema that Derrida seeks to 
follow, moving beyond HusserI's expressed intentions to their logical, aporetic 
'ends', ends leading ultimately (via what might be termed the 'linguistic turn' in 
Derrida's own work) to the re-inscription of the Husserlian 'transcendental' back 
within the differential matrix as the radically historical non-originary origin of 
Western philosophical discourse per se. The Husserlian 'transcendental' is 
helpfully clarified by Marian Hobson as follows: 
For HusserI ... Things transcend our perceptions of them, in that they are over 
against our perception, not in it; that is what makes it always possible for us 
to perceive more, to try to fix our perceptions and make them clearer. So 
that the different ways we see things, the different perspectives in our 
perceptions, are an essential part of the clarifying process not an accidental 
weakness of human constitution (HusserI1931:SS149). The mind stands 
27 
beyond - not in the world, but as a subject for which this world has meaning 
and being. Here, 'transcendental' applies not, as with Kant, to conditions of 
possibility, but implies that the'!, is the concrete source and place of every a 
priori or essential piece of knowledge. 38 
The significance and implications of what Hobson is saying that Husserl is saying 
must be understood; namely, that ifHusserl cannot establish a transcendental 
history purified of all matters of (constituted) fact, chance and ambiguity; if the 
transcendental'!, is not the simple concrete source and place of every a priori or 
essential piece of knowledge but rather both subject and object are constituted 
through the interface of an originary synthesis of language, time and the other 
where meaning is always differing from itself and endlessly deferred, then the 
entire 'history of meaning' - in as far as it has determined the meaning of being as 
presence, as pre-sent - must be called into question. This is why I argue that 
through a double reading ofHusserl's 'phenomenology of history' Derrida is 
thinking something other than history which nevertheless has given the concept of 
'history' (indeed concepts as such, essence(s) as such) the chance to be thought. 
Thus Derrida bespeaks a certain 'end of history' - or better, he speaks of the 
coming to the end of history's ends (of history not having 'ends') - which 
announces itself in that critical epoch which is ours and has been defined by the 
(perennial) problem of language (sign-Ianguage).39 That is, the end of the 'history 
38 Hobson, Marian, Jacques Derrida: Opening Lines. Routledge, London and New York: 1998, 
E· 39. 
9 I say the end of a certain history because while Derrida will speak of the end of a certain 
metaphysical concept of history, the end of history's ends, as he often does he still retains the word 
'history' in order to inscribe its force, but this time cast in tenns of 'a new logic of repetition and 
the tra~e' - this being his radical quasi-philosophy of history which he here develops through his 
deconstructive reading of Husserl. As I will go in to argue in Chapter Two, tins quasi-philosophy 
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of meaning' 'developing itself, producing itself, fulfilling itself' ... linearly ... in a 
straight or circular line' .40 
Geometry and the Problem of History 
As Derrida argues, then, HusserI' s choice of the mathematical/geometrical obj ect 
as the privileged example and most permanent thread guiding his reflections is 
predicated upon it being 'totally transparent' and therefore 'exhausted' by its 
phenomenality: 
Absolutely objective, i.e. totally rid of empirical subjectivity, it nevertheless 
is only what it appears to be. Therefore, it is always already reduced to its 
phenomenal sense, and its being is, from the outset, to be an object [etre-
object] for a pure consciousness. 41 
It is not therefore difficult to understand why, as Leonard Lawlor notes in Derrida 
and Husserl: The Basic Problem of Phenomenology, that 'Husserl' s privilege of 
the mathematical object is the source ofDerrida's concept of presence' .42 It is also 
clear, I think, that the (putative) ideality of the mathematical obj ect appears to -
and indeed does - bring it into immediate conflict with the (f)actuality of a history 
that is, by definition, unique, irreversible and non-iterable. And indeed in The 
Origin, HusserI, starting from the reduction of the factual history of geometry 
of history is perhaps best articulated by Geoff Bennington as a 'politics of memory' which opens, 
as all thinking does, in aporia. (See page 94). 
40 Derrida, Jacques, Positions. The Athlone Press, London: 1987, p.56. To put what I have said 
here slightly differently (and ironically given the subject-matter), Derrida in effect argues that 
realist-representational(ist) discourse ends here, in an epoch wherein language can no longer be 
regarded as delivering up self-pre-sent meaning to (be) thought. To repeat once again, meaning 
remains to made and re-made without limits, without ends. 
41 Derrida, Jacques, Introduction, op.cit, 1989, p.27. 
42 Lawlor, Leonard, Derrida and Husserl: The Basic Problem of Phenomenology. Indiana 
University Press, Bloomington: 2002, p.62. 
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(who said what to whom, where, when, etc ... ) argues that the normative value of 
geometrical truth should be radically independent of its history in order to respect 
and show the 'unique historicity' of the ideal object itself. At the same time, 
however, Derrida will argue that HusserI also has to respect the singularity of 
history since he himself argues, contra Kant, that geometry happened for a 'first 
time': geometry is instantly historicised. Again Lawlor is very clear on this point 
too: 
Even though, as Derrida stresses, this 'first time' act must include a strata of 
receptive intuition, it is still a production (Leistung) ... Even though, for 
HusserI, geometrical ideal objectivities such as triangularity must arise out of 
non-geometrical objectivities, they did not exist as such before this 
'experience'. As non-revelatory, geometry's original experience cannot not 
be a 'total fact'. It must bear the characteristics of uniqueness ('unicite', as 
Derrida says), irreversibility, and irreplaceability ... ; a creation happens only 
once. Although this 'only once' would seem to preclude access for 
phenomenology to history, it does not, according to Derrida. 43 
And the reason 'not' is that Husserl will argue that the non-repeatable fact brings 
into history what can be wilfully and indefinitely repeated as an 'essence of the 
first time' which excludes empirical individuality but includes the individuality in 
general of a thing, the sense of the fact which is the repeatability of the non-
repeatable. So for example, when a triangle was experienced for the first time, it 
was not simply 'this triangle' but the 'essence' of triangularity which was 
experienced and allowed it to be identified as such. When someone draws a 
triangle on the blackboard or makes it out of stones, or traces it in the air, it is not 
the marks on the blackboard, or the stones on the ground, or the movement of their 
43 Ibid, p.62. 
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finger which makes of the triangle what it is; in all three cases it is the 'essence' of 
the triangle, its triangle-ness, general and essential, which makes it understandable 
as such, which gives it its 'sense'. Thus HusserI will argue that the 'ideal object' 
has historicity - the always inter-subjective consciousness of history - as one of its 
components. The same object can be experienced and identified in its (es)sense 
over time; the conditions of objectivity are the conditions of historicity itself. The 
paradox that therefore confronts HusserI's phenomenological inquiry (and leads to 
its undoing) - whereby reason is historical only on the condition that it escapes the 
empirical ground of history - is thus above all (and this must be stressed) what 
interests Derrida in his Introduction, seeing the dialectic between phenomena and 
Idea necessitated by an originary lack of self-present Truth which undercuts 
phenomenology's 'principle of principles' and bifurcates the 'history of meaning'. 
It is here that the priority of presence over the sign - as it is articulated in an 
exemplary way in HusserI' s phenomenology - is called into question (calling into 
question the question). For having dismissed both the concept of a Platonic realm 
of ideas and the fallacy of historicism/empiricism, HusserI turns to language. 
Language and Truth: 'The Most Interesting Difficulty' 
The 'problem of language' is raised for Derrida (it is, he thinks, the 'most 
interesting difficulty' of The Origin of Geometry) when, suspending the actual 
description of the origin of geometry as such, HusserI answers the question as to 
how the subjective, intra-mental evidence of sense - i.e. the geometrical structure I 
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have in my head for the first time, the sense-structure of the geometrical object-
becomes objective and inter-subjective by arguing: 'the broadest concept of 
literature,.44 As Derrida points out, language is used by Husser! to initially 
consider the very nature of ideality within a three-tier structure of ideal objectivity; 
namely, that of the word, of the intentional content, and, crucially for Husserl, of 
the object itself. The ideal objectivity of geometry is absolute and without any 
kind of limit. Thus as Derrida states: 
... For Husserl. .. 'The broadest concept of literature' comprises all ideal 
formations, since, in order to be such, they must always be capable of being 
expressible in discourse and translatable, directly or not, from one language 
into another. In other words, ideal formations are rooted only in language in 
general, not in the factuality of languages and their particular linguistic 
incarnations. 45 
Husserl is thus bracketing out empirical language and culture - French or German, 
Russian or Anglo-American - in order to let the originality of 'transcendental 
language' come to light, an in-formation of such ideal objectivity within a 'pure 
language in general'. Geometrical truth relies on this pure and essential linguistic 
possibility if it is not to remain 'ineffable and solitary'. As Derrida argues, speech 
is thus no longer a supplement to an already constituted presence, to an ob-ject 
already given in completion to and for the subject. Instead, speech is the concrete, 
juridical condition of truth, and its paradoxical re-internment of absolute ideal 
objectivity back into language and history - which simultaneously frees this sense 
at the same time as it contaminates its ideal purity - is precisely the 'difficulty' or 
44 Husser! is quoted in Derrida, Jacques, Introduction, op.cit, 1989, p.66. 
45 Ibid, p.66. 
32 
(what Derrida will come to call) the aporia. As he will argue, the 'transcendental' 
must thus be rethought in terms of an essential contamination of the empirico-
transcendental difference. 46 
At which point what is of most interest to Derrida is that the very possibility of 
transcendental language is co-extensive with intersubjectivity (with the relation 
with the other). Pure language (that is the possibility of language in general I 
pointed to a moment ago) requires consciousness of being-in-community, and 
being-in-community requires pure language. At the same time, both require, or 
pre-suppose, the horizon and unity of one and the same world - as the one, 
infinitely open totality of possible experiences. Without the knowledge that we are 
before one and the same world individuals separated across vast expanses of time 
and space could not be sure that they were before the same 'thing' and something 
like a geometrical tradition or tradition of truth in general could not be assured. 
However, as Derrida will argue at this point, it is precisely this which produces a 
number of problems which remain un-thought in The Origin and which threaten 
Husserl's whole teleological philosophy of history with ruination. 
The first problem for Husserl, then, is what he terms 'adult normality' as the 
horizon of civilisation; this is the 'privileged example', as opposed to the young, 
the mad or the infirm. Thus one group becomes exemplary, essential, as one 
46 Once again and in other words, the ground or 'foundation' of meaning must be re-thought in 
ways which re-cognise the always im-possible condition of meaning and being, whereby the world 
always remains to be thought, always resists every attempt at closure. 
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'empirical and factual modification ... is pretending to be a universal norm'. 47 
Without a yardstick to measure 'normality' it is simply assumed by Husser! to be 
that of two 'grown' men of sound mind and body (whatever that may mean), thus 
foregrounding the added complication that Husser! has already pointed out in other 
parts of his work, that one can never have knowledge of the other's lived 
experience (one can never get inside of the others head and confirm s/he has the 
same experience as '1' do). The second problem is that two essential limits are 
posed by Husserl. First, Derrida notes Husser!' s inability to solve the problem of 
the possibility of a 'pure grammar' and 'a priori norms' of language, quickly 
proceeding to the problem of Husserl 's postulation of a pure natural existent - the 
same (life-) world, the earth itself - as that which guarantees translatability and 
grounds the consciousness of the pure 'we'. For as Derrida argues (and as the 
necessity of the reduction and return inquiry (backward glance) implies) pre-
cultural pure nature is, very precisely, always already buried. There are no 
absolute or purely objective objects as such - least of all natural ones - the 
consequence being that we can never overcome singular, cultural differences and 
be before 'one and the same world'. This does not (incidentally) preclude 
translation between readings of this one world, or mean that the attempt at 
univocity should be abandoned (for in that case there would be no history in the 
absence of some kind of universal communication and understanding), rather, the 
upshot is that non-communication and misunderstanding are the very horizon of 
47 Derrida, Jacques, Introduction, op.cit, 1989, p.80. 
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culture and language - the possibility and impossibility of communication and of 
understanding themselves. As the postal metaphor(s) Derrida often invokes 
suggests, the possibility that a letter may be lost, damaged, cast adrift in circulation 
or indeed mis-read or read by someone else, are part of its very readability in 
infinitum. Neither the finitude of the sender nor the receiver can be overcome as 
meaning is cast adrift in circulation as a 'wild singularity' which ultimately resists 
the teleological imperative as a certain irreducible excess. When I receive a letter I 
may understand it, but I can never know what it really means even if the sender is 
still alive and I can broach the question with them - for the sender is always 
already the receiver of things 'before' them, even in the act of writing. The 
significance of this for both subjective and objective presence is already becoming 
clear: everything always escapes closure - both 'front' and 'back', 'before' and 
'after'. No beginnings - no ends. 
At the Beginning: Language, Time and the Other 
That language and intersubjectivity (relation with the other) - both of which are 
spatial - are revealed by Husserl to be co-dependent on a temporalisation which, in 
the first place, is operative at the level of intra-subjectivity and productive of an 
ideality across different moments of the same subject means, for Derrida, the 
possibility of a greatly more radical historicity (in terms of self-creations and 
human solidarities) than Husserl's phenomenology of history envisages, coming as 
he does to recognise not the historicity of sense but that historicity is sense, is 
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passage (this passage being the always imperfect, ambiguous path of meaning). 
Anticipating much of his work in Speech and Phenomena, Derrida reads in 
Husserl's description of the inner historicity of (an ideal) sense - where the same 
sense is recalled and anticipated in the Living present of a Transcendental Subject 
- a radical alterity which bifurcates the Living Present while giving it to be 
thought; the Living Present, for Husserl, being the ultimate form which seeks to 
tame a (wild) genesis (becoming). For Husserl's phenomenology draws attention 
not just to the consciousness of delay - the originary experience of the essence of 
the geometrical obj ect, say, lapsing into the just past and then becoming further 
and further past and only existing through the present recollection of its 'identity' 
and the anticipation of more of the same - but consciousness as delay. Here we 
find an extended articulation of the irreducible structural genesis of meaning, as 
subject and object are constituted in a trace-structure without beginning (all 
reflection - by definition - on an 'originary' experience or evidence admitting an 
irreducible absence of the ob-ject and the subjects own self-presence) and without 
end (it being an infinite ideal- more on this later), which takes on an added 
significance after Husserl's discussion of the necessity of the written as well as the 
spoken sign in the constitution of truth. Hence here, at the 'beginning', we can no 
longer speak of identity and difference but only and 'forever' of identity in 
difference; always differing from and deferring 'itself ad infinitum. 
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From Speech to Writing: 'The Most Difficult Problem' 
And so concerned (as he is all along) to show the way in which foundational 
thinking of whatever kind is always contaminated by a certain irreducible excess (a 
certain looseness - a certain 'play') which prevents any fixity, which prevents any 
closure, and turning from 'the most interesting difficulty' of The Origin to its 
'most difficult problem' - the 'move' from speech to writing - Derrida examines 
the paradox whereby an absolutely ideal objectivity free from every factual subject 
and community in general is bound to be written. For spoken language only frees 
ideal objectivity from individual subjectivity to leave it dependent on the 
instituting community, that of the first geometers, meaning that it would remain 
relative to this community and inevitably die with it. Freed from actual 
subjectivity in general, freed from actual evidence for a real subject, and freed 
from actual circulation within a determinate community, only writing can assure 
absolute objectivity in its relation to a universal transcendental subjectivity. That 
Husserl suggests here that writing makes up for a 'lack' of persisting truth at the 
origin is critical and must be noted. Writing is the necessary supplement to truth, 
it produces presence by delivering it from the place of its utterance in a specific 
individual or a specific community. In other words, writing (permanence) takes 
the place of the Platonic realm of ideas without (in Husserl's view) falling into 
speculative metaphysics. For Husserl the 'body of writing' is a spiritual body, 
alive with the animating intentions of the author (with the necessary presumption 
that when I write I know what I mean and mean what I say). Not that truth's 
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ontological sense is now seen to derive solely from its factual linguistic 
incarnations by way of some sort of pernicious relativism, rather' graphic 
possibility' frees ideality in the first place. It is the nature of this paradox - namely 
that truth is bound to be free - that once more interests Derrida here, as the sign 
itself appears to move on to centre stage and, at that very moment, be 
simultaneously thrown into crisis. 
Death and the Transcendental 
That the necessity of 'consignment' - ultimately in terms of the written sign -
unites death to the transcendental by ensuring the possibility of the repetition to 
infinity of the same sense after my death, marks for Derrida the moment when 
what had been at times considered a factual event is made into a transcendental 
condition of possibility for both absolute objectivity and transcendental 
subjectivity to appear; my intentions must survive me and be re-cognised and 
fulfilled by other (transcendental) subjects, any time, any where. But this is not 
without its 'dangers'. As Rudolf Bernet perceptively writes in 'On Derrida's 
Introduction to Husserl' s Origin of Geometry': 
.,. writing generates an anonymous and 'autonomous transcendental field' 
which is comparable to the ego-less 'field of consciousness' described by A. 
Gurwitsch on the basis of his phenomenology of perception. Writing 
promotes intellectual flexibility in the cultural world which always already 
embraces us and upon which we can only impress a personal stamp by 
exerting considerable creative force. But the anonymity and the 
independence of writing also makes possible a radical loss of sense, the 
burying of the intentions and the cultural world of the author, or the 
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indecipherability of a stone inscription. Because of this possibility of radical 
loss writing confronts us with 'the transcendental sense of death' as no other 
phenomenon does. Perhaps we must even say that transmission and the loss 
of sense do not simply hold the balance of writing but rather that the very 
possibility of loss contributes to the significance of the text in a quite 
essential way. 48 
And as Derrida himself argues: 
The silence of prehistoric arcane and buried civilisations, the entombment of 
lost intentions and guarded secrets, and the intelligibility of the lapidary 
inscription disclose the transcendental sense of death as what unites things to 
the absolute privilege of intentionality in the very instance of its essential 
juridical failure. 49 
It may appear that Husserl's phenomenology - essentially a philosophy of Life - is 
thus threatened by the course of his own description which, in the constitution of 
truth through writing, admits a danger to meaning from what is outside of the sign 
- hence the current 'crisis'. As Derrida states: 'In the moment of writing, the sign 
can always "empty" itself, take flight from awakening, from "re-activation", and 
may remain forever closed and mute'. 50 And as Peter Fenves argues, for Husserl: 
An indefinite 'taking flight' would be the fate of reason's 'higher products', 
including the ideal objects of geometry, if reason were not from its inception 
teleological; if, therefore, its end and purpose were not the rediscovery and 
recovery of its origin. But history can then have no other subject than 
meaning, and meaning must be recovered after all - after, that is, the 
dangerous epoch of writing. An inquiry into the history of geometry, for 
example, could never begin ifit did not take the telos of history - 'the sense 
[of geometry] as we now know it' (0,50) - for its starting point; otherwise it 
could never be sure that the same things were experienced under the same 
names over an indefinite extent of time and across an indefinite expanse of 
space. And if the history of geometry is exemplary, this is true of the history 
of reason in particular and history as such: whatever happens, the danger to 
48 Bernet, Rudolf, <On Husser!' s Introduction to The Origin of Geometry'. In Hugh Silvennann 
(Ed) Derrida and Deconstruction. Routledge, London and New York: 1989, p.1-l5. 
49 Derrida, Jacques, Introduction, op.cit, 1989. p.88. 
50 Derrida, Jacques, Wr;ring and Difference, op.cit, 1997, p.166. 
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meaning will have been arrested after all. 51 
For Derrida, however, writing's 'ambiguous value' and the transcendental sense of 
death which has a constituting value for all language, cannot be effaced by such a 
teleology which seeks to reduce writings equivocation. The necessary readability 
(that is to say iterabi lity ( repetition)) of marks in different contexts, constitutes 
both the chance for the transmission of meaning and the necessary possibility of its 
failure: I can never control or anticipate the future context(s) within which such 
marks will be read. In fact, I can never be sure that I have the same sense of 
geometry as the other (however minimal the difference in time and distance in 
space may be). That forgetfulness and/or loss of sense - or at least ambiguity-
seems to be part of the necessary constitution of sense or meaning, is to be 
affirmed in the course ofHusserl's own argument. In the first place, although 
Husserl rules out the hypothesis of a death of sense in general within the individual 
consciousness (which itself remains contentious) he makes clear that the 
permanence and virtual presence of sense only announces ideal objectivity which 
'there' requires speech and writing. As Derrida says at this point, 'Profound 
forgetfulness therefore extends into the spaces of intersubjectivity and the distance 
between communities' .52 In other words, from the very beginning' crisis' is both a 
risk and a chance for making meaning which cannot be overcome. Of course for 
Derrida this is a good thing, an affirmative condition: meanings must always be 
51 Fenves, Peter, 'Derrida and History'. In Jacques Derrida and the Humanities: A Critical Reader. 
Edited by Tom Cohen. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: 2001, p.284. 
52 Derrida, Jacques, Introduction, op.cit, 1989. p.93. 
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capable of being re-made: closure permanently recedes. But for Husserl it is not; 
such equivocality must be overcome otherwise knowledge wobbles. Thus, in the 
second place, while for Husserl the burning of the 'world-wide library' would not 
effect the ontological sense (truth) of an ideal object like triangularity, the fact that 
Husserl argues 'truth' must be consigned in order to 'be' (being an ob-ject rather 
than an in-itself or a 'pure spiritual interiority') implies, for Derrida, that such a 
catastrophe would effect all the senses - bound or free. For although, as Derrida 
argues, the materiality of the sign may not constitute what the sign 'is', as 'Husserl 
clearly [ says] (c )orporeality is indispensable to it'. 53 That Hussed makes writing 
not just a sensible phenomenon but at the same time a living flesh, therefore makes 
it hard to understand how writing could save its (spiritual) meaning from worldly 
disaster. Accordingly it is only by subsequently evacuating the material body from 
the 'essence' of the sign that Husserl can claim that the danger to sense is in the 
intellectuality of the flesh; the intentional act itself. Forgetfulness of truth is thus 
not radical for Hussed but an abdication of responsibility which his 
phenomenology seeks to overcome. This responsibility is a co-responsibility on 
the part of the reader and writer whose imperative should be univocity. Ideally a 
word or term should have one unambiguous, unmistakable meaning. Ironically, it 
'never' does ... that's 'for sure' ... 
53 Ibid, p.94. 
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The History of Meaning: Between Husserl and Joyce 
The notion of univocal expression as it has just been considered is critical for 
HusserI in that the unity of history is only given in so far as ideal objects break the 
surface. In other words - and to put this as plainly as I can - only if univocal 
expressions remain the same and carry an identical meaning across the whole 
becoming of culture( s), can communication across generations and the exactitude 
of translation be assured. Univocity, for HusserI, retains 'pure sense' within the 
flux of historical change as intellectual intuition; as the logos itself. Consequently, 
it is important to emphasise here (to re-emphasise) that Derrida does not, as some 
have argued, deny the importance ofunivocity.54 Rather, and in a move which 
opens the ethico-political space of deconstruction, the impossibility of languages' 
univocity necessitates the infinite task of a reduction to the making of sense which 
must be begun over and over again - interminably; neither pure univocity or pure 
equivocity make a history. John D. Caputo helpfully summarises much of this in 
his excellent Deconstruction in a Nutshell where he writes: 
54 TIlls 'fact' contradicting accusations by the likes of Cambridge Professor of Philosophy Simon 
Blackburn, who, in an ill-informed and ill-judged summary of Derridean thinking, contrasted pro-
Derridean 'hey nonny porno tendencies' with that 'objectivity' and 'truth' guarded by old stalwarts 
such as the historian Geoffrey Elton. Blackburn went on to argue that the kind of textual analysis 
promoted by Derrida saw objects like a speed bump being read in terms of the 'charged subset of 
letters it contains' - namely B-U-M. TIus clearly nllsses what Simon Critchley has tenned the 
'patient, rigorous and scholarly' reconstruction of a text which comprises an important part of any 
deconstructive reading (the other part, of course, opening this same te:\1 to the so-called 'blind-
spots' it contains. Surely the very model of critical thinking?) Blackburn and Critchley's articles 
both appeared in the November 12th 2004 issue of the The Times Higher as part of a series of 
articles on the Derridean legacy. 
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Trying to trace the historical genesis or constitution of ideal meaning, 
Husser! insisted upon 'the imperative of univocity' ... that the same words 
bear the same meaning across time, that later generations be able to repeat 
and reactivate exactly the same sense, in order thereby to allow 
communication and, hence, progress among generations of investigators. 
The opposite conception is Joyce's, which locates history in releasing every 
buried association in language, in loading every vocable, word, and sentence 
with the highest possible amount of associative potential, which cultivates 
rather than avoids plurivocity, so that history lurches forward in a labyrinth, 
a 'nightmare' of equivocation. 55 
Thus where for Caputo (and in fact Derrida ), James Joyce in Ulysses56 attempts to 
recollect all empirical cultural meanings in one book (focusing on the 'passive 
associative resonances' and 'ignoring the translatable cores'), Husser! seeks to 
precisely reduce factual or empirical language to its translatable cores in order to 
render the pure structure of history visible; the invariables among the variables. 
Derrida - and this is a key pOint to retain - clearly sees the limitations in both 
ideas: untamed equivocality would mean that the very 'text of repetition' would be 
unintelligible while, on the other, perfect univocity could only lead to paralysis and 
sterility in the 'indefinite repetition of the same'. Consequently, only a 
relationship, only a differential tension between the two, can guarantee a 'history' 
as such. As Caputo puts this, again very sharply: 
55 Caputo, John D., Deconstruction in a Nutshell: A Conversation with Jacques Derrida. Fordham 
University Press, New York: 1997, p.183. 
56 Of this book Derrida states' ... in 1956-57, I spent a year at Harvard, and what I did there was to 
read Joyce in the Widener Library, which provided my encounter with Ulysses. Since then, Joyce 
has represented for me the most gigantic attempt to gather in a single work, that is, in the 
singularity of a work which is irreplaceable, in a singular event ... the presumed totality, not only of 
one culture but of a number of cultures, a number of languages, literatures, and religions'. Derrida 
in Caputo, John, Ibid, p.25. (James Joyce's Ulysses, as referred to by Caputo and Derrida, is 
published by Random House, New York: 1961). 
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Deconstruction - as usual- situates itself in the distance between these two 
[between univocity and equivocation.]. It does not renounce the constitution 
of meaning and the transmission of scientific ideas, even while it inscribes 
ideality in the flux of writing, for the sphere of ideal meaning is always 
already forged from below, as an effect of the play of traces. Deconstruction 
is a certain HusserIianism, a theory of the constitution of meaning and 
ideality, but one that is always already exposed to a certain Joyceanism, to 
the irrepressible anarchy of signifiers, the unmasterable, anarchic event of 
archi-ecriture. For textuality or ecriture sees to it that we are at best able to 
put together certain unstable and contingent unities of 'meaning', certain 
effects of the differential play of traces that, with a lick and a promise, may 
get us through the day, that are only as good as the work they do and only for 
the while that they do it, before they give way to more felicitous effects and 
more successful convergences, before they are taken up into 'higher' but into 
different and more felicitous configurations. 57 
That the only two 'limit' cases in which univocity could be imagined prove self-
defeating merely serves, for Derrida, to confirm the auto-deconstruction of 
HusserI's attempt to establish a transcendental history. In the first 'limit case', 
absolute univocity would be assured by the proper name in its designation of a 
singular, natural 'object'. But, as Derrida argues, for that to happen, such a 'word' 
would have to be a 'pure' ideal or universal. But, because any such 'univocity' 
necessitates translation (that is, the ability of the same sense to be communicated 
from emitter to receiver) the word must be uttered 'in the world' which 
immediately places it 'in a culture, in a network of linguistic relations and 
oppositions which would load the word with intentions or virtual reminiscences,58: 
univocality is therefore ruined. As noted above, Derrida has already argued that 
pure nature is 'always already' buried. In the second such 'limit case', the 
possibility of univocity would be tied to the possibility of a trans-cultural 
57 Ibid, p.183. 
58 Derrida, Jacques, Introduction, op.cit, 1989, p.103. 
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objectivity like that of the geometrical object. Again, Derrida sees this 
'possibility' to be simultaneously an 'impossibility', since the ideal object is 
'always already' inscribed within an ever changing system of relations. This 
interminable' iterability', this incessant repetition of the ideal object in 
innumerable and unforeseen contexts, therefore makes the object both 'irreducibly 
relational' and tied to the context within which it is (each time) realised. As 
Derrida thus argues, that every univocal attempt always falls into 'some singular 
placings in perspective, some multiple interconnections of sense, and therefore 
some mediate and potential aims,59, precludes absolute univocity while giving it its 
very chance. Since all objects must be 'consigned', and since words and language 
per se can never be absolute and unambiguous, then there can never 'be' pure 
translatability and pure community. The phenomenological 'absolute' is caught up 
in interminable mediation which contaminates its ideal purity - the' differential 
matrix' is thus' confrrmed' . 'Absolutely' ! 
The Limitations ofHusserl's Idea 
That Husserl thinks it is possible to 'idealize away' this relativity ofunivocity and 
plurivocity by instituting absolute univocity as an infinite task in line with an Idea 
in the Kantian sense thus marks, for Derrida, the very specific tension which opens 
up phenomenology as a dialectic between its 'principle of principles' - the 
'definite thing' present in person - and its final institution, the infinite Idea as an 
59 Ibid p.104. 
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always deferred Telos. As John P. Leavey pertinently remarks in his preface to 
Derrida's Introduction: 
The dialectic of these two, phenomenon and Idea, is what Derrida seems to 
feel implicitly guided HusserI in his reflections on historicity, and a study of 
Derrida's commentary reveals what happens when these implications are 
made explicit.60 
Moreover, HusserI evokes the Idea and the type of idealisation which produces it -
which he calls Reason - not only to help deal with the problems of equivocity and 
finitude in the actualisation of sense, but also to describe the origin and infinite 
progress of geometry itself. For Derrida this recourse to the Idea in the Kantian 
sense at certain difficult moments ofHusserI's description creates a difficulty in 
that the origin of idealisation cannot be determined by an intuition. As Geoffrey 
Bennington pertinently argues: 
... the Idea ... allows Husserl to think the transcendental as in some sense 
essentially historical ('transcendental historicity'), and yet itself escapes 
phenomenological analysis - for the watch-word of phenomenology, 'to the 
things themselves', is inoperative in the case of the Idea in the Kantian sense, 
which works just where the 'thing itself is by definition inaccessible to full 
intuition. The Idea-in-the-Kantian sense, then, has a paradoxical status in 
these late HusserI texts, providing phenomenology with a vital resource for 
thinking the relation between the transcendental and the empirical, and yet 
itself perpetually escaping phenomenological grasp.61 
That the infinity of interconnections between ideas/things cannot be intuited, 
introduces an irreducible absence into the plenitude or 'full-ness' of experience as 
the promise of unity can only be experienced as its impossibility through a certain 
experience of language as the 'un-safe house of truth'. Because the interminable 
60 Ibid, p.lO. 
61 Bennington, Geoffrey, Interrupting Derrida. Routledge, London and New York: 2000, p.185. 
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iterability of any sense-structure necessarily implies the possibility of alterity, then 
the possibility of 'presence' is contaminated by an essential finitude which heralds 
a 'radical other' who/which escapes positive determination. This radical other is 
(first of all) an 'other in me', an absolute past which opens on to an absolute future 
which always calls upon me to decide, to make sense, but to do so each time in a 
new way, in order to do justice to all that falls silent in the process - those unheard 
of possibilities both past and still to come. Consequently (and this is crucial for 
my 'thesis' to note), it is here that Derrida's early work plentifully foreshadows 
what he will come to call a 'democracy to come' and the 'messianic call' which 
calls forth the decision itself. The inability to determine meaning absolutely; the 
inability to 'gather' the history of meaning in the unity of the (transcendental) 
subject who makes sense of the world (for which the world 'is'); the fact that 
meaning is generated across an interminable process of signification (such that all 
meaning is structured like a language) in terms of an originary synthesis of 
language, time and the other - without beginning and without (ends) - all this is 
the opening of an 'infinite' Justice as a radical responsibility to the other. 
Speech and Phenomena: Touching the Void, the Voice of 'Truth' 
Having discovered through his reading of The Origin of Geometry that HusserI 
fails to make the sign derivative to presence since Truth requires writing in order 
to achieve absolute ideal objectivity and all the problems that brings, Derrida now 
equates 'the problem of the sign' in Husserl's philosophy to that of the voice; a 
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move which can be seen to motivate his subsequent analysis in Of Grammatology 
of the speech/writing binary as the founding opposition of what he comes to term 
(in Speech and Phenomena) the Western 'metaphysics of presence'. Indeed by 
way of a 'summary', in 'Implications: Interview with Henri Ronse' (published in 
Positions), Derrida says of Speech and Phenomena: 
... in it is posed, at a decisive point which appears juridicially decisive for 
reasons that I cannot explain here, the question of the privilege of the voice 
and of phonetic writing in their relationship to the entire history of the 
metaphysics, and metaphysics in its most modern, critical, and vigilant form: 
HusserI's transcendental phenomenology. What is 'meaning', what are its 
historical relationships to what is purportedly identified under the rubric 
'voice' as a value of presence, presence of the object, presence of meaning to 
consciousness, self-presence in the so-called living speech and self-
consciousness? The essay which asks these questions can also be read as the 
other side (recto or verso, as you wish) of another essay, published in 1962, 
as the introduction to HusserI's The Origin of Geometry. In this essay the 
problematic of writing was already in place as such, bound to the irreducible 
structure of 'deferral' in its relationships to consciousness, presence, science, 
history and the history of science, the disappearance or delay of origin 
t 62 e c ... 
It is this privileging of speech over writing that is central to Derrida's 
deconstructive reading of Husseri. For we can now see, moving on to a brief -
though important - analysis ofDerrrida's subsequent reading ofHusserl's 
'philosophy of language', the way in which the drive to efface the originary 
synthesis (sans origin) of language, time and the other in HusserI's 
phenomenology, is orientated by the absolute privilege granted to the most 
intimate, ordinary, everyday experience - namely hearing oneself speak; the way 
this seemingly 'natural' commonplace has orientated an entire history of meaning 
62 Derrida, Jacques, Positions. Translated and Annnotated by Alan Bass. The Athlone Press, 
London: 1987, p.5. 
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of which Husserlian phenomenology is the raison d'etre, and which is now, 
arguably, coming to an 'end'. Accordingly, it is to this crucial aspect in Derrida 
that I now tum. 
Derrida, the Living Present and the 'Privileged Concept of the Sign' 
It is in his Introduction to Speech and Phenomena, then, that Derrida announces 
his intention to return to HusserI's Logical Investigations (one ofDerrida's 
earliest works) in order to show, as David B. Allison accurately states in his 
'Translators Introduction', how the whole of phenomenology is implied in a 
reflection upon language; how a discussion of meaning, expression, grammar and 
logic - the themes of the Investigations - will anticipate and later decide the 
forthcoming 'transcendental problems'. Proceeding to engage in a deconstruction 
of the essence of phenomenology Derrida will use - as we will see shortly - the 
'difference' within the sign between 'expression' and 'indication' as the lever for 
his reading of the entire framework ofHusserl's thought in terms of what Derrida 
will identify as the constitutive and unquestioned metaphysical pre-supposition; 
presence or the living present. For what is at issue for Derrida in the 'privileged 
example of the sign' is 
... to see the phenomenological critique of metaphysics betray itself as a 
moment within the history of metaphysical assurance. Better still, our 
intention is to begin to confirm that the recourse to phenomenological 
critique is metaphysics itself, restored to its original purity in its historical 
achievement. 63 
63 Derrida, Jacques, Speech and Phenomena, op.cit, 1973. p.5. 
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Despite HusserI's claim to have avoided speculative metaphysics, it is clear to 
Derrida that he does not (can not) actually renounce metaphysics per se, but only 
the 'degenerative' schemas which have remained blind to what he terms the 
'authentic mode of ideality'. In repeating the Platonic gesture which inaugurates 
Western onto-theology, HusserI tries to bring us to an experience of presence -
both subjective and objective - in the form of the living present. And yet, 
typically, Derrida is concerned not merely to show how HusserI is 'taken' by the 
'metaphysics of presence' - led there precisely by the inescapable necessity that all 
experience occur within the form of the living present - but how he is concerned to 
bring out an irreducible necessity that amounts to a 'discontinuous and irruptive 
change of terrain from Western metaphysics' .64 In a move which reveals the same 
aporias which beset HusserI's later 'historical phenomenology' as present at the 
very outset of his Investigations (indeed they open up phenomenological space) 
Derrida argues: 
... phenomenology seems ... tormented, if not contested from within, by its 
own descriptions of the movement of temporalisation and of the constitution 
of inter -subj ectivity. At the heart of what ties together these two decisive 
moments of description we recognise an irreducible non-presence, a non-self 
belonging to the living present, an ineradicable non-primordiality.65 
This is the 'other of philosophy' which is no longer 'its' other but the condition of 
possibility and impossibility for presence, the Living present, to be thought. This 
'non-site' can no longer be constrained by a determinate arch-telos, but rather is 
64 Derrida, Jacques, 'The Ends of Man'. In "Hargins of Philosophy. Translated by Alan Bass. 
Harvester Wheatsheaf, Herts: 1982, p.l35. 
65 Derrida. Jacques, Speech and Phenomena, op.cit, 1973, p.6-7. 
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the place (without it ever 'taking place') where the closure of metaphysics can be 
solicited and opened to the future, to what is to come. Thus it is that the re-
inscription of the empirico-transcendental difference traced in Derrida's 
Introduction to The Origin in syntactic and thematic form (that is in terms of the 
pattern of ideas and Derrida's meditation on the difference and deferral of a truth 
constituted (ultimately) through writing) finds lexematic form in Speech and 
Phenomena in terms of differ-a-nce and the trace; words which give 'names' to the 
impossibi lity of fixing any meaning( s) outside of the play of differences (pre-
figuring the expansion of the very concept of writing in terms of Derrida' s 
ecriture). It is this movement of the originary synthesis of language, time and the 
other, which I have already called in this study the' differential matrix', the axiom 
underwriting Derrida's position. 
The distinction HusserI wishes to draw, within language, between indication and 
expression is thus critical for Derrida here, as the absolute privileging of 
'expression over indication' HusserI creates ensures his (definitive) concepts of 
sense, objectivity, truth, intuition and perception. For as Derrida will show, if this 
distinction can not (and it cannot) be maintained; if expression is always trapped in 
an indicative web (which it is) then, from the very start, the whole ofHusserl's 
Phenomenology will be delimited by its own 'internal' logic. It is thus that 
Derrida wishes to make the tension between gesture and statement appear in terms 
of a certain 'experience of the impossible' which undercuts or 'deconstructs' not 
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only the HusserIian project but the Western tradition of presence per se; an 
experience which Derrida comes to define as the 'least bad definition of 
deconstruction itself. 66 
Sense, Expression and the Reduction of Indication: The Nerve ofHusserI's 
Demonstration 
When opening his analysis of language, HusserI had stated that 'every sign is a 
sign for something, but not every sign has 'meaning', a 'sense' that the sign 
expresses' .67 So it is by virtue of this stipulation that expressions - which carry a 
meaning which is present as the signified content - are distinguished from 
indications - movements of empirical association. For while not being without 
signification, indicative signs (indications) have no inherent sense, rather they 
point away from themselves to another object or state of affairs, for example, 
smoke indicates the presence of a flfe. Not only that, for HusserI all relations 
share the' common circumstance' that a belief in the existence of one thing 
motivates a belief in another - a psychological association. As Derrida expresses 
this point: 
... it will then be quickly seen that, for HusserI, the expressiveness of 
expression - which always supposes the ideality of a Bedeutung - has an 
irreducible tie to the possibility of spoken language (Rede). An expression is 
a purely linguistic sign, and it is precisely this that in the first analysis 
distinguishes it from an indicative sign. Although spoken language is a 
highly complex structure, always containing in fact an indicative stratum, 
66 This is a sentiment he e:\.l'resses in 'Afterw.rds, at least, less than a letter about a letter less'. In 
Afterwords. Edited by Nicholas Royle and translated by Geoffrey Bennington. Outside Books, 
Tampere, Finland: 1992, pp.197-203. 
67 Derrida, Jacques, Speech and Phenomena, op.cit, 1973, p.23. 
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which, as we will see, is difficult to confine within its limits, HusserI has 
nonetheless reserved for it the power of expression exclusively - and thereby 
pure logicality ... a speaking subject expressing himself. .. about something, 
means or wants to say something. One would thus be assured that the 
meaning (Bedeutung) is always what a discourse or somebody wants to say. 
What is conveyed then, is always a linguistic sense, a discursive content. 68 
It is thus that John Sallis in his 'Doublings' (in Derrida: A Critical Reade~9 ) 
argues that whatever falls outside of intention HusserI will exclude from the sphere 
of expression, this coming to include facial expressions, gestures, the whole of the 
body and of mundane inscription - in other words the whole of the visible and 
spatial order as such. HusserI is therefore not just drawing a boundary between 
language and non-language but a boundary within language, 'between the 
voluntary, transparent, self-present' - the meaning that I intend here and now -
and the involuntary, external, non-self-present - i.e. the look on my face, the 
movement of my hand, the marks on a page. The essence of language is revealed 
and enclosed in the' citadel of Geist', which is to say, in pure spiritual intention. 
Despite the fact that HusserI is forced to recognise that the difference he draws at 
this first stage is more functional than substantial - not least because in 
communicative speech expression is always interwoven with an indicative relation 
- he still tries to rigorously distinguish an essence from his 'investigations'. The 
stakes for him are high. The separation between existence and essence, fact and 
intention define phenomenology, a definition that depends entirely on the validity 
of a radical distinction between indication and expression. The thrust of HusserI' s 
68 Ibid, p.18. 
69 Wood, David (Ed), Derrida: A Critical Reader. Blackwell Publishers, Oxford: 1992. 
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demonstration is thus to prove, while recognising every expression to be caught in 
an indicative process, that the reverse is not true. Crucially, as Derrida remarks: 
One might be tempted ... to make the expressive sign a species of the genus 
'indication'. In this case, we would have to say in the end that the spoken 
word, whatever dignity or originality we still accorded it, is but a form of 
gesture. In its essential core, then, and not only by what HusserI considers 
its accidents, it would belong to the general system of signification and 
would not surpass it. The general system of signification then would be co-
extensive with the system of indication. 70 
HusserI, however, wants to find a phenomenological situation in which expression 
is not caught up in this entanglement - that is, with indication - and he thinks he 
has found this in the 'unshaken purity of expression in a language without 
communication, in speech as interior monologue, in the completely muted voice of 
the "solitary mental life'" . 71 Accordingly, at this point the nerve of Derrida 's 
demonstration, contra HusserI, will thus be to uncover the way in which the 
indicative relation inevitably pervades interior monologues. The privilege granted 
to what Derrida calls the 'living present' - in which I say what I mean and mean 
what I say - uniting objective and subjective presence in the voice, indicates 
HusserI's dogmatism in terms of the question of the sign. It is this dogmatism, 
argues Derrida, which neuters what may have been an exemplary critical Vigilance 
had HusserI taken his own descriptions to their conclusions and which would have 
then revealed the living present (of the voice) to be never present; to be always 
other than itself, an effect within the movement of traces where anything like 
subjective and objective unity are revealed as an 'effect'. Had HusserI undertaken 
70 Derrida, Jacques, Speech and Phenomena, op.cit, 1973, p.2l. 
71 Ibid, p.22. 
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this task - a move which Derrida will henceforth undertake via Saussure - not only 
would the hierarchy between the sign and logic have been reversed but the sign 
itself deconstructed as an inherently metaphysical concept. Let us follow Derrida 
following HusserI here (both in the sense of following HusserI' s argument, and 
following it up) ... 
In interior monologues, then, HusserI will argue that the sensible sign is ultimately 
reduced so that, in effect, one speaks to oneself in silence. This does not mean that 
words entirely disappear from this 'fictional communication' with oneself, but that 
the word is merely 'imagined' and thus assimilated to the self-present intention; as 
'sounded', it can only be indicative (i.e. indicating the thoughts of a speaker to 
another). Having argued that only expression is a 'purely' linguistic sign, in fact 
all 'real' signs have been exiled from the realm of pure self-presence which is 
taken to stand before the operation of signification as such. This move is further 
assured by HusserI' s next reduction of pure expression to sense experience; that 
which the expression serves to double in the order of ideality. Here, as John Sallis 
argues, '[i]t is the voice that preserves presence and thus lets the ideal meaning be 
immediately present,.72 As Derrida states at this point: 
This immediate presence results from the fact that the phenomenological 
'body' of the signifier seems to fade away at the very moment it is produced. 
It seems already to belong to the element of ideality. It phenomenologically 
reduces itself, transforming the worldly opacity of its body into pure 
diaphaneity. This effacement of the sensible body and its exteriority isfor 
72 John Sallis in David Wood (Ed) Derrida: A Critical Reader, op.cit, 1992, p.129. 
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consciousness the very form of the immediate presence of the signified. 73 
Hearing myself speak at the same moment that I speak, I am given back to myself 
in this moment of self-coincidence; the object and subject are united in the purity 
of the living present of Transcendental Life. 
Time and the Presence of the Present: Touching the Void. 
This is the 'point', announced already in his Introduction to The Origin of 
Geometry, at which Derrida will determine the way in which Husser!' sown 
analysis of temporalisation bifurcates the 'unity' of the living present, and the 
extent to which the voice, in hearing oneself speak and hearing an-other at the 
same time, introduces the movement of inter-subjectivity into the allegedly 'self-
present' subject, ultimately serving to make subjectivity derivative to a movement 
no longer 'nameable'. For while Husser! admits that 'the now' cannot be isolated 
as a pure 'now point', he thinks that this does not prevent it being granted a 
constitutive privilege in the flow of time. (The living present of the actual now, 
enshrined in the privilege of the phenomenological voice, is precisely what 
guarantees the immediacy or presence of the signified content, as (pure) expression 
merely doubles - without 'adding' anything - the pre-expressive stratum of sense). 
Without questioning the privilege of this experience as that which determines 
ourselves as conscious beings as such, Derrida wishes to introduce, at the same 
time, an irreducible non-presence into this sphere of originary presence which, as I 
73 Derrida, Jacques, Speech and Phenomena, op.cit, 1973, p.77. 
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have said, writes itself within HusserI's own discourse here. As Derrida remarks 
, ... the presence of the perceived present can appear as such only insofar as it is 
continuously compounded with a non-presence and non-perception, with primary 
memory and expectation (retention and protention), .74 As John Sallis admirably 
summarises all of this: 
... the self-identity of the present would no longer function as a simple origin 
(as present origin or originary present) but would rather be produced through 
a certain compounding of presence and non-presence, of impression and 
retention, of impression and protention. Hence the very constitution of the 
now, the moment, takes place as a doubling of the previous nows (or the 
nows to come) in the present now, that is, as retention (or protention); and as 
a doubling, an unlimited repetition, of the now as such, in its ideality, as the 
ideal form of presence. This double doubling in which time is constituted, 
produced - Derrida will call it differance - is thus more originary than the 
present ... more 'originary' than the phenomenological originary itself. 
In other words, and this glossing is crucial because it gets straight to the point, at 
the heart of the alleged 'phenomenological originary' apres HusserI, in hearing 
oneself speak in 'my' living present, something of me, some' meaningful' thought 
or content, has always already passed away and can only be brought back in the 
form of the trace in the composition of a 'new now' which itself only appears in 
the compounding of the 'no longer' and the 'not yet'; a-presentation always 
'taking' presentation, giving it to be thought in the structure of originary difference 
and delay or deferral. I am 'always already' late for my own self-presence, not in 
the sense of a loss, but as an unavoidable, originary lack which therefore always 
requires indefinite supplementation which is productive of self-presence and 
objective presence as such. As Rudolphe Gasche pertinently observes at this 
74 Ibid, p.64. 
57 
juncture: 
Without an originary trace, that is, 'a bending-back of a return', and without 
'the movement of repetition' constitutive of the possibility and impossibility 
of self-reflection, how could there even be (and not be) something like self-
reflection. 75 
It is therefore this originary trace which is (and has to be) repressed by Husserl in a 
gesture which repeats the gesture that inaugurated the Western (philosophical) 
tradition and its metaphysics of presence. Uncovering its effacement, Derrida thus 
uncovers the HusserIian transcendental in an exemplary manner and from the 
'beginning' (if we can still use this term here!) to be complicated by the empirical 
as its transcendental. Accordingly, all ofHusserI's subsequent 'problems' of 
separating the purity of the phenomenological Absolute stem from the 
impossibility of rigorously separating indication, expression and sense. There is 
only difference at the 'origin' of all 'things': bringing this to theoretical 
consciousness we are touching the void 
So much for HusserI's attempt to replace a single 'origin' that is, actually, always 
multiple, always more than one, always constituted in its sense of now by the 
'before now' and the 'after'; always constituted indifferently in difference 
(differance). For so much of what Derrida will be(come) is thus expressed by him 
in this very early critique of Husser I. But, Derrida's position not only originates 
differently in/from HusserI but, positively, also owes much to Ferdinand de 
Saussure's 'structural linguistics'. Indeed Saussure, widely recognised as the 
75 Gasche, Rudolphe, Inventions of Difference. op.cit, 1995, p.40. 
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father of a 'structuralism,' is regarded by Derrida himself as the twin pole (to 
Husserl's phenomenology) of twentieth century thought, a pole which he himself 
gravitates/oscillates around. Consequently, in order to 'trace' this 'other influence' 
on Derrida I now follow his deconstruction of the sign to its 'logical conclusions' 
formative of his (quasi)-philosophy of language (as trace-structure) which I argue 
underpins all of his subsequent thinking; a thinking which raises to (theoretical) 
consciousness the new 'post'modem 'age of the aporia' and a co-extensive 
affirmative postmodem subjectivity able to re-conceive our self-creations and 
human solidarities in new more democratising and emancipating ways. My 
treatment of Saussure is briefer than my treatment ofHusserl given the 
'foundation' Husserl has provided for us (me). 
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Part Two: 
Derrida and Ferdinand de Saussure: A Sign of the 
Times 
The Sign in 'Crisis': Derrida Post - Structuralism 
In OfGrammatology Derrida states that the 'historico-metaphysical epoch must 
finally determine as language the totality of its problematic horizon. "Language" 
ceases to be assured, contained, guaranteed by the infinite signified which seemed 
to exceed it'. 76 It is here, in a deconstructive reading of Ferdinand de Saussure' s 
project to found a structural1inguistics, that Derrida arguably best articulates his 
quasi-philosophy of language which he never renounced and which undoubtedly 
developed, via Husserl, from the cardinal insight of a primordial difference at the 
origin whereby the privilege of presence over the sign cannot be assured. What 
Marian Hobson calls the 'originary synthesis of language, time and the other' 
(which she terms, against Geoffrey Bennington, as 'intentions of the infinite,77)-
that is the movement of difference and deferral constitutive of meaning - is, in this 
context, referred to under the quasi-transcendental concept of 'arche-writing', a 
structure which Saussure reveals (against his express intentions) to envelop both 
speech and writing in its innermost 'meaning'. It is this insight that calls further 
attention to the sign as that 'ill-named thing' which, now having become 'critical', 
undercuts the 'history of truth' per se which has, for Derrida, always relied on a 
76 Derrida, Jacques, OfGrammat%gy, op.cit, 1997, p.6. 
77 Hobson, Marian, Jacques Derrida: Opening Lines, op.cit 1998, p.50. 
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conscious or unconscious suppression of that element of the written sign which 
Hussed calls that' dangerous supplement' . 
In his essay 'Differance', then, Derrida states: 
Most of the semiological or linguistic research currently dominating the field 
of thought (whether due to the results of its own investigations or due to its 
role as a generally recognised regulative model) traces its genealogy, rightly 
or wrongly, to Saussure as its common founder.'18 
Thus it is that structuralism (the other twin pole of twentieth century thought - the 
other, of course, being phenomenology) traces its genesis back to Ferdinand de 
Saussure and his posthumously published Course in General Linguistics79 , Derrida 
acknowledging that his own quasi-philosophy (of the limit) - frequently referred to 
in contemporary theory as 'post-structuralist' co-extensive as it is with his quasi-
philosophy of language - finds most of its impetus in his deconstructive reading of 
Saussure's attempt to found a science of language. 
Saussure's 'Essential Distinctions' and the Exclusion of Writing 
As in Hussed's Phenomenology, Saussure's reading of linguistics as a human 
science turns on a number of what Derrida has called 'essential distinctions'. The 
first few chapters of The Course in General Linguistics separates out the abstract 
system of langue - a system of distinct signs corresponding to distinct ideas, 
78 The essay 'Differance' was originally published in the Bulletin de la Societie francaise de 
philosophie (LXII, NO.3 July September, 1968, 73-101), but republished in both the David B. 
Allison edition of Speech and Phenomena (op.cit, 1973) and Margins of Philosophy (op.cit, 1996). 
79 de Saussure, Ferdinand, Course in General Linguistics. McGraw-Hill Book Co, New York: 
1966. 
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axiomatically 'true' of language per se by definition - from the 'empirical 
multiplicity of languages' with their linguistic, physical and physiological 
variations. Within the limits of the social conventions which underpin the system 
of langue, Saussure argues that the essence of this system is to be found in the 
'union of meanings and sound-images'. Yet despite having spoken of the 
'artificialness' of the 'institution' of langue, he will argue that the sign itself is 
made up of a natural unity between a psychic sound (signifier) and the meaning 
(signified), and that (crucially for Derrida) whilst the psychic sound (the being-
heard of the sound) must be differentiated from its physiological manifestation (the 
sound heard), the phonetic pronunciation of the word is still considered by 
Saussure as being more 'natural' than its written inscription. Indeed, for him, the 
effective exclusion of 'writing' from the field of linguistics is what establishes 
linguistics as a science. Thus it is that the speech/writing binary determining 
Husserl 's phenomenology comes to pre-eminence again. Indeed, it is Saussure's 
arguable failure to pass with sufficient critical vigilance through the transcendental 
(voice) which prevents him from reaching the logical conclusions of his own 
descriptions, it subsequently being the tension between gesture and statement that 
provides the 'space' within which Derrida will insert his by now 'typical', 
deconstructive reading. 
Consequently, Derrida will come to identify Saussure' s phono-Iogocentrism as 
both metaphysical and violent in its privileging of the by no means 'natural' 
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relation between phonic signifier and (signified) meaning. As Richard 
Beardsworth says of Saussure' s prioritisation of the phone: 
Despite noting at the very beginning of the Course in General Linguistics 
that the only access to the matter of linguistics is through writing, Saussure 
considers writing's unique raison d' etre to be the representation of speech. 
Indeed, whenever the question of writing turns up in Saussure's 
observations, it is immediately stigmatised and expelled as a 'monstrosity' 
which reverses the natural order between speech and writing ... writing is 
considered a tyrant (1915:53/31) which usurps the natural phonic 
pronunciation of words, substituting for them their visual images. 80 
So it is that, as with Husser!' s Phenomenology, Saussure's (structuralist) 
linguistics - which claims to be general, universal, non-metaphysical and value-
free - is seen to be founded on what Derrida terms an ethico-theoretical decision 
'disguised by the apparent naturality of the object under consideration, but 
revealed by the obsessive insistence with which the founder of linguistics wishes 
to expel writing from the essence of language' .81 For this 'in essence' 
phenomenological reduction of language reveals Saussure to be 'taken' once more 
by the 'metaphysics of presence', repeating the founding Platonic gesture of 
Western phono-Iogo-centrism by disavowing inscription. It is thus clear again, as 
Beardsworth comments, that the relationship(s) between philosophy and a human 
science such as linguistics is infinitely more complicated than one might have 
assumed and, indeed, that what Geoffrey Bennington refers to as 'transcendental 
contraband' is an abiding interest for a Derrida who regards this necessary 
contamination as a (non-) site of ethical and political opening (though of course in 
80 Beardsworth, Richard, Derrida and the Political. Routledge, London and New York: 1996, p. 9. 
81 Ibid, p.9. 
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the non-traditional, non-dogmatic, 'messianic' sense of these two terms, to the 
extent that they too 'belong' (without belonging) to metaphysics as such). 
Speech and Writing: The Violence of Thought 
In following Saussure's 'essential distinctions' - between speech and writing, the 
intelligible and the sensible, la langue and parole, signified/signifier - and the 
exclusions upon which they are predicated, Derrida thereby re-negotiates the law 
(that is the determination and hierarchisation of these exclusions, with the former 
retaining pre-eminence over the latter) such that he effectively re-casts - or better 
re-inscribes - the empirico-transcendental difference (this very oppositionality as 
such) and the tertiary structure of violence which issues from this re-inscription. 
Indeed, in this early work - and against the arguments of philosophers/theorists 
such as Richard Rorty who have denied the edifying status ofDerrida's 
deconstructive readings - Derrida here prefigures what he will later call the 
opening to a democracy-to-come. This he will do by demonstrating, after 
Saussure, that the very condition of possibility (and impossibility) of the phone is 
arche-writing, doubling, in effect, what he had already re-marked in the passage 
through the Husserlian transcendental (arche-writing, like differance and the trace 
being - as we have already seen - 'points of accumulation of an argument, places 
where it was possible to bring complexity together in a word and hence raise as a 
theme'). 
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For having thus instituted linguistics on the exclusion of writing, Saussure's 
discourse becomes irremediably complicated from the outset by an aporetic logic 
which issues in a 'double reading' of The Course. Famously, in terminology 
which will soon become synonymous with deconstruction (namely the conceptual 
dyad signifier/signified) Saussure argues that the sign is made up of the signified 
(concept) and the signifier (sound-image). For Saussure the sound-image is 
phoniC, securing the allegedly 'natural' dimension to the unity of sound-meaning 
and determining the derivative, secondary nature of the written sign (as the sign of 
a sign). However, the fact that Saussure postulates an 'arbitrary' relation between 
signifier and signified questions the very nature of the phonic sign as such. For if 
the sign is arbitrary; if it is instituted by its insertion in a structure of difference, 
then there seems to be no reason for his vitriolic denigration of writing. Rather, 
the fact of writing, as the unmotivated relation between concept and sound-image 
par excellence, is now extended to cover the whole field of linguistic signs. This 
elaboration of the trace already points towards a first account by Derrida of the 
spatio-temporal field of arche-writing whose effects constitute precisely a 'tertiary 
structure of violence' described thus: 
first, the originary violence of the system of differences which 
disappropriates the proper in constituting it'; second, the violence of what is 
commonly conceived as the attempt to put an end to violence - the 
institution of law - but which is revealed as a violence because of its 
apparent suppression of the originary difference; and third, the necessary (if 
empirical) possibility of phenomenal violence as the consequence of the 
inability of the law to suppress its 'illegality' in relation to originary 
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difference. 82 
Arguing as Saussure does, that language is constituted by 'differences without 
positive terms', the natural unit(y) of sign-meaning now appears only as a 
secondary effect of the differential system of language. Indeed, Saussure himself 
concedes that an ethico-theoretical decision - the taking of the 'word' as the 
minimum object of analysis - institutes linguistics as an objective science, this 
decision casting the very objectivity it claims into critical relief. That Saussure 
seeks to conceal/disavow this decision by naturalising his description(s) marks, for 
Derrida, the effacement of the originary violence referred to above and which can 
only lead to a 'worst violence' serving to repeat the suppression of difference as 
history already seen in relation to Husserlian phenomenology. Indeed the very 
space between philosophy and linguistics is transformed as both are revealed as 
founded on the generalised space of arche-writing which they disavow in order to 
appear as such. 
F or in designating language as a system of differences without positive terms, 
Derrida argues that Saussure must acknowledge that the signifier is actually not 
phonic (i.e. not in any way essentially related to, or a property of, the voice) and 
that nor does it belong to langue, but rather that it is generated by the differences 
which separate one signifier from every other signifier, such that meaning is both 
constituted in this 'web of differences' and endlessly deferred: in-definite. It is 
82 Ibid, p.23. 
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here that Saussure introduces the analogy with writing, an analogy allowing 
Derrida to see the movement of arche-writing as the difference between the 
materialisation of each phoneme or letter and the acoustic-sound they must 
presuppose in order to be recognised as such - whatever the form this 
materialisation may take. This is the very difference of consciousness, of the 
possibility of re-cognising things 'as such'. This difference, transformed by the 
inaugural Platonic gesture into the opposition between the sensible and the 
intelligible, the ideal and the material, the finite and the infinite, is precisely what 
is described in the course of the Introduction to The Origin of Geometry and 
Speech and Phenomena in relation to HusserI's passage through the transcendental 
(voice) which both conceals and reveals, in the course of its own description, the 
'differential matrix' as that which is 'upstream' from metaphysic's oppositional 
structure. Saussure's recourse to the metaphor of writing at the same moment as 
he brackets the materiality of the sound-image thus confirms, for Derrida, that 
arche-writing constitutes the structure of the instituted trace and constituted the 
foundation, exclusions and contradictions of (the history) of linguistics. 
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Concluding Remarks 
In this first chapter I have attempted to trace, through Derrida's engagement with 
the works of Edmund Husserl and Ferdinand de Saussure, the bifurcation of the 
onto-theological 'history of meaning' by way of what I have called here the 
differential matrix as Derrida seeks to affirm that metaphysics is 'in' 
deconstruction ('meaning' always being constituted and incessantly able to be 
reconstituted in the web of difference and deferral without beginning and without 
end(s)). It is thus that Derrida will repeatedly and quite properly argue that 
deconstruction is not a method or theory applied 'from the outside' but is always 
already at work in texts variously under consideration. Tracing the deconstruction 
of the dyad separating the sign and presence which allows language to be revealed 
as the problematic horizon of an entire (metaphysical epoch) - as the sign 
'language', indeed' sign-language' (as sign of), moves into crisis - I have argued 
that Derrida allows us to see subjective and objective presence as the effect of a 
greatly more radical historicity in which they are produced as always unstable, 
infinitely deferred effects produced within the quasi-economy of difference whose 
originary violence must be recognised and minimised in the responsibility of the 
decision. For, as I continue to argue in Chapter Two, the raising to theoretical 
consciousness of the originary synthesis of language, time and the other in 
'postmodemity' - such as we will have to justify the use of this term - enables us 
to conceive of a quasi-philosophy of the limit which has the potential to transform 
our self-creations (i.e. how we decide within our (con)textual milieu who or 'what' 
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we are on an individual basis) and - further explored in Chapter Three - our 
human solidarities (how we come to understand, negotiate and take responsibility 
for the other on a communal, national and Inter-National scale) from the totalising 
limits within which they have been constrained in and by and' around' the 
metaphysical tradition. With Derrida we therefore do indeed come to a certain 
'end of history' (the end of history as the end of a definitive meaning per se), as 
something 'other than' history emerges from, and 'grows out of, our modem 
historical consciousness in its specificity and its general signification as an attempt 
to efface originary difference. And this really is excellent news for those - like 
Derrida, and like myself - who will never give up the hope, the demand, for a 
fairer, freer and more peaceful world to come, now. 
69 
Chapter Two: 
Re-Figuring the Postmodern Subiect 
a. 
Beyond the End(s) of History: A 
Comparative Study of Jacques 
Derrida and Elizabeth Deeds Ertnarth. 
Who is it that is addressing you? Since it is not an author, a narrator, or a 
dues ex machina it is an'!, that is both part of the spectacle and part of the 
audience. An 'I' that, a bit like 'you', undergoes its own incessant violent 
reinscription within the arithmetical machinery. An 'I' that functioning as a 
pure passageway for operations of substitution is not some singular and 
irreplaceable existence, some subject or life. But only rather moves between 
life and death, between reality and fiction. An 'I' that is a mere function or 
phantom 
Jacques Derrida83 
In this second chapter I want to argue (recalling my remarks in the Introduction) 
that, recognising ourselves to be in the "'post'" -modem'84; in the 'era of the 
aporia', Jacques Derrida gives voice, with increasing urgency, to an absolutely 
affirmative 'postmodem' subjectivity whose axiom might be 'I inherit, therefore, I 
am ... yes, yes ... '. In this way Derrida arguably refigures our modem-
83 Quote taken originally from Derrida's Dissemination (The Athlone Press Ltd, London, 1993) but 
reproduced in Screenplay and Essays on the Film Derrida, op.cit, 2005, p.68. 
84 It must be emphasised that Derrida doesn't much like the pre-fix 'post', with its historical 
connotations of the 'new' or the linear; but - and in a more radical historical sense which is better 
defined in terms of historicity - I keep the term in relation to our current condition and the kind of 
subjectivity I see co-extensive with it for three reasons. First, because of its power to shock -
especially linked to Derrida and, second, (and conversely), because some have already proclaimed 
the death (or immanent death) of the postmodem which is not only premature but plain wishful 
thinking, and third, because I utilise the word 'post' apres Geoffrey Bennington to signal a way of 
working through the complex textual resources of the modem-metaphysical tradition and the 
metaphysical tradition more widely. See Bennington, Geoffrey, Legislations: The Politics of 
Deconstruction. Verso, London and New York: 1994, p.180. 
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metaphysical inheritance beyond the 'ends of history' by way of a new 'politics of 
memory' which makes of us all (whether we know it or like it or not) postmodem 
resistance fighters against the attempt(s) - 'modern' or 'postmodem' - to execute 
what Jean Baudrillard calls 'the perfect crime'.85 For apropos Chapter One, faced 
with an inherent un-decidability which results from the re-inscription of the 
empirico-transcendental difference separated in Plato's inaugural decision to 
oppose the sensible and the intelligible through the law of the bar (1)86, Derrida 
argues that we must take 'a risk and a chance' and make decisions concerning our 
own self-creations and human solidarities based on our own moral and aesthetical 
sensibilities alone, with one ear open to the other (the other and the other in me); 
an interminable openness to the future, to what is always 'to come'. And in this 
openness the relationship of Derrida to Husserl and Saussure is crucial. For in the 
position he develops and consolidates in works subsequent to those wherein 
Husserl and Saussure are at the centre of his attention - works wherein he 
exemplarily effects the above re-inscription qua his raising to consciousness of 
(what I call here) the differential matrix - he deepens, extends and goes beyond the 
HusserllSaussure inheritance, thus forming, despite local 'variations', the theme of 
85 This term, the 'perfect crime,' is one introduced by Jean Baudrillard to describe the attempt by a 
society to reproduce itself in as stable condition as possible so that all potentially de-stabilising and 
thus dangerous excesses are either rigorously excluded from, or incorporated into, 'the Same'. This 
is a condition which, were it achieved, would be so perfect that no-one would ever know that it was 
taking place as it quickly folds all unwanted phenomena such as difference, otherness and excess -
all that cannot be digested by current social and political fonnations - into the old and familiar 
without remainder; without any 'loose ends'. Another 'ending'. 
86 In summary this bar (I) separating the intelligible and the sensible, perception and conception, 
signifier and signified, institutes the epoch of the metaphysics of presence (whether subjective 
and/or objective): the idea that there exists some knowable essence/foundation underlying what we 
think and what we do. 
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the impossibility of fixing meaning anywhere, in anything, by anyone; Derrida's 
radical quasi-philosophy of history (qua) inheritance and its attendant postmodem 
subjectivity as it gives itself to be thought in our arti-factual87 and actu-virtua188 
'postist' condition being nothing but the theoretical and practical registering of this 
simple 'fact'. Critically for my purposes here in Chapter Two then, and 
anticipating the thematics of Chapter Three, it is this re-cognition which 
subsequently opens the ethico-political horizon to new and un-thought, greatly 
more democratising and emancipating possibilities for both our self-creations and 
human solidarities. 
To support this thesis - to make this line of thinking persuasive, attractive - I here 
juxtapose Derrida's thinking' against' another version of 'radical openness' as 
outlined by literary theorist/historian Elizabeth Deeds Ermarth. As my 
introduction to this thesis states, my reasons for using Ermarth at this juncture are 
three-fold. First, I think that Ermarth's systematic re-thinking of our 'modem' 
conceptions of 'historical' time, consciousness, representational language, 
narrative conventions and so on - most cogently and extensively essayed in her 
1992 publication, Sequel to History: Postmodemism and the Crisis oj 
87 As we will see in more detail (pp.l 00-1 06 ) the term 'arti-factuality' refers to the fact that 
actuality is made (not found) by a range of 'hierarchising' and 'selective' procedures wherein the 
'reality' of 'actuality' only reaches us through fictional devices. 
88 As we will see in more detail (p.106) the term' actu-virtuality' refers the always positioned, 
never (value) neutral virtual images, spaces and events which help construct our 'actuality' today. 
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Representational Time89 - helpfully contextualise (in a different register) Derrida's 
own thematics of radical historicity and post-historical man. Indeed having come 
to Derrida 'after Ermarth' I found that her tracing of what she terms in Sequel to 
History and elsewhere the 'Postmodern Reformation', really enabled me to get a 
better grasp ofDerrida's more philosophically difficult, challenging and 
comprehensive' end of history' argument (qua the entire history of meaning which 
the modern 'concept' of history, working itself out in 'postist' ways - i.e. through 
an ironical historical consciousness - arguably gives to be thought); as my earlier 
remarks suggest, this argument already being delineated in some detail through his 
deconstructive readings (in this study) ofHusserl and Saussure and the quasi-
philosophy of history developed therein (with all the implications for the modem 
idea of the subject this quasi-thematic implies). 
Somewhat ironically, however, and despite throwing Derrida's oeuvre into relief, 
my second reason for using Ermarth at this point is due to her arguable 
misreadingO of Derrida' s theorisations with regards to whether they can be 
considered 'postmodern' and/or 'post-structural' in their orientation. For for 
Ermarth the 'postmodern' involves a reformation in consciousness going back to 
89 Princeton University Press, Princeton In developing Ennarth's thematics it is to this publication 
that I will chiefly refer given that while since 1992 Ermarth bas returned to the issues and the theses 
first outlined in this work - most recently in her 2004 article 'Ethics and Method' (History and 
Theory, Theme Issue 43, December 2004, pp.61-83) - apart from a brief engagement with some of 
the operative codes (social, economic etc ... ) at work in our postmodem landscape I consider that 
her position/focus on the more formal aspects of her thinking - in particular what (as we will see) 
she terms 'rhythmic time' and multi-level (anthematic) consciousness - remains broadly the same. 
90 In the sense of failing to read Derrida with sufficient critical vigilance to support her own 
argument(s). 
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the Renaissance more specifically and whose singularity she argues Derrida 
ignores (to his detriment) in favour of a more pervasive post-structural approach 
which takes the horizon of this reformation back to Plato. In what I subsequently 
argue to be a misunderstanding of his work, Ermarth's (mis-)reading thus allows 
me to situate Derrida's corpus in relation to both 'postmodernity' and 'post-
structuralism' such as they are traditionally conceived, conflated and sometimes 
opposed. In the same critical vein, my third and final reason for using Ermarth is 
that despite her best efforts and the undeniable utility of her 'working out' of the 
postmodern condition, I find her subsequent development of a radical postmodem 
aesthetic to reveal her, in the detail of its tracing, not to be as open as she thinks; 
her acts of (relative) closure only serving to draw attention to the' openness' of 
Derrida's postist thought. 
With these brief' contextualising' remarks in mind, my approach in this second 
chapter is as follows: 
First, I concentrate on that part of Elizabeth Deeds Ermarth's work in which she 
thematises the peCUliarity of modem 'historical time'. This then enables me to 
situate, with an ironical historical consciousness, 'modernity' as it developed from 
its supporting spatio-temporal framework to become figured in grand-narrative 
forme s) as the 'proj ect of modernity'. Ironical, not only in the sense of being 
'wise' to the fallacy of modernity's attempt to execute the 'perfect crime' but also 
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because 'history' in its all pervasive modern-metaphysical form(s) gets to conduct 
its own wake, reflecting on its own radical im-possibility. As Ermarth herself says 
in the course of Sequel to History 'this text "about" postmodernism is written in 
the language of representation; it produces meaning, assumes a consensus 
community, engages in historical generalisation and footnotes ... 1 assume that one 
need not give up history to challenge it'. That modernity is both slayer and slain is 
no bad thing however, and, as I will argue in relation to Derrida's thought, is in a 
certain and important manner entirely continuous with the self-reflexive spirit of 
modern philosophical thought. 
Second, I turn to what I regard as Ermarth's mis-reading of the 'horizon' and the 
subtly of Derrida' s work and which I argue is instructive for delimiting the kind of 
affirmative postmodern subjectivity I believe he gives voice to, and whose axiom 
is described as 'I inherit therefore, I am, yes ... yes .... '. At which point I leave 
Ermarth to follow the way in which (what is generally taken to be) the more 
abstract, theoretical pronunciations ofDerrida's early work on 'metaphysics in 
deconstruction' - in this thesis exemplified by his deconstructive readings of 
HusserI and Saussure - is actually enormously concrete and salient for the entirety 
of the (inter) textual milieu (in the expanded sense) we confront in our postmodern 
condition today with all its social, economic, cultural, political and religious 
discourses 'beyond the (ends) of history' . In particular, I propose that it enables us 
to become Derridean-type postmodern resistance fighters against those 
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modernJpostmodern attempts to institute foundationalist maxims under a 
naturalist/realist pretext which serve to close off the future to the unpredictable and 
the unforeseeable (l 'avenir).91 For this is a kind of 'radical openness', I argue, 
which enables us to re-think our economies of knowledge in greatly more 
democratising and emancipating ways than has hitherto been possible within the 
theoretical constraints of the Western onto-theological tradition which has sought, 
very precisely, to constrain the meaning of being to presence. 
Third, and finally, I return to Ermarth in order to underline what I perceive to be 
Derrida's more radical openness by comparing her conception of rhythmic time 
and multi-Ievel/anthematic consciousness with the kind of affirmative postmodern 
subjectivity I believe Derrida to espouse and which is, as I shall by then have 
argued in the previous section, at the same time a kind of textual praxis operative 
in the 'here and now' in our postmodern condition. This is not, I hasten to add, to 
say that I disagree with most of what Ermarth says at the level at which she says it 
- Ermarth's feminist, radical theorising is so much better than most of her 
colleagues - rather I feel that there is a gap between the critical consciousness she 
91 In this context it is worth noting here that Derrida will distinguish between what he calls the 
'future' and the '1 'avenir', the fonner having to do with the programmable, foreseeable - and the 
latter (which often confusingly he still refers to as the future) refers to someone whose arrival is 
totally unexpected. However this (almost) necessary confusion has undoubtedly to do with the 
'fact' that for Derrida it is not a case of either/or but both/and. That is, it is always a tension 
between the future and the I 'avenir, economy and the gift, same and other which de-limits all 
attempts at definitive closure. For Derrida (as ever) it is a case of keeping the future as open as 
possible to the other, but this is always an other which comes to interrupt some existing horizon of 
sense - wherever we are in a text already. It is a question of vigilance and, as we will see, respect 
for the secret. 
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advocates when she speaks about understanding what kinds of codes and tacit 
knowledges or implicit understandings govern the operation of powerful 
systematic influences in our society such as the corporation, media, etc ... , and the 
kind of experimental thematic she advances in terms of an-thematic (which is to 
say multi-level) narrative processes.92 For I will argue that we need to take up 
Derridean-like positions of resistance as postmodern subjects with the (admittedly 
hard) task of exhausting the conceptual resources of terms such as 'history' so 
radioactive, still, with old meanings (which is perhaps where Ermarth, concerned 
to emphasise the idiomatic nature of the modern sense of history, underplays the 
vast metaphysical tradition within which the term is inscribed). In fact I shall 
argue that we need to work within structures in ways which loosen them and which 
eventually disregard or change beyond recognition those terms/concepts/systems 
which fail to call for, elicit and provoke responses due to their totalitarian nature -
taking texts in new and unforeseen directions while taking the time and care to 
read texts in their original language, context and history of reception. It is, also, 
critically important to draw attention to what I, following Derrida, have already 
referred to as the arti-factual and actu-virtual nature of actuality in these 
'postmodern times' so as to open this 'actuality' to difference and alterity. And all 
of this, I think - and as Ermarth's own remarks suggest - involves a certain 
ironical historical consciousness which is 'post' in the sense of still working 
91 Processes where readers (as multi-level thinkers) actively engage in the text (in the expanded 
sense), attending to a multitude of thematic voices and constructing from the paratactic elements 
'sequential figures that differ with each reader and reading'. Deeds Ermarth, Elizabeth, Sequel to 
History, 1992, p.19-l. 
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through its modem-metaphysical (as well as metaphysics in general) inheritance 
beyond the ends of history (upper and lower case history and the history of 
meaning per se). For our contemporary consciousness is still being moulded by 
hyper-modem forces (not least those of the economic and techno-scientific) which 
have simply speeded up historical time to an absolute real time which itself now 
needs to be addressed and de-constructed. Thus while the kind of experiments 
Ermarth advocates - which involve experimenting with 'phenomenological time' 
and making consciousness aware of the need to attend to multiple acts of attention 
no longer rationalised into a single, homogenous 'meaningful' horizon - do have 
their place in what is arguably a condition of polemos (certainly interrupting the 
comfortable boundaries between history and literature), I am not sure, certainly 
outside of a relatively small radical theoretical community, if they have the ability 
to change the way we think and act outside of a more pervasive Derridean 
approach to the postmodem condition. This is not to say that Derrida's approach 
does not advocate a certain multi-level thinking, but that it does so in such a way 
that it works within existing discursive boundaries so as to make them speak 
differently, thus opening such texts to the aporias, fissures and paradoxes which 
they themselves contain; this kind of textual praxis being that which reveals what 
is always already at work but effaced, by the attempt to constrain the meaning of 
being to presence. It is not (if I can enter another caveat) that I do not necessarily 
consider that one day we might come to think in the way Ermarth suggests, but 
rather that once we take it as inevitable - i.e. we think we just have to re-write our 
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narrative conventions - and more importantly once we treat it as closer to the way 
reality 'really is' than historical time and its conventions as Ermarth arguably does, 
then we risk gifting it back to the onto-theological tradition Derrida (and 'we') 
seek to escape. Let us thus press forward - take a risk and a chance - and 
welcome that which has not yet come (about)! 
So, I now begin to give some substance to the above delineated 'approach' by 
following Ermarth's examination of 'modernity' in such a way as to help us 
comprehend the nature and scale of the reformation that leads, for her, to precisely 
the 'postmodern condition' we currently live in and through. 
Derrida and Ermarth: Re-Thinking 'Modernity' in the 'Post' Modem 'Age of the 
Aporia' 
That we are in the postmodern condition now seems fairly obvious, if by this is 
meant the condition engendered by the failure of the 'project of modernity' defined 
by Keith Jenkins as 
... the attempt, from the eighteenth century in Europe, to bring about through 
the application of reason, science and technology, a level of social and 
political well-being within social formations which, legislating for the 
increasingly generous emancipation of their subjects/citizens, we might 
characterise by saying that they were trying, at best, to become human rights 
communities. 93 
This failed attempt to execute the 'modernist project' absolutely - a project I think 
might be considered the 'raison d'etre' of Western metaphysics - is traced back by 
93 Jenkins, Keith (Ed), The Postmodern History Reader. Routledge, London and New York, 1997, 
p.4. 
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Ermarth somewhat beyond the' experiment of modernity' re: the Eighteenth 
Century, to the much earlier Renaissance. And this is because, for Ermarth, 
'modernity' signals neither the local event of modernism she sees prevalent at the 
turn of the nineteenth and twentieth century, nor the era since the eighteenth 
century Enlightenment, but rather marks the type of humanist rationality 
constructed and disseminated in Renaissance and Reformation Europe without 
which the later 'project of modernity' would have been 'unthinkable'. 'Older than 
the Enlightenment and newer than the kind of rationalism traceable to the Greeks' , 
she writes, this modern 'Culture of Representation' is defined by 
... its libraries and universities, its democratic politics and its human rights, 
its reliance on rationality and universal laws, its new kind of descriptive 
notation that made possible the development of empirical science and of 
technology, its emphasis on development and production, its reliance on a 
particular definition of individuality, its faith above all in neutrality and its 
constructed objectivity. 94 
For Ermarth, what underpins modern culture as its founding meta-narrative is 
'historical time', a particular and peculiar time-bound 'timing of time' which she 
traces back to the Renaissance when the rediscovery of classical learning led to 
those shifts in technical achievement which changed the very 'bases' and methods 
of our 'understanding'. Out of this shift emerged the modern idea of history, which 
she describes in her seminal work, Sequel to History: Postmodernism and the 
Crisis of Representational Time, as follows: 
94 Deeds Ennarth, Elizabeth, Rewriting Democrac:v: Cultural Politics in Postmodernity, 2005. p.7 
(unpublished typescript). 
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The view of time as a neutral homogeneous medium like the space of 
pictorial realism in painting; a time where mutually informative 
measurements can be made between past, present and future, and where all 
relationships can be explained in terms of a common horizon ... The 
temporal analogue that links past, present, and future involves a different 
faculty ( consciousness) and a different medium (time) but the same 
formation inheres. 95 
To exemplify this view of linear history, Ermarth asks us to consider (the 
analogous) single point perspective of painting. Here, in single point perspective, 
the view from any point on a common horizon gives the spectator a view of the 
'world' that remains the same regardless ofhis/her position and which extends to 
infinity, thus having the value of a 'universal truth'. It is through a similar use of 
single point 'time' that history has become a - indeed the - commanding meta-
narrative in modernist discourse, the organisationalform of , modem' narrative in 
which language is constrained to a representational function, 'one in which a sign 
refers, without any unsettling influence, to a world where language functions 
chiefly as information'. 96 So it is that Ermarth argues that the literary conventions 
of modernity, far from being constrained to the pages of the novel or the pictorial 
or plastic arts, etc, support an entire 'representational discourse'. 
Ermarth's own critique of single-point linear history and its temporality rests on 
two main premises. First, her rebuttal of the' omniscient narrator' (or what she 
95 Deeds Ennarth, Elizabeth, Sequel to History, op.cit, 1992, p.27. 
96 Ibid, p.157. 
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terms in Realism and Consensus in the English Nover the 'Narrator as Nobody') 
and, second, her conception of the limitations or weaknesses of what she calls 
historical convention's most powerful effects: its production of transcendence in 
'various appealing forms'. With respect to the former, Ermarth contends that in 
modern narrative there is a general acceptance of 'the Narrator as Nobody', in 
other words, the narrator is simply 'History speaking' to 'us'. This 'Nobody' 
narrator rationalises consciousness by channelling time into a single horizon 
(hence Ermarth's analogy to single point perspective). The continuums of time 
and consciousness thus appear inseparable, serving as the medium in which events 
are understood 'neutrally', it being the unquestioned assumption of neutrality 
which is arguably used by those claiming objectivity and subjectivity in their study 
of the 'past'. However, as Ermarth warns us 
... the formal achievement which I call realistic 'consensus' has itself created 
the media of space and time in which we proceed to make our mutually 
informative measurements, arrive at hypothesis, formulate our laws, and 
produce our experiments, our capital, and our knowledge, that other form of 
capital. There is nothing 'natural' about it. 98 
It is this 'illusion of history' which Ermarth thinks gives rise to the production of 
transcendentalism in a variety of forms - not least in those Capitalist and Marxist 
eschatological grand-narratives helpfully define as the project of modernity -
motivated by the desire to deflect what Martin Heidegger identified as the desire to 
transcend what she calls the 'decisive material limitation of death'. Ermarth, like 
97 Deeds Ennarth, Elizabeth, Realism and Consensus in the English Novel: Time, Space and 
Narrative. Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh: 1998 (2nd Edition, orig.1983). 
98 Deeds Ennarth, Elizabeth, Sequel to History, op.cit, 1992, p.30. 
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Heidegger (to whom she regularly refers)99, argues for the rejection of 
transcendence (and dialectics) which 'requires' people to accept the condition of 
today in anticipation of tomorrow (a tomorrow Baudrillard reminds us may never 
arrive). As she argues: 'If I remain aware of my own inevitable finitude, questions 
of value become urgent' .100 
It is thus that Ermarth uses literary narratives - namely those multi-level narratives 
of Vladimir Nabokov, Julio Cortazar and Alain Robbe-Grillet - to re-organise 
sequence and meaning at the level of both written text(s) and the 'level' which she 
also sees governing our understanding of the unwritten text(s) i.e. the 'world', the 
'self, the' other,' etc. For subverting the literary conventions of modernity 
arguably helps change how 'we' perceive/order both 'ourselves' and 'others'. As 
Ermarth argues: 'The revision of sequence at the level of language is where the 
practical, embedded resolutions of postmodernism become available' .101 
Ermarth: Mis-Reading Derrida. 
Having thus situated 'postmodernity' in relation to 'modernity' and before coming 
back to a critical examination of Ermarth' s own postmodern 'revision of sequence' 
in the last part of this chapter, I now want to briefly examine what I take to be 
99 Ennarth states that for her, Heidegger's most important perception was that 'the idea of temporal 
infinity is what in practice deflects our attention from the ultimate human necessity of facing 
death'. Ibid. p.35. For for Heidegger Dasein (human being) opens up the arena of significance 
very precisely by anticipating its own death. He calls for Dasein to reclaim its own radical finitude 
and the finitude of (beings) disclosure and so become authentically itself. 
100 Ibid p.36. 
101 Ibid, p.3. 
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Ermarth's mis-reading of what I have already called the 'horizon and subtlety' of 
Derrida's work, which creates a kind of 'jetty' 102 for launching my own reading of 
the kind of post modem subjectivity I believe Derrida does actually give voice to. 
For while I agree that there is a certain specificity to the modem tradition and to 
modern historical time (which I don't think Derrida would deny) I cannot agree 
with Ermarth's remark (in the 1998 Preface of the second edition of Realism and 
Consensus), that Derrida 'mistakes the historical horizon,103 indicated by the 
mutation which gives rise to the differential consciousness (or rather the 
consciousness of differance) which she also suggests arises from Derrida's work 
on Husserl and Saussure. For here Ermarth argues that Derrida represents that 
tendency of thought which she calls 'post-structuralism' and which she argues 
traces the critique of Western metaphysics back to Plato, rather than her own brand 
of 'postmodernism' which takes the critique of Western culture back only as far as 
modernity; and, in my view, this rather skews the issue as far as Derrida is 
concerned. For whilst the kind of 'post-structuralist' insights he gleans from his 
engagement with Saussure and Barthes et aI, do indeed impact on a certain 
'structuralism' common from 'Plato' onwards in the 'metaphysical tradition', his 
102 I like the word 'jetty', it appears in Derrida's essay 'Some Statements and Truisms' and refers 
to a kind of 'force of movement' which escapes determination. The implication is that while all 
jetty's start from somewhere, from a certain decision, a certain determinate gesture, each 
(theoretical) jetty enters originally into conflict and competition where all totalising gestures remain 
partial and open to re-interpretation without ends. The full title ofDerrida's essay is 'Some 
Statements and Truisms about Neologisms, Newisms, Postisms, Parasitisms and Other Small 
Seisisms'. This essay appears in The States of 'Theory ': History, Art and Critical Discourse, edited 
and introduced by John Carroll. Translated from the French by Anne Tomiche. Stanford 
University Press, Stanford: 1990, pp.63-94. 
103 Deed~ Ermarth, Elizabeth, Realism and Consensus, op.cit, 1998, p.xxii. 
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position is both in-formed by (and in-forms) what might be called his 
'postmodernism' as an engagement with modern (philosophical) thought. For 
Derrida's is not a conventional critique but a reading of , modernism' and its 
'history' (in its various incarnations) rendered other-wise. This can best be 
illustrated by the lengthy engagement with Emmanuel Kant in Derrida's essay 'On 
a Newly Arisen Apocalyptic Tone in Philosophy'I04, which raises the spectre of an 
'apocalyptic postal system' informed by an affirmative perversion of Kant's 
modern critical thought which refuses not only to give up the modern desire for 
critique and truth (law and destiny), but also becomes resonant for the entire 
metaphysical tradition beyond its modern formulation( s) alone in terms of the 
foundationalist 'messages' we have been sent after Plato's inaugural decision to 
oppose the sensible and the intelligible through the law of the bare/). This is not to 
deny, of course, the importance or the specificity of modernity in relation to 
postmodernity - not least because Derrida's thought would have been impossible 
and unthinkable outside of a Marxist space which itself has relied on the 
development of modern historical time - but to recognise that 'modernity' (its 
upper and lower case discourse(s)) has sought to justify itself through the attempt 
to throw a totalising explanatory grid over the differential matrix (in which it is 
inscribed), common to an entire metaphysical tradition ... the dislocating effects or 
'excess' of which the tradition as a whole has always tried to suppress. This is 
104 Derrida, Jacques, 'On A Newly Arisen Apocalyptic Tone in Philosophy'. In Raising the Tone 
Of Phi losophy: Late Essays by Immanuel Kant, Transformative Critique by Jacques Derrida. 
Edited by Peter Fenves. The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore and London: 1993. 
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why the 'age of the aporia', which recognises an irreducible heterogeneity, makes 
Derrida state: 'I had the feeling that - despite the enormous tradition going back 
thousands of years - something singular is happening today, of which there are a 
great many signs in the world. Something completely new, to which we have to 
respond and with respect to which we have to situate ourselves' .105 For here he is 
giving voice to something which is at the same time both very new and very 
ancient and which is thus 'signified' repetitively throughout our historical 
tradition, in 'Greece and in Rome. . . [in] ... Plato and Descartes and Kant' .106 
Accordingly, what Ermarth arguably mis-reads is the extent to which Derrida's 
'postmodern' engagement with modernity/modernism has both informed and been 
informed by his post-structuralism which uncovers the' differential matrix' whose 
rupturing effects are felt, and generally effaced, by Western metaphysics per se 
and which, raised to theoretical consciousness (without being itself a 'theory' as 
such), enables a kind of textual praxis interminably open to the future; open to the 
irreducible excess of a certain structural genesis which cannot ever be closed. 
Ermarth claims that Derrida mistakes the historical horizon of post-modernity. He 
does not. 
105 Derrida, Jacques and Maurizio Ferraris, A Taste for the Secret. Polity Press and Blackwell 
Publishers, Oxford: 2001, p.79. 
106 Derrida, Jacques in Richard Kearney (Ed), States o/Mind, op.ci~ 1995, p.163. 
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The Postmodem Apocalypse (Sans Apocalypse): Beyond the Ends(s) ofHist01Y 
As Geoffrey Bennington argues in his excellent, Legislations: The Politics of 
Deconstruction, 'I suspect that the prefix "post" - in terms such as 
"postmodemism" and "poststructuralism" can be worked with interestingly - non-
journalistically - only if linked to Derrida's exploration of the postal system' .107 
And it is this point - that I regard as absolutely critical - which can be seen in the 
above mentioned essay 'On a Newly Arisen Apocalyptic Tone in Philosophy', 
which is characterised by one of Derrida' s most incisive commentators, John D. 
Caputo, as an 
... essay on what could have been called 'postmodemism', that is, of how to 
work ones way through modernity (not around it), how to work with it (not 
jettison it), had not this word suffered the ill-fortune of being ground into 
senselessness by overuse, by a wild circulation that is postmodern in the very 
worst sense.108 
In the essay itself Derrida thus explores, following Kant's own essay 'On a Newly 
Arisen Superior Tone in Philosophy' 109, the question of what he calls the 
'apocalyptic tone' (then) recently adopted in French Philosophy - his own 
included - and what he terms his notion of the apocalypse without (sans) 
apocalypse which, he will argue, is the transcendental (read quasi- foundational) 
condition of all discourse, of all experience, of every 'mark' or 'trace', and whose 
movement he will liken to an apocalyptic postal system which, while keeping 
107 Bennington, Geoffrey, Legislations, op.cit, 1994, p.180. 
108 Caputo, John D., The Prayers and Tears of Jacques Derrida: Religion without Religion. Indiana 
University Press, Bloomington: 1997, p.89. 
109 Kant, Immanuel, 'On a Newly Arisen Superior Tone in Philosophy', in Peter Fenves (Ed) 
Raising the Tone, op.cit, 1993. 
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'Reason' alive, dreams of the impossible, the unprogrammable, the unforeseeable. 
Against those such as Searle and Gutmann 110 who read deconstruction as an anti-
modernist, anti-enlightenment Schwarmerei (passion), in fact what Derrida reads 
through Kant's 'modem' tract is Reason rendered other-wise through what Caputo 
calls a 'little postmodern prayer'. Let us now follow Derrida following Kant as 
this prayer is made audible and where, in my view, a new kind of postmodem, 
post-historical consciousness/subjectivity is heralded or 'called forth'. 
In 'On a Newly Arisen Superior Tone in Philosophy', Kant seeks to defend the 
idea of a pure, passionless reason from those dangerous 'mystagogues' (viz: 
religious and mystical enthusiasts) who for him threatened the very survival of 
philosophy by opining feelings and private communications with the super-
sensible world. For Kant saw in the mystagogues secretive 'crypto-poetics' a 
profoundly un-democratic tone which replaced reasoned argument with debased 
metaphor and threatened to confuse philosophy with 'mere' literature. 
Accordingly, Kant's response was to extol the superior virtues of the 'moral law' 
110 John Searle and Amy Gutmann view deconstruction as providing a license for 'irresponsible 
scholarship', arguing this manner of reading advocates the free play of meaning and is politically 
conservative, only serving to obfuscate the grounds on which a nonnative communicative reason 
could be established (clear overtones of Habermas here). The Searle-Derrida debate dates back to 
Derrida's 1971 essay 'Signature, Event, Context' and Searle's reply 'Re-iterating the Differences' 
(see Derrida's Limited Inc, Northwestern University Press, Evanston: 1988). For a more recent 
summary of Searle's polemics against deconstruction see his essay 'Postmodemism and the 
Western Rationalist Tradition' which appears in the collection Campus Wars: Multi-Culturalism 
and the Politics of Difference. Edited by John Arthur and Amy Shapiro. Westview Press, Boulder: 
1995, pp.28-48. For an ex1ended example of Amy Gutmann's views on how deconstruction (used 
as a synonym for Derrida) destroys both academic standards and reason itself, see her essay 
'Relativism, Deconstruction, and the Cuniculum' which appears in the same volume (pp.57-69). 
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(as categorical imperative) without ever positively identifying it as such whilst 
calling on the mystics to no longer attempt to 'lift the goddesses skirt' to reveal her 
secrets. 
Of course, Derrida reminds us that it is not simply the mystagogues who espoused 
(and still espouse) such an apocalyptic eschatology. Hegelian, Marxist and 
Nietzschean eschatologies all 'happened' after Kant, and at the time of writing the 
'Apocalyptic Tone' essay (1980), the 'ends of man' was a then current topic for 
much intellectual debate. Indeed as Caputo reminds us (and as Derrida concurs), 
nowadays a whole variety of discourses zoom in on the 'end' of this or that: the 
end of philosophy, the end of history, the end of metaphysics, the end of 
epistemology, the ends of progress, the end of ideology, etc. And part ofDerrida 
(and Caputo's) concern is to be alert to the very 'ends' such 'endist' philosophers 
seek to lead us toward (which is not of course to simply reject in a blind cynicism 
such legacies, as Derrida's work on Marx demonstrates). This is why Derrida 
thinks that we cannot (for all that his passage through Husserl and Saussure has 
taught him and us about the differential function of language, about (inter) 
textuality, about the fallacy of the transcendental signified and such like), forego 
the desire for critique and truth (law and destiny). Indeed, Derrida doesn't find the 
two positions mutually exclusive: we must continue to seek to demystify 
speculative discourse( s) on vision, theophany and parousia wherever they are 
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found. This is why Derrida, contra Habermas' 111 arguments, is not anti-
Enlightenment and why, as Niall Lucy reminds us in his succinct A Derrida 
Dictionary: 
IfDerrida has sometimes taken Kant's ideas to task (see especially Troth in 
Painting), it has not been in order to pave the way for 'relativism' or to 
sound the death of 'reason' but to question his 'faith in the purity of 
transcendental questions, which ask after the conditions, the preconditions or 
the presuppositions of knowledge' . 112 
What Derrida argues, then, is that we must be suspicious of those Enlightenment 
philosophers who claim to have seen the light at the end of various tunnels; to 
know the secret of the thing 'in itself, to know what is to come. We must be 
sceptical of hidden secrets, of all apocalypticisms, just as we are also of the 
religious fanatics or mystics or fundamentalists who claim to know 'the secret'. 
Indeed, it is precisely when Kant recognises that the Enlightenment has not yet 
happened in his time (is still happening, is still 'to come', has not yet 'found' the 
secret) that Derrida becomes 'a happy post-Kantian'. For he is not so happy when 
Kant seeks to overcome this condition by way of a 'peace treaty' with the 
111 As Christopher Norris states in Deconstruction: Theory and Practice (Routledge, London and 
New York: 1999). of the prejudice which sees Derrida' s work as a practice of an artful, allusive, 
'literary' style incompatible with the interests of truth seeking thought: 'TIlis prejudice assumes its 
most elaborate and systematic form in a work like Jurgen Habermas's The Philosophical Discourse 
oF~1odernity (trans. 1987), where Derrida is cast - along with various other "postmodern" enemies 
of reason - as just another latter-day sophist, a skillful rhetorician whose literary gifts are placed in 
the service of a wholesale Nietzschean-irrationalist creed, a betrayal of that 'unfinished project of 
modernity' which Habermas regards as our last, best hope in an age of distorted mass-media values 
and inert consensus politics ... Habermas is virtually predestined to misread Derrida in so far as he 
makes it a requirement for enlightened thought that criticism should respect the de jure separation 
of discursive regimes, and not allow itself to become mixed up with the poetic (or world-disclosive) 
function properly served by metaphorical or literary language'. (p.139-140). The relationship 
between Habermas and Derrida has grown more conciliatory over the years as my remarks in the 
next Chapter will show. their sharing a concern in the years before Derrida's death with issues 
surrounding the future of Europe, the UN, international law and Kant 
112 Lucy Niall A Derrida Dictionary. Blackwell Publishers, Oxford: 2004. p.66 . 
. ' . 
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mystagogues whereby all are to stand before the moral Law. 113 For Derrida sees it 
as our postmodern fate to live in the (ethico-political) space between the 
Auf/darers and the mystics in the structurality of an opening which says, 'Come, 
will you ever be up to it ... ' and to which we must be end-Iess-Iy affirmative and 
inventive, tirelessly vigilant and' just 'that little bit blind'. 
For what Derrida seeks to emphasise, in part through the 'catastrophic reversal' of 
the scene of the Apocalypse of John is that as soon as one no longer knows who 
speaks or who writes, then the text becomes apocalyptic; here Derrida is making, I 
think, a 'postmodern scene' .114 For whereas traditionally, and without simply 
reducing all apocalypticism to a mono-tone, apocalyptic writings (of a mystical or 
an Enlightenment disposition) positioned themselves above the 'chaos' of 
contingency from whence they could locate and explain everything' clearly' , 
deconstruction exposes the quasi-structure of a 'system of relays in which we do 
113 The problem with the moral law, as Derrida amongst others has pointed out, is that there is 
more to morality than always adhering to a set of compulsory moral values, regardless of individual 
circumstances. For not only does this ignore singularity, it implies a co-ex1:ensive lack of 
responsibility for one's decisions. Despite Kant's invocation of free will, what 'free choice' is 
made or exercised when one simply follows or obeys a rule/law etc ... 
114 In 'The Revelation of St. John The Divine' (The Holy Bible, Collins, London and New York: 
1957) is written '1 am Alpha and Omega, the beginning and the ending, saith the Lord, which is, 
and which was, and which is to come, the Almighty' (1:8) As John D Caputo writes in Religion 
without Religion (Indianna University Press, Bloomington: 1997) 'If we imagine, by a kind of 
provisional fiction, that there were but one apocalyptic tone, instead of a generalized derangement 
(Verstimmung) and unmasterable polytonality of apocalypticisms (which is what Derrida really 
thinks), it would sound something like this: 1 have come to unveil the truth for you about the end of 
the world. The end is near and 1 can see it; we are going to die, the faithful and the goyim alike. 1 
alone can reveal the truth, the destination. We must fonn a closed community of those who stay 
awake while the others sleep. The Apocalypse of John embodies this scene.' (p.90). By way of a 
'reversal' Derrida seeks to make us aware of that 'experience of the impossible', of 'un-
decidability', whereby there is no unitary authoritarian voice to assure a self-present and/or 
objective meaning. The tex1: is duplicitous, and we just have to take responsibility and decide, each 
time, affirmatively. 
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not know who is saying what to whom, thereby stirring up passion du non-
savoir,115 (a passion for the un-knowable). In what has become (in Derrida's 
sense) an apocalyptic postal system, it is no longer clear or certain from whence 
we have come or where we are headed (besides, things are always getting 'lost in 
the posf). This is the scene, then, amongst other scenes, of that 'strange institution 
called literature'; of what Nicholas Royle calls a 'certain experience of 
displacement, a question of any and every sense of "place'" . As Royle remarks: 
Literature has no definitive meaning or resting place, even if it allows one to 
explore notions of 'definitive meaning' and 'resting place' in especially 
critical and productive ways. The literary work never rests. It does not 
belong. Literature does not come home: it is strangely home-less, strangely 
free. 116 
This kind offairly 'modem' experience of literature Derrida finds salient for all 
discourse, for all text( s) which, as bearers of' meaning' constructed in and through 
the movement of the' differential matrix', remain interminably open. 
Consequently, this experience of the 'impossibility' of arresting or consolidating 
meaning 'once and for all', can be linked back to the above discussion of Husserl 
whose recourse to writing - to 'literature in the broadest sense' in order to 
guarantee the ideal objectivity of meaning (in the case of geometry) - seemed to 
interrupt his very ideal of translatability and univocity as sender and receiver 
became irreducibly complicated and meaning, if not irrevocably 'lost in 
translation', was cast adrift into an interminable relay of difference(s) and 
deferral(s) without beginning and without end(s). 
115 Royle, Nicholas, Jacques Derrida. Routledge, London and New York: 2003, pA5. 
116 Ibid, pA5. 
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A Question of Inheritance: The 'Politics of Memory' 
Ours is thus, argues Derrida, a messianic time without messianism, a time beyond 
calculable plurality, a moment beyond the linear time of history and/or the 
controlling vision of modernity's sovereign subject. Developed not least through 
his readings of Walter Benjamin's 'Theses on the Philosophy ofHistory'll7 and 
various texts by Marxl18, this messianic (quasi-) structure is linked by him to the 
notion of inheritance which takes on so much importance for the postmodem 
subject. 119 Which is to say, as Derrida puts it in Spectres of Marx : 
That we are heirs [inheritors] does not mean that we have or that we receive 
this or that, some inheritance that enriches us one day with this or that, but 
that the being of what we are is first of all inheritance, whether we like it or 
not. 120 
117 Benjamin, Walter, 'Theses on the Philosophy of History', in, Illuminations: Essays and 
Reflections. Edited by Hannah Arendt and translated by Hany Zohn. Schoken, New York: 1%9. In 
this work Benjamin will speak of a 'weak messianic power' admirably summarised by Niall Lucy 
in his Derrida Dictionary (op.cit, 2004) as follows: '[I]t relates each of us today to those who came 
and suffered before us. We are the chosen ones, as it were, whose present time was once the 
promised future of the past, and it is our responsibility to remember and redress the injustices that 
were suffered by those who made it possible for us to live. For Derrida, this is to rethink the 
present in tenns ofa never-ending future to come, based on our 'inheritance' from the past.' (p.74). 
In other words, and as 1 suggest here, this is Derrida's quasi-philosophy of history. 
118 For example The German Ideology (written with Engels), Capital and the 1844 Manuscripts. 
Through his deconstructive reading of these texts and others what Derrida will argue we have 
inherited from Marx is not a programme for change but a messianic promise of change; Derrida's 
reading(s) of Marx fonning the basis for my next chapter 'Derrida: Changing the World (Before 
Two O'Clock)'. 
119 It is also important to mention Kierkegaard at this juncture. Kierkegaard will speak in The 
Journals ofSoren Kierkegaard of the uncertainty of history, the lack of pre-existent proofs of 
determinate knowledge, and instead advocates the primacy of life, a life where one must take a risk 
and a chance (already a familiar Derridean axiom to us) and make a subjective choice yia a 'leap of 
faith', a commitment to the absurd. As my discussion progresses it will be clear to what extent the 
Kierkegaardian inheritance in-fonns deconstruction. The Journals of Soren Kierkegaard were 
selected, edited and translated by Alexander Dru, Oxford University Press, Oxford: 1955. 
120 Derrida, Jacques, Spectres of Marx: The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning, & the New 
International. Translated by Peggy Kamuf and with an Introduction by Brend Magnus and Stephen 
Cullenberg. Routledge, London and New York: 1994. 
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For the postmodern subject, recognising itself to be 'thrown' (to borrow a 
Heideggarian term) into an inherently foundationless, inter-textual discursive 
landscape which preceded its 'birth' and which will survive its 'death', the 'history 
of meaning' - up to and including the 'modem historical tradition' which gives us 
the (now ironical) conceptual tools in order to conceive of the metaphysical 
tradition as such - is transformed into what Geoffrey Bennington has called a 
'politics of memory' - a situation which has no omniscient narrator or super-
sensible deity to guide or take responsibility for the idiomatic (without of course 
being totally idiomatic) paths to be forged. As Derrida explains: 
Let us consider frrst of all, the radical and necessary heterogeneity of an 
inheritance, the difference without opposition that has to mark it, a 
'disparate' and a quasi-juxtaposition without dialectic (the very plural of 
what we will later call Marx's spirits). An inheritance is never gathered 
together, it is never one with itself. Its presumed unity, if there is one, can 
consist only in the injunction to reaffirm by choosing. 'One must' means 
one must filter, sift, criticize, one must sort out several different possibilities 
that inhabit the same injunction. And inhabit it in a contradictory fashion 
around a secret. If the readability of a legacy were given, natural, 
transparent, univocal, if it did not simultaneously call for and at the same 
time defy interpretation, we would never have anything to inherit from it. 
We would be affected by it as by a cause - natural or genetic. One always 
inherits from a secret - which says 'read me, will you ever be able to do 
so' .121 
The 'politics of memory' thus involves taking up critical positions toward the 
archive(s) - modem and postmodern - an increasingly important 'position' in our 
information age where data is brought and sold on the open market. Thus, just as 
we must 'filter, select, [and] criticise' modernity's archive and its legacy which is 
still maintained today by those who seek to consolidate a more conventional 
121 Ibid, p.16. 
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historical memory, so we must be aware of new archiving techniques (micro-chips, 
the internet, virtual reality, mobile phone, ipod technology, television archives 
etc ... ) which, whilst they may seem diverse, free and accessible, remain no less 
over-determined by economical, political and cultural influences/constraints than 
more 'traditional' archival remains - books, newspapers, paintings, handwritten 
diaries, and so on. 
This notion of inheritance and the various archival/communicative structures we 
both help (re-)form and are formed by, serves to re-mark the fact that the kind of 
liminal postmodern subjectivity Derrida advocates is thus above all a responsible 
one, not least in the sense that'!, am responsible for the decision taken by me (by 
us all) 'before the other'. As Derrida says in 'Intellectual Courage: An Interview', 
this is an ethico-political (space of the) decision which 
... to be just, cannot content itself with applying existing norms or rules but 
must take the absolute risk, in every singular instant, of justifying itself 
again, alone, as if for the ftrst time, eve if it is inscribed in a tradition ... A 
decision, though mine, active and free in its phenomenon, cannot be the 
simple deployment of my potentialities or aptitudes, of what is 'possible for 
me'. In order to be a decision, it must interrupt that 'possible', tear off my 
history and thus above all, in a certain strange way, the decision of the other 
in me: come from the other in view of the other in me. 122 
122 Taken from an interview with Jacques Derrida whose english translation reads 'Intellectual 
Courage: An Interview'. This interview was originally conducted by Thomas Assheuer of German 
weekly Die Zeit. At Jacques Derrida's request the full text was published in French on the Derrida 
website in March 1998. Assheuer's questions were translated into French by Andreas 
Niederberger: after a long correspondence, and an abbreviated form of the interview was printed in 
German as 'Ein Gesprach mit dem Philosophen Jacques Derrida uber die Intellektuellen, den 
Kapitalismus und die Gesetze der Gastfreundschaft' [a conversation with the philosopher Jacques 
Derrida about intellectuals, capitalism and the laws of hospitality) in Die Zeit on March 5, 1998 
(Die Zeit 1 L 1998.) The English translation was completed by Peter Krapp. See: 
http://culturemachine.tees.ac.uklCmach/Backissues/j002/Artic1es/art_derr.htm. 2003. 
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What Derrida is outlining here, as we will see, is a new way of construing ethics 
which en-courages us all to take responsibility - as far as is possible - for our own 
life as, precisely, responsible for 'more than one'. For, possibly, every-one. 
Affirmez La Survie: in the Spirit of the 'Incorruptibles' 
For what Derrida is cultivating here is an 'ethos of writing and thinking' which he 
has 'inherited' (without of course espousing vain repetition or unquestioning 
faithfulness) from both a by-gone generation - stretching from 'Lacan to Althusser 
by way of Levin as, Foucault, Barthes, Deleuze, Blanchot, Lyotard, Sarah Kofman, 
etc ... ,123 - and those writer-thinkers, poets, philosophers, or psycho-analysts still 
living, all of whom he regards as being characterised by a metonymic, intransient, 
incorruptible approach which involves, as he argues: 
... not letting public opinion, the media, or the phantasm of an intimidating 
readership frighten or force us into simplifying or repressing. Hence the 
strict taste for refinement, paradox and aporia. 124 
It is not that Derrida wants to teach us a 'postmodem lesson' in the sense of 
teaching us 'how to live ... finally', for as Derrida remarks, 'to learn how to live is 
to learn how to die' 125 - and Derrida professes to have remained uneducable as 
123 From Derrida's last interview with the French newspaper Le Monde entitled: '1 am at War with 
Myself' and published on Wednesday the 18 August 2004. English translation by Pascale 
Fusshoeller. Leslie Thatcher and Steve Weissmen for 'truthout.org' on-line at 
http://www.truthout.org. With many thanks to Dr David Clark for his help in locating this English 
Translation. 
124 Ibid. 
125 Ibid. 
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regards even (or particularly) his own death. 126 Rather, in drawing attention to the 
primary, structural dimension of 'survival' - which 'does not add up to living or 
dying' 127 - Derrida is raising to the level of consciousness a form of 'yes' saying 
which remains indifferent to evidence by way of being an unconditional 
affirmation of life. As Judith Butler says correctly in her obituary-cum-homage to 
Jacques Derrida, 'Affirm the survival': 
Derrida makes clear that there is, regardless of the impoverished state of 
wisdom in this life, an imperative to affirm this life, a life for which there is 
no redemption, a life that is not justified through reference to another, more 
perfect life. 128 
For Derrida does not wish to renounce anything which has formed him - things 
which he loves (thosejorees which are 'infinitely greater and more powerful than 
oneself. .. [but] ... nonetheless form part of this little "me",129, from the Bible to 
Kant, Marx to Freud, Heidegger to Levinas, Hussed and Saussure). At the same 
time, however, he also explores the problems of formulation; of the folds, the 
paradoxes and the supplementary contradictions he finds in this 'inheritance' and 
which appear to evade understanding, not in order to debunk this or that text (used 
in both its conventional and expanded sense), but in order to mark the singularity 
of every situation, of every' event' of writing or reading. Derrida wants to make 
126 Asked in a 2002 interview whether or not he had made peace with the inevitability of death 
Derrida replied 'So far I haven't and I doubt I ever will, and this awareness permeates everything I 
think. It's terrible what's going on in the world and all these things are on my mind, but they exist 
alongside the terror of my own death'. The interview is contained in Screenplay and Essays on the 
Film: Derrida. Directed by Amy Ziering Kofman and Kirby Dick, op.cit, 2005. 
127 Ibid. 
128 'Affirm the survival' by Judith Butler contained in the journal Radical Phi losoph.v. Jan!Feb 
2005, p.23. 
129 Derrida, Jacques, 'I am at War with Myself', op.cit 2004. 
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salient the endless readability which appears as the structurality of an opening 
common to both language and existence; an irreducible excess which calls for the 
incessant drawing and redrawing of boundaries as we try to make sense of the 
world - the rules of which we have to invent (even if it is to re-affirm an already 
existing rule) along the way. This is the chance for that which is irreducible to the 
same; for that 'bit of newness' which (possibly) grows out of the inherent 
instability of a past inheritance (always more than one), that always runs wild 
without the assurance of an identifiable sender or addressee able to fix/determine 
meaning in the form of univocal and immovable foundations, axioms, ideas and 
concepts and the like (we are back to the apocalyptic postal system). 
And, undoubtedly, Derrida's own life experiences heightened his sensitivity to the 
inter-textual differential networks within which we all operate; the border lines we 
both respect and transgress. In autobiographical mode he says: 
Contingencies have made me a French Jew from Algeria from the generation 
born before the 'War of Independence': so many singularities, even among 
the Jews and even among the Jews from Algeria. I participate in an extra-
ordinary transformation of Algerian French Judaism; my great grandparents 
were still very close to the Arabs in language, customs etc ... 130 
Derrida's language (his 'essential' as he describes it in Le Monde) is, of course, the 
'French' language, which he describes as 'the only one I was taught to cultivate, 
the only one for which I may call myself more or less responsible' .131 And yet, 
Derrida always had the feeling of being, in varying degrees, a 'foreigner' to this 
130 Ibid. 
131 Ibid. 
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language, as did many Algerian French people - albeit he is now 'welcomed in'. 
Indeed, Derrida feels that his 'singular story' has exacerbated his consciousness of 
what he calls the 'universal law in me'; namely, that 'language is not owned. Not 
naturally by its very essence. Hence the fantasies of property, appropriation and 
colonial imposition' .132 Of his relationship to his mother tongue - which he 
describes as neither nationalistic nor conservative - as of language in general, he 
says: 
One may not do whatever one wants with the language; it was there before 
we were; it will survive us. If one affects the language of anything, it must 
be done in a refined way, by respecting its secret law through disrespect. 
That is, unfaithful fidelity: when I do violence to the French language, I do it 
with a refined respect for what I believe to be an injunction of this language, 
in its life, its evolution.133 
It is Derrida's hope that he will leave his own 'traces' in the French language -
indeed in all the discourses/texts (in the conventional and the expanded sense) in 
which he operates - and so engender that passion for the impossible in others; with 
one ear open to the other, to the future, to what is to come. Interminably. 
It is this call which Derrida will sound with increasing urgency in our postmodern 
condition which is, in a sense, 'hyper-modem'. That is to say, that shorn of 
historical teleology, postmodern societies (re-)produce their socio-economic, 
cultural and political hegemonies in as stable a condition as possible, in a 
significant part through an increasingly complex techno-scientific media which 
132 Ibid. 
1.13 Ibid. 
99 
continues to (re-) produce the 'neutral' space-time fostered by historical discourse 
by speeding it up to an absolute 'real time'. Despite the increased recognition of 
difference - different people/culturesireligions/customs/politics/morality - the 
world appears smaller and more homogenous via a kind of calculable plurality that 
attempts to manage and, to a significant extent, 'stereo-type' different 'identities' 
both at the point of production and consumption. For such images are immediately 
disseminated and made accessible through radio, television and the internet, 
whereby everything appears both more diverse yet somehow simultaneously pre-
programmed or saturated with an immanent meaning where nothing is left to 
chance and where nothing is allowed to 'become' anything other than it is said to 
be by those who (chiefly economic and political hegemonic groups in charge of the 
mechanics of discourse) dominate discursive practices. Derrida therefore thinks 
that (in the West at least) we have come to pretty much un-critically accept our 
liberal, capitalist democracies as somehow the best we can hope for, however 
imperfect, and however far from their emancipating and democratising ideals they 
appear to have strayed. Whether through ignorance or apathy we have become 
paralysed in relation to how to act or resist in ways which seek to foster new 
democratising and emancipating ways of thinking and acting. 
Critical Resistance: The Arti-Factuality and Actu-Virtuality of the Postmodern 
Times. 
F or the above reasons it is therefore essential for Derrida to make us aware of the 
artifactuality and actu-virtuality of 'our' postmodern times. Here the task is one of 
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making us aware of the artificial nature of the 'present' (Western) world; a 
'present' which - as he says in the interview 'The Deconstruction of Actuality' - is 
'constantly changing in form and content as a result of the tele-technology of what 
is confusingly called news, information or communication' .134 It is crucial that the 
postmodern subject - as the 'resistance fighter' Derrida explicitly wants us to be-
comprehends the means by which postmodern societies have come to reproduce 
themselves beyond the' ends of history' and have helped form the horizon of their 
own self-creations and human solidarities. As we might expect from Derrida, this 
is not simply a negation or a straightforward critique of such production, but a 
means of de-naturalising its 'systems' in order to expose their constructed and 
selective nature so to open up such systems to difference and otherness in more 
democratising and emancipating ways - a process which might be aided by just the 
tele-technological advances which overwhelmingly conspire to close off such 
possibilities. Again, it is about taking up political positions in this 'age of the 
aporia' against those who seek to control and appropriate the (in principle if not in 
fact) uncontrollable and the un-appropriable. 
Accordingly, it is in this 'context' that Derrida explains what the 'portmanteau' 
term - 'artifactualify' means; it means 
134 'The Deconstruction of Actuality: An Interview with Jacques Derrida'. Conducted by Brigitte 
Sohm, Cristina de Peretti, Stephane Douailler, Patrice Venneren and Emile Ma1et (English 
translation by Jonathan Ree). In Radical Philosophy 68, Autumn 1994, p.28. 
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· .. that actuality is indeed made: it is important to know what it is made of, 
but it is even more necessary to recognise that it is made. It is not given, but 
actively produced: it is sorted, invested and perfonnatively interpreted by a 
range of hierarchising and selective procedures - factitious or artificial 
procedures - which are always subservient to various powers and interests of 
which their 'subjects' and agents (producers and consumers of actuality, 
always interpreters, and in some cases 'philosophers' too) are never 
sufficiently aware. The 'reality' of' actuality' - however individual, 
irreducible, stubborn, painful or tragic it may be - only reaches us through 
fictional devices.135 
The only way to analyse such artifactuality is thus, for Derrida, through a 'work of 
resistance', through vigilant counter-interpretation and such like. Just as Hegel 
was correct to advise philosophers of his time to read the newspapers, then 
Today, the same duty requires us to find out how the news is made, and by 
whom: the daily papers, the weeklies, and the TV news as well. We need to 
insist on looking at them from the other end: that of the press agencies as 
well as that of the tele-prompter. And we should never forget what this 
entails: whenever a journalist or a politician appears to be speaking to us 
directly, in our homes, and looking us straight in the eye, he or she is 
actually reading, from a screen, at the dictation of a 'prompter', and reading 
a text which was produced elsewhere, on a different occasion, possibly by 
other people, or by a whole network of nameless writers and editors.136 
One is never sure exactly who is speaking, from where, why, to whom: there are so 
many voices, so many echoes, so many crossed lines ... 
Consequently out of 'duty' to develop a systematic critique of artifactuality as 
'citizens' or 'philosophers' Derrida makes some 'crucial qualifications' which he 
argues must be kept in mind if this artifactuality, however 'artificial and 
manipulative' it may be, is to 'bend itself or lend itself to the coming of what is on 
135 Ibid, p.28. 
136 Ibid, p.28. 
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its way, to the outcome which carries it along and towards which it is moving. 
And to which it is going to have to bear witness, whether it wants to or not. '137 
They are three-fold, and they run as follows. 
The first qualification concerns 'the question of nationality'; that is to say, the way 
in which the apparently international processes of homogenisation may provoke 
national resistance. In other words, the way in which creating a global solidarity 
might be undermined by nationalist (in terms of either an individual or a group of 
nations) concerns. Derrida argues here that among the 'filters' which inform what 
he calls 'the moment' - nations, regions and provinces, indeed 'the West' - there 
is still a dominance which over-determines every other hierarchy: sport in the first 
place, then the 'politician', and finally the cultural (where-in the nations identity, 
its concerns and interests are given predominance to the exclusion of 'others'). 
What this leads to, argues Derrida, is a discounting of a whole mass of events 
which are regarded as being irrelevant to the national interest, the national 
language or the national code/style. Thus on the news, 'actuality' in Europe is 
automatically Eurocentric. Even if not with an openly nationalistic fervour, 
'foreigners' - even those resident in the same country - are effectively excluded or 
silenced. He goes on: 'Some journalists make honourable attempts to escape from 
this pressure, but by definition they can never do enough, and in the end it does not 
137 Ibid, p.29. 
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depend on professional journalists anyway' .138 And for Derrida this situation has 
particular resonance at a time when the old nationalisms are taking on new forms, 
and utilising the most up-to-date media techniques/equipment (quoting the official 
radio and television of the former Yugoslavia to be a particularly striking 
example). Speaking of those whom he argues have now seen it necessary to cast 
doubt on the critique of ethno- and Euro-centrism Derrida states: 
... it is as if they were completely blind to the deadly threats currently being 
issued, in the name of ethnicities, right at the centre of Europe, within a 
Europe whose only reality today - whose only 'actuality' - is economic and 
national, and whose only law, in alliances as in conflicts, is still that of the 
market. 139 
As always for Derrida, the tragedy lies in a contradiction, a double-demand: 'the 
apparent internationalisation of sources of news and information is often based on 
the appropriation and monopolisation of channels of information, publication and 
distribution' .140 Thus it is that he argues: 'this apparently international process of 
homogenisation may provoke national resistance' .141 
Turning to the second qualification, Derrida says: 
... this international artifactuality - the monopolisation of this' actuality 
effect', and the centralisation of the artificial power to 'create events' - may 
be accompanied by advances in 'live' communication, taking place in so-
called 'real' time, in the present.142 
138 Ibid, p.29. 
139 Ibid, p.29. 
140 Ibid, p.29. 
141 Ibid, p.29. 
142 Ibid, p.29. 
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As Derrida argues - appropriately enough given the medium he is communicating 
through here - the interview itself is exemplary of the kind of genres (including 
telephone and (video) taped recordings, on-line chat rooms etc ... ) which give the 
(fictive) impression of 'immediate' presence and 'live' communication. Crucially, 
if we want to continue making use of such methods of communication - and how 
else, he rhetorically queries, can we seek an effective dialogue with the other on a 
local, national and inter-national basis - we must recognise that they 'are never 
pure: they do not furnish us with intuitions or transparencies, or with perceptions 
unmarked by technical interpretation'. Indeed this is a lesson we have already 
learnt on the most intimate level through Derrida's deconstructive reading of 
HusserI and the fallacy of a totally self-present communication (in interior 
dialogue). The (quasi) structure of the mark/trace, of mechanical repetition, has 
always already intervened. 
Third, and in response to those who conflate all postmodem thinking with nihilism 
and/or anarchism; with the fictionalisation of 'the real', Derrida writes: 
... the necessary deconstruction of artifactuality should never be allowed to 
tum into an alibi or an excuse. It must not create an inflation of the image, 
or be used to neutralise every danger by means of what might be called the 
trap of the trap, the delusion of delusion: a denial of events, by which 
everything - even violence and suffering, war and death - is said to be 
constructed and fictive, and constituted by and for the media, so that nothing 
really ever happens, only images, simulacra and delusions. The 
deconstruction of artifactuality should be carried out as far as possible, but 
we must also take every precaution against this kind of critical neo-
idealism. 143 
1-13 lb' A 29 lu, p. . 
105 
F or what deconstruction is 'about'; what drives Derrida' s democratic and 
emancipatory hopes and desires, is singularity, are singular events and all which 
remain irreducible in them. His concern is to demonstrate the way in which (in our 
postmodern societies as in all social formations) 'news' or 'information' is a 
contradictory and heterogeneous process. '[I]t can transform and strengthen 
knowledge, truth and the cause of the future democracy, with all the problems 
associated with them, and it must do so, just as it often has done in the past' .144 But 
we have to be aware of what is left out, of the way our 'reality' is a shifting 
construction which must be constantly revised in the face of the 
other to whom we must always seek to do justice (again, in principle if not in 
fact).145 To draw attention to what Derrida calls (via his second 'portmanteau' 
term) the actu-virtuality of the (postmodern) times (that is to the always 
positioned, never 'neutral' virtual images, virtual spaces and virtual events which 
help to construct146 what we regard as our 'actuality' today) is to open up the 
closure of 'events' (of all kinds) to re-reading(s), to new meanings/significance(s) 
outside those sanctioned or designated by those in control of the means of 
production and the consumers who devour such 'information'. 
144 Ibid, p.29. . .. 
145 For to remind ourselves, it is the other who will judge whether or not my actIons, my deCISIOns, 
(will) have been just. 
146 For our actuality is, of course, not only produced by the 'media'. 
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Counter-Signatures: a Matter of Life and Death 
It, therefore, appears to be a question of the various inter-weaving discursive levels 
and their media constitutive of our 'everyday reality'; of what Derrida calls in 
'Choreographies' : 
... an incessant, daily negotiation - individual or not - sometimes 
microscopic, sometimes punctuated by a poker-like gamble; always deprived 
of insurance, whether it be in private life or within institutions. Each man 
and each woman must commit his or her own singularity, the un-translatable 
factor of his or her life and death.147 
Only'!' can live my life and die my death. However over-determined I may be by 
the systems/structures (economic, social, cultural etc ... ) which have formed 'me' 
and continue to do so, there is a certain irreducible, idiosyncratic quality about my 
life which is suitably complex; a certain 'excess' over all and every generalisation 
(not least the'!, itself) which allows one to re-member, choose, to make decisions, 
to 'change' - however (seemingly) minor or private this incessant structural 
genesis may be. So, just as I never stop re-reading myself, so others should never 
stop (re) reading this 'little me' and I should never stop reading others (people, 
groups, academic discourse, nations etc ... ). In my singularity I remain a 'secret' 
to the other and they to me, and I remain above all a secret (perhaps) to myself. 
This is not to say that I do not have an identity or, better still, 'identities', identities 
largely formed by the discursive world I have been born into (that is predominantly 
a white, western, capitalist, liberal, male dominated, technocratic, social-
democracy). Instead it is to say that such identities are only constructed in and 
147 Derrida, Jacques, 'Choreographies'. In Points ... Interviews with Jacques Derrida 197-1-1994. 
op.cit, 1995, p.95. 
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through difference and deferral that whatever '1 am', '1 am' ('is') an ongoing 
project without beginning and without (ends).148 1 will never know 'who I really 
am' and after my death, no one will ever 'get me right.' Doubtless this is what 
prompted Derrida himself to remark, in the face of his own impending death: 
I feel that people have not even begun to read me, that if there are many very 
good readers (a few dozen in the world, perhaps) they will do so only later. 
On the other hand, 1 feel that two weeks after my death, nothing at all of my 
work will be left except what remains in the copyright registration library. 149 
This can be read, in a certain highly suggestive way, as a meditation on copyright, 
on the signature, and on what Derrida calls here the 'counter-signature': of who 
'owns' what? who signs?, who counter-signs?, and what does this mean for 
traditional, metaphysical notions of property, propriety and authority in terms of 
the politics of interpretation involved in the negotiation of our (inherently) textual 
world; the kind of questions/issues raised here having occupied Derrida 
incessantly throughout his career (most thematically in works such as Limited 
incl50, 'Counter-signatures' (PointsY 51 , Writing and Difference152 , 'No Apocalypse, 
148 As always here it is a matter of remaining on guard against the One. For as Derrida will argue: 
'As soon as there is One, there is murder, wounding, traumatism. The One guards against the 
Other, it protects itself from the Other. But in the movement of this jealous violence it 
compromises in itself its self-othemess or self-difference. The difference from within one's self, 
which makes it One. The One as the Other. At one and the same time, but in a same time that is 
out of joint, the One forgets to remember itself. It keeps and erases the archive of this injustice that 
it is, of this violence that it does. The One makes itself violence, it violates what it is, the very 
violence that it does to itself. The determination of the self as One is violence'. This quote 
originally taken from Archive Fever (The University of Chicago Press, Chicago: 19%) is re-
produced as it appears here in Screenplay and Essays on the Film: Derrida, op.cit, p.88. 
149 Derrida, Jacques, 'I am at war with myself', op.cit, 2004. 
150 Derrida, Jacques, Limited Inc, op.cit,1988. 
151 Derrida, Jacques, Points, op.cit, 1995. 
152 Derrida, Jacques, Writing and Difference, op.cit, 1997. 
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Not Now' (Psyche: Inventions de L 'autre.153 Of singularity and the (counter-) 
signature Derrida says, typically, 
... there is singularity but it does not collect itself, it 'consists' in not 
collecting itself. .. the idiom[ atic], if there is any, that by which one 
recognises a signature, does not reappropriate itself, as paradoxical as that 
may seem. It can only be apprehended by the other, given over to the other. 
Of course, I may think I recognise myself, identify my signature or my 
sentence, but only on the basis of experience and of an exercise which I will 
have undertaken and in which I will have been trained as other, the 
possibility of repetition and thus of imitation, simulacrum, being inscribed at 
the very origin of his singularity.154 
In other words, as Caputo states cogently: 
A 'text' for Derrida has a 'signature' which is not reducible to the name of 
an 'author' or to the signing of a proper name. A signature is a matter of the 
idiomaticity of a text ... of the idiosyncratic string of traces that constitute it, 
not of the psychology of an author. As a structure of writing [my italics] it 
invites or solicits repetition, a counter-signing. Texts, if there is anything to 
them, elicit, call for, and provoke other texts - responses, commentaries, 
interpretations, controversies, imitations, forgeries, plagiarisms, echoes, 
effluences, influences, confluences, translations, transformations, bald 
misinterpretations, creative misunderstandings, etc ... (Otherwise they are 
ignored and forgotten, and serve only the purpose of tenure and 
promotion). 155 
Caputo further remarks (on the text and the signature in general) that it belongs to 
the very structure of the signature to solicit and elicit counter-signatures: 'ways of 
signing on to, ways of repeating the text'. The question, as ever - in the light of 
what Derrida has taught us about the fallacy of the transcendental signified, about 
the irreducible excess of meaning produced by the inscription of presence in the 
153 Derrida, Jacques, Psyche: Inventions L 'autre, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis: 
1989. 
154 Derrida, Jacques, 'A 'Madness' Must Watch Over Thinking', in Positions, op.cit, 1995, pp.354-
355. 
155 Caputo, John.D, Deconstruction in a Nutshell, op.cit, 1997, p.189. 
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differential matrix and of the complexity of the (inter) textual milieu and about our 
certain (non) place within it (always on border lines) - is whether we have the 
intellectual courage to counter-sign affirmatively, faithfully (in our unfaithfulness), 
creatively, and responsibly by trying to make decisions which respect the 
singularity of the context and the other who will always judge if 1 have been just 
(even when I aff'rrm an existing rule) and counter-sign. 
Derrida and Ermarth: A Tale of Two Axioms 
1 turn now, as outlined in my introductory remarks to this second chapter, to 
juxtapose Jacques Derrida's affirmative postmodern subjectivity whose axiom is 
arguably 'I inherit, therefore, 1 am ... yes, yes ... ' against the kind of post modern 
consciousness espoused by Ermarth in her Sequel to History: Postmodernism and 
the Crisis of Representational Time whose axiom is therein described as 'I swing, 
therefore, 1 am'. 1 do so, as already indicated, to support my contention that while 
Ermarth's experimental 'anthematics' provide us with radical imaginaries to work 
with, Derrida operates in terms of a much more effective textual praxis which, 
working within existing structures and working through our modern-metaphysical 
inheritance, has a better understanding of the need to work in the 'torsion' between 
metaphysics and the' differential matrix' (in which it is inscribed) whilst 
conversely arriving at a greatly more open and radical reading of the 'politics of 
morality' . 
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Of the new kind of rhythmic consciousness which Ermarth finds at work 
exemplarily in postmodem narrative sequences, she says: 
This new cogito is like breathing or like a heart-beat, not like thinking, 
pneuma not logos, a most intimate rhythm. In this way, every moment is a 
'terribly sweet instant' where conscious life first is conjugated and then goes 
'paff, the end', to be succeeded by another, and another again. This delicate 
shift of equipoise initiates a profound reformation: a new definition of 
consciousness, and a new world of practice without transcendence, or depth, 
or history, or dialectics, or the 'subject' and the 'object'. Pneumatic, not 
logo centric, like Robbe-Grillet's successive experiments, like the heartbeat 
of Ada, the redefinition of consciousness and subjectivity empowers that 
'swing' that puts discourse on the march. 156 
For Ermarth what distinguishes postmodern narrative sequences from their 
historical counterparts is the active engagement of readers who, 'as they attend to 
varying thematic voices, construct from the paratactic elements sequential figures 
that differ with each reader and reading' .157 Of this process she goes on: 
This constructive activity takes place at a level of complexity impossible to 
summarize. Reading Jealousy or Hopscotch or Ada engages readers in 
sustained feats of multilevel thinking, a complex discipline of consciousness 
resembling the power of good chess players. Not only must the player 
remember accumulated patterns and frequencies, with each new variation he 
or she must also keep in view the possible developments of which these 
themes might be capable. The more themes of details one becomes aware of, 
the more multi-thematic power one has. 158 
Linear time and its constitutive alibi in modernity's 'sovereign subject' become 
rhythmic time and multi-level consciousness: 'The collapse in postmodem writing 
(and living) of dualisms that sustain representational distance and enables it 
mediations, opens an unfamiliar and surprising situation where both time and 
156 Deeds Ennarth, Elizabeth, Sequel to History, op.cit, 1992, p.137. 
157 Ibid, p.194. 
158 Ibid, p.194. 
III 
consciousness belong to the linguistic figure'. 159 Following Julia Kristeva' s work 
on the semioticl60 and Derrida's notion of the endlessly ludic character of language 
(and thus life - for to have residence in a language is to have residence in a reality) 
Ermarth seeks to promote the limitless play which ruins any structures attempt to 
effect closure. Like Derrida, Ermarth seeks to affirm life, the future, the 
unknowable and unforeseeable. 
It is thus that Ermarth argues that postmodernism has changed our 'reality' in ways 
which she likens 'in general' to the 'postmodem' re-description of physical reality 
by those such as Illya Priogine and Isabelle Stenger. Priogine himself received the 
Nobel Prize for his work on the thermo-dynamics of irreversible systems and most 
importantly showed in this context that in dissipative structures (i.e. systems far 
from thermodynamic equilibrium) ordered states may sometimes arise 
spontaneously out of disordered states. Our chaotic universe is inherently creative. 
This presents a new conception of order which is independent of the' closures and 
finalities' of classical dynamics and allows us to see how nonequilibrium brings 
'order out of chaos'. Here the element of chance in probabilistic processes opens 
up 'new sources of life, new rhythms of continuance in ever new states and modes: 
The more determinist laws appear limited, the more open the universe is to 
159 Ibid, p. 18. 
160 As the Concise Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy states: 'Kristeva fuses linguistic insights 
with psychoanalytic inquiry as she presents two distinct yet interrelated aspects of the signifying 
process, the semiotic and the symbolic. The semiotic aspect of language is vocal, pre-verbal, 
rhythmic, kinetic and bodily. The symbolic aspect of language is social, cultural and rule 
governed'. Routledge, London and New York: 2000, pp.444-445. 
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fluctuation and innovation'. 161 
However, as I have already alluded to in my opening remarks, there are some 
fundamental problems with Ermarth's conception of rhythmic time and multi-level 
consciousness which arguably make it less useful for re-thinking or re-
conceptualisng our self-creations (and human solidarities issuing there-from) in 
post-modernity than Derrida's reading(s) of metaphysics in deconstruction. 
First, the kind of multi-level consciousness Ermarth find salient in postmodern 
rhythmic narratives (such as Ada or Hopscotch) sounds terribly reminiscent of the 
kind of 'nightmare of equivocality' Derrida describes in relation to, for example, 
the work(s) of James Joyce. For while it is the case that in our own lives there are 
various phenomenological rhythms (some fast, some slow, some regular, some 
interrupted) and various levels of discursive operation, to keep them all 'in mind' 
with their co-extensive potentialities for development seems difficult if not 
impossible to imagine in daily life - and certainly no guarantee of a less totalising 
way of thinking: there seems nothing that would, in principle, preclude the 
decisions we make being fascist or racist, for example. And indeed, there is no 
such restraint on the ethico-political/moral decisions we make. Once, apres 
Derrida, the space of the ethico-political decision is uncovered, even if one accepts 
the 'differential matrix' and the foundationless nature of discourse - which by no 
161 Jenkins, Keith, Why History? Routledge, London and New York: 1999, p.180. 
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means everybody does of course - nothing - and this is crucial to register -
follows from this. Derrida opens up the chance, the possibility for less 
foundational, less totalising decisions to be made by drawing attention to 
'metaphysics in deconstruction'. But, after this, nothing necessarily follows, no-
thing is entailed. Instead, we have to make what are always undecidable decisions 
- on an individual and communal basis - over and over again, and hope that, being 
increasingly educated to difference and alterity (in the radical sense) we make 
more emancipating and democratising choices. Not that we (we resistance 
fighters) will ever get anything 'right' of course. For to reach such a point would 
be to close things off; to deny the un-programmable and unforeseeable future; the 
radical other then is, always, yet 'to come'. 
Thus I think that what Derrida hopes for is that we will develop a taste (moral and 
aesthetic) for the secret; that is, that we will cultivate a critical consciousness here 
and now in our current socio-intellectuallandscape wherein we will work to 
exhaust metaphysics conceptual resources - modem and postmodem - in the face 
of the other (always more than one) who will always decide if I have been 
successful. It is a daunting task and we may not succeed. Nothing is now 
guaranteed. And, to some degree, Ermarth herself draws less radical conclusions 
than this from a possibly more radical notion of the postmodem consciousness. 
For Ermarth still holds out for the hope of a 'consensus' based on what she sees as 
the acceptance of the finite nature of postmodem time and space as described 
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through the chaos theory and 'dissipative structures' depicted by Priogine and 
Stenger. Apart from the fact that this sounds very much like a proposition 
concerning how the world 'really is' (i.e. terribly metaphysical in the most 
conventional sense), as Keith Jenkins argues: 
Let us suppose that the actual world is like Ermarth's rhythmic description of 
it apres Priogine and Stenger. And let's say everyone accepts this - liberals, 
Marxists, feminists, Fascists - everyone. What difference would it make? 
Do we seriously think that a political/moral 'constrained' consensus between 
Ermarth and Fascists is going to be arrived at because of the wayan 
(indifferent) world is under the description ofphysics? . .I don't think so; 
their moral differences remain incommensurable because they're moral all 
the way down.162 
Subsequently, and with such qualifications as this in mind, I would argue that 
Derrida's more 'measured' (and what can indeed be described as a more 
conservative) approach to 'metaphysics in deconstruction', is more likely to effect 
a change in our postmodem consciousness which becomes increasingly aware of 
our meaning-making capacities; indeed the meaning-making process per se. This 
is not, of course, hostile to Ermarth's thinking, not least in terms of the fact that, 
constructed out of strings of traces containing various voices (even if barely 
audible) and inter-textual processes, Derrida shows the way that thought has 
always been 'multi-level', even if channelled in foundationalist ways closed off to 
difference. Indeed, it is such processes which Derrida seeks to explore and exploit 
both as they have been metaphysically construed in various contexts and as they 
are open to more violent re-interpretations without ends. For after Derrida (and 
Ermarth), even if, as I have argued, we always remain over-determined by various 
162 Ibid, p.180. 
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structures (economic, cultural, political), so long as we accept the consequences of 
this we all (in principle, if not always in fact) have a certain freedom to change 
'our world' on an individual and communal basis. Structures are never closed. 
And this I would want to insist, is a good thing. But we have to accept - a 'we' 
that includes Ermarth - that there is an irreducible danger co-existing with this 
chance, whilst further recognising that 'hegemonic thinking' is not exclusively a 
Nazi or Stalinist phenomenon but a propensity (albeit at a lower level of violence) 
of all thought which tries to make sense of the world (historical or rhythmic or 
whatever) which can be minimised but not eradicated (which is not simply a 
negative phenomena but the condition of meaningful discourse and the opening of 
a new kind of morality). That is to say, we cannot think (individually or 
communally) outside of a certain presence which cannot but help reduce 
difference. However, wherever we are in the text already, taking the singularity of 
events into account (that is, re-thinking the very concept of the event), we can 
think presence other-wise - that is, in ways un-conducive to totalitarianism and 
more conducive to an endless dialogue with the other, with those who appear 
unfamiliar and different to 'us'. As Jenkins reminds us, nothing is intrinsically 
repressive or intrinsically liberating (for postmodem thinking empties out all 
notions ofintrinsicality) only contingently so. Some ways of thinking (Derrida's 
exemplarily I think) are more open to this than others and lead one to act (in the 
ethico-political space of the decision) accordingly. Thus, while I do not 
necessarily disagree with much of what Ermarth says, I think that the ontological 
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and ethico-political conclusions she draws remain particularly suspect, conflictive, 
and out of kilter with the textual praxis needed to negotiate the post-modem 
condition ... not least because she fails to adequately address in anything like the 
same detail as her investigations into historical time, the postmodem phenomenon 
of virtual time/space which I argue has filled the uncritical certaintist void left by 
conventional historical temporality and its conventions. 
Concluding Remarks 
In this Chapter, I have attempted to argue that Jacques Derrida gives voice, with 
increasing urgency, to an absolutely affirmative postmodem subjectivity whose 
axiom might be 'I inherit, therefore, I am ... yes, yes ... ' Following the way in 
which this subjectivity has emerged from the ruins of modernity's 'sovereign 
subject' and its 'History', I have followed Derrida as he arguably re-figures our 
modern-metaphysical inheritance by way of a new 'politics of memory' which 
makes of us all (like it or know it or not) postmodem resistance fighters against 
the attempt(s) - 'modem' or 'postmodem' - to execute what Baudrillard calls the 
'perfect crime' - that is - the attempt by social formations to reproduce 
themselves in as stable a condition as possible so that all de-stabilising 
problems/excesses are either excluded or reduced to the 'old and the familiar' 
without remainders. For as Derrida argues following his deconstructive readings 
of Kant, what such societies attempt to efface is the secret that there is no secret. 
And of course, this changes every 'thing , , no'thing' is given (in advance) but is 
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always a task to do, to come. To remind ourselves ofDerrida's crucial point once 
more, as subjects we are thrown into an inherently foundationless, inter-textual 
discursive landscape which precedes our birth and will survive our death, and we 
can each sign or, better, counter-sign differently (wherever we are in a text 
already) according to our own ethical/aesthetic sensibilities. There are no alibis 
here (no historical necessities for example), no norms or rules or authorities or 
institutions we have to appeal to. In the final instance of the decision the decision 
is 'mine' (without ever being quite mine), re-marking the singularity of a life, a 
singular'!', which is always, always, 'more than one'. 
The result of Derrida' s bringing to theoretical consciousness of this 'subj ectivity-
in-processes' (Ermarth, 1992), born into a 'zone of arrivals without arrivals' 
(Bennington163), is thus a hyper-politicising of our textual world which, as I will 
argue in Chapter Three, profoundly transforms the 'ethical' and the 'political', 
opening up Western liberal capitalist democracies to a potentially more radical, 
emancipating and democratising, future. As I will suggest, Derrida hereby offers a 
163 This 'zone of arrivals without arrivals' is designated by Geoff Bennington in the essay 'Is it 
Time' (Interrupting Derrida, op.cit) as that quasi-messianic structure wherein the 'here and now 
which allows for the thought of singularity as alterity in its arrival requires a thought of the moment 
that is not only simply present to itself in the presence of the present, but which is not recoverable 
as the telos of any natural or institutional process whatsoever, an eskhaton without salvation or 
redemption'. (p.137). Critiquing the tendency of some post -structuralists (including the early 
Derrida) to conflate the eschatological and the teleological, this 'zone of arrivals without arrivals' is 
thus the 'maintenance of the strictly messianic moment not only short of any predicatiYe when '" 
but any content and axiological detennination'. (p.137). It is, in other words, the condition of a 
never satiated justice, it is the radicall'avenir, which respects the alterity of the 'other' which 
always remains, structurally, 'to come'. This takes on even greater significance in the coming 
chapter. 
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very real, and very practical opportunity, orientated through what he calls a new 
'global solidarity', to re-invent a fairer, freer and more peaceful world. There are 
no guarantees, contra Ermarth there is no foundation( s) for a politicaVmoral 
constrained consensus. This is a task always and forever forged in aporias, in 
risks and chances. But, as I hope to show in the next chapter, this is a chance well 
worth taking for those with similar dreams. 
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Chapter Three: 
Derrida: Changing the World Before 
Two O'Clock. 
We won't change the world before two o'cloc~ but what I'm saying is that we 
have to. 
Jacques Derrida 164 
In this chapter I argue that the kind of post-historical, post-modem subjectivity to 
which Derrida gives voice, working, as it does, beyond the ends of endist history, 
offers the best chance (a risk and a chance) for 'us' to be able to refigure our 
Western liberal capitalist democracies in more democratising and emancipating 
ways no longer paralysed by what he calls old radioactive 'habits of the past'. 
With particular reference here to Francis Fukuyama's now infamous proclamation 
of 'our' having reached the 'end of history' as he saw it embodied in the hegemony 
of free market liberalism, Derrida not only brings to the fore those crises/issues 
which appear to contradict this utopian eschatology - for example famine, disease, 
poverty - but he offers a sustained meditation, proffered in certain 'spirits of 
Marx'(ism), on how we might re-think the logic of those (Eurocentric) social, 
economic, cultural, political, ethical and legal frameworks (such as they can be 
dissociated) which attempt to regulate our lives on an individual and communal 
164 Quote taken from an interview with Jacques Derrida conducted by Geoffrey Bennington at the 
Centre for Modem French Thought at the University of Sussex on the 1st of December 1997. This 
interview centres on a discussion of Jacques Derrida's 1997 work Politics of Friendship (Verso, 
London and New York: 1997). Translation by Benjamin Noys and published on-line at 
http://www.sussex.ac.uklUnitsifrenchthoughtiderrida.htm. 
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basis and dictate our patterns of thought in ways over-determined by various 
ideological/political interests grounded in various metaphysics of presence. In so 
doing I believe Derrida offers a practical opportunity, orientated through his vision 
for a new 'global solidarity', offostering a fairer, freer and more peaceful world 
which comes out of these axioms - and informed by those axioms he first 
articulated 'against' HusserI. 
Consequently in advancing this thesis I shall begin by framing my discussion with 
reference to the path taken from Derrida's earliest works - in this study his 
deconstructive readings ofHusserl and Saussure exemplarily - in order to support 
his claim that 'everything I have written has been directly or indirectly political'. 165 
Unlike some commentators, I take this remark as literally as a remark can be taken. 
For it is in what are generally regarded as his more abstract theoretical works that a 
hitherto effaced ethico-political space (of the decision) - which is first a relation to 
the other - is revealed to rupture those metaphysics of presence upon which 
traditional political and ethical thinking has been based. It is thus that from the 
beginning, and passing (in this study) through a deconstructive reading of 
Emmanuel Kant's anti-apocalyptic treatise, that Derrida serves to undercut 
modernity's sovereign subject and its 'history' and in the process demand a 
revision of the 'new world order' and its modem-metaphysical conceptual 
genealogy. This 'continuity' between Derrida's earlier more 'elliptical' political 
165 Derrida, Jacques and Geoffrey BenningtoQ Politics o/Friendship interview. op.cit, 1997. 
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(and ethical) enunciations and his later more overt examination of the 'political 
question'l66 as such, is demonstrated, I argue, in his first work to openly address 
these ethico-political matters, Specters of Marx: The State of Debt, the Work of 
Mourning & the New International. 167 Here, Derrida develops what he terms the 
(quasi-) 'logic of spectrality', a 'hauntologicallogic', which he follows into a 
sustained meditation on various sprits ofMarx(ism) in order to set forth a 
deconstructive reading not only of capitalism in all its forms, its superstructures, 
media and self-justifying ideology, but also its means of self-consolidation through 
that 'techno-mediatic power' which, touched on in Chapter Two, can both open 
and severely restrict the democratic space. Indeed I argue here that Specters of 
Marx serves as a microcosm of the entire Derridean 'corpus' (such as it can be 
constrained in a unity) in terms of its epoch changing significance vis a vis the 
opportunity for the radical post-historical transformations of our self-creations and 
human solidarities. 
I then proceed to examine the way in which what Derrida develops after Marx in 
terms of a new global or International solidarity (of intellectuals and activists) 
allied against the 'ten plagues of the new world order' figures a new role for 
'Europe' 'as a proud descendent of the Enlightenment past and a harbinger of the 
166 As Leonard Lawlor argues in his book Derrida and Husserl (op.cit, 2002) 'the concepts forged 
during this first period (from 1954-1967) ... Difforance and Supplementarity ... remain in place in 
the later writings. In fact, the most remarkable thing about Derrida's vast corpus is its continuity; 
Derrida's thought does not, as one might think, shift all of a sudden from metaphysical issues to 
ethico-political issues ... the ethico-political issues make an appearance [in the early writings] ... the 
"we", for example in the Introduction'. (P211). 
167 Derrida Jacques, Specters of Marx, op.cit, 1994. 
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new Enlightenment to come' .168 This would be a Europe Derrida describes as 
being less market-dominated; a Europe neither content to compete with other 
superpowers, nor prepared to let them do as they please. A Europe 
[w]hose constitution and political stance would make it the cradle of counter-
globalisation, its driving force, the way alternative ideas reach the world 
stage, for example in Iraq or Israel-Palestine ... This Europe ... would show the 
world what it means to base politics on something more sophisticated than 
simplistic binary oppositions. In this Europe it would possible to criticise 
Israeli policy, especially that pursued by Ariel Sharon and backed by George 
Bush, without being accused of anti-semitism. In this Europe, supporting the 
Palestinians in their legitimate struggle for rights, land and a state would not 
mean supporting suicide bombing or agreeing with the anti-semitic 
propaganda that is rehabilitating (with sad success) the outrageous lie that is 
the Protocols of the Elders of Zion. In this Europe it would be usual to 
worry both about rising anti-semitism and rising Islamophobia ... it would be 
possible to criticise the policies of Bush, Cheney, Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz 
without being accused of sympathy for Saddam Hussein and his 
regime ... That is my dream ... shared by billions of men and women all over 
the world Some day, though the work may be long and painful, a new world 
will be born. 
Let us now begin to examine the path taken by Derrida (and in this study) from his 
early work on Husserl (and Saussure) through (Kant) to his deconstructive reading 
of a certain Marx(ism) and thus insist, contra oppositional voices, that politics that 
has always informed his readings - and my reading of those readings. 
The 'Political Question': From HusserI to Marx 
Apropos Chapter One, Derrida's early exemplary works - his deconstructive 
readings ofHusserl's phenomenology and Saussure's attempt to found a structural 
linguistics - serves to undercut the entire Western metaphysical (philosophical) 
168 Derrida, Jacques, 'Enlightenment Past and Still to come', in Le Monde Diplomatique, English 
edition, published on-line at mondediplo.com, November 2004. 
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tradition which has sought to constrain the meaning of being to presence, to some 
foundation or essence. Derrida shows through his elaboration of the counter-logic 
of HusserI' s phenomenological project that Plato's inaugural gesture of separating 
the sensible and the intelligible through the law of the bar (I) which primarily 
rested on the experience of hearing oneself speak through the phonic substances, 
was fatally flawed in its absolute privilege of the present/presence; a flaw HusserI, 
critical of Plato's speculative metaphysics, failed to overcome despite the logic of 
his own arguments vis a vis temporalisation and the constitution of inter-
subjectivity. It is thus that Derrida will put into question the possibility of a pure 
self-identical 'presence' and the concept of (a pure) communication co-extensive 
with it, whereby one means what one says and says what one means in an (ideally) 
transparent relay to the other (both an other person/persons and the other in me). 
F or as we have already seen, Derrida argues that time, 'the now', has no self-
identical points but exists only as an 'effect' between the no longer and the not yet, 
between memory and desire, in an interminable relay of difference and deferral. 
And language, used supposedly to represent (self) present thoughts based on pure 
(transcendental) experience, is shown by Derrida to itself generate meaning 
through the' differential matrix'. As Derrida's work on Saussure demonstrates, 
words or signifiers and (most importantly) their signifieds, assume their meanings 
through difference, through the absent' other' (s) whereby meaning is never 
'present' as such but is always deferred, always capable of being re-formed in new 
chain of signifiers whereby concepts appear unstable, un-grounded; forever on the 
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move. 
Accordingly, the early development of a 'conceptual politics' feeds into a 
generalised 'politics of memory' whereby modernity's sovereign subject and its 
history are displaced by a new kind of affirmative postmodern subjectivity and its 
inheritance. Though no less over-determined by socio-economic and ethico-
political codes and their media in postmodernity (which remain still too 'modem' 
in spirit, however 'contemporary') the foundationless nature of these 
codes/practices are brought to (theoretical) consciousness in this 'age of the aporia' 
as we are called to take our place within a certain 'theatre of violence' as 
performative 'resistance fighters' newly aware of the acts of exclusion 
characteristic of institutional categorisation which on an individual and communal 
basis make us what we are (and are 'not'). As Derrida argues (and recalling my 
argument in Chapter Two) we cannot escape this 'theatre', but we can 'act' 
responsibly in less violent, more democratising and emancipating ways in accord 
with our own moral and aesthetic sensibilities. As we have seen, what Derrida 
inherits from his deconstructive reading of Kant is an Enlightenment spirit at once 
self-critical, a messianic consciousness (without messianism), an apocalyptic tone 
(sans apocalypse) which takes him and 'us' beyondthe eschatological and 
teleological ends of history as such - not least those 'ends' John. D. Caputo 
reminds us are consistent with a certain 'European gesture' which (variously) 
attempts to secure a cultural and economic hegemony working in the interests of 
certain dominant ideological/political powers. 
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It is in this context that in his Specters of Marx (1993) Derrida seeks to clarify 
deconstruction's relationship with Marx(ism) at a certain moment of what he calls 
'a concrete and personal commitment'. It is here that Derrida, a self-proclaimed 
'man of the Left'169, will ftrst openly address the 'political question' as such, in 
order to show how his deconstruction of various 'metaphysics of presence' related 
to ethical and political issues conceived in the more traditional sense. Until this 
date, theorists such as Frederic Jameson170, Frank Lentricchia171 and Terry 
Eagletonl72, had lambasted Derrida for his silence on Marx and Marxism. As 
Geoffrey Bennington reminds us, there had long been a call for Derrida to 'come 
clean' about (his) politics, and a 'lurking suspicion that his (at least apparent) 
169 Of his (by no means 'easy') allegiance to the political Left, Derrida proposes this minimal 
axiom: 'on the left there is the desire to affinn what is to come, to change, and to do so in the sense 
of the greatest possible justice. I would not say that everyone on the right is insensitive to change 
and to justice (that would be unjust), but it never makes justice the first resort or axiom of its action. 
To take up distinctions that are not outdated, despite a fundamental transformation of the very 
concept of labour: the left will always privilege the profit from "labour" over that from "capital". 
The right always allege that the latter is the condition of the former. To be "on the right" consists 
in being conservative, but of what? Over and above certain interests, powers, riches, capitals, 
social norms and "ideologues" and so forth, over and above politics, the right always tends to 
preserve a certain traditional structure of the political itself, of the relations between civil society, 
nation and state. If one upholds the opposition of left and right, it is surely not easy to be on the left 
with some consequence, to be always on the left is a difficult strategy'. In 'Intellectual Courage: An 
Interview', op.cit, 2003. 
170 As Jameson argues in The Prison House of Language, forerunner to his later The Political 
Unconscious and Postmodernism, or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism (1991) Derrida's 
deconstruction, having its source in Saussure's synchronic paradigm of language which abstracts 
language and knowledge from temporal change, fundamentally distorts thought's relation to social 
experience and catastrophically severed humanity's connection to its own past and future. 
171 Frank Lentricchia argues in After the New Criticism (University of Chicago Press, 
Chicago: 1980) that the post-structuralist project - of which he takes Derrida to be a leading 
proponent - reinforces rather than subverts the reification to which it opposes itself; and it being an 
'activity of textual privatization, it marks the critics doomed attempt to retreat from a social 
landscape of fragmentation and alienation' (p.186). 
172 Eagleton believed that Derrida has hitherto been caught up too much with words and their 
endless semantic possibilities and leant heavily on Nietzsche to the great detriment of Marx and 
socialism. 
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failure to do so was in principle a reason for dissatisfaction' .173 As Bennington 
says: 
According to a very common mechanism, Derrida's apparent reticence about 
some forms of political statement and argument led to charges (from the self-
appointed guardians of the 'Left' tradition in academic politics) of liberalism 
or even conservatism written into his most general philosophical arguments, 
while his more obviously 'political' texts have given rise to objections on the 
grounds that they supposedly show no more than a decently liberal attitude, 
and not the sort of genuine recognisable radicality we might otherwise think 
it reasonable to expect. 174 
However, in the opening pages of Specters of Marx (and referring here to my 
earlier remarks) it is obvious (contra Jameson, Lentricchia, Eagleton et at) to what 
extent Derrida's readings of metaphysics in deconstruction have, from the very 
'beginning', formed the basis for what would be a decisive and epoch-changing 
intervention in ethical and political matters (broadly conceived under the rubric of 
the 'political question' as such). As Derrida argues - aware of the anti-political 
characterisation of him - it was a matter of waiting for' a moment in the 
development of my work when the level I wanted to reach in [the] re-elaboration 
of the political question could be reached' .175 This was a moment, I think, when 
Derrida had sufficiently brought to theoretical consciousness the 'beginning of 
historicity' and 'post-historical man', and, called by 'world events' (or more 
precisely a reading of them) was ready to tackle the political question by showing 
the extent to which what he develops into his work on Marx in terms of a 'logic of 
hauntology' or 'spectrality' was 'central to an understanding of Marx and 
173 Bennington, Geoffrey, Interrupting Derrida, 2000, op.cit, p.18. 
174 Ibid, p.18. 
175 Derrida, Jacques and Geoffrey Bennington, Politics of Friendship interview, op.cit, 1997. 
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therefore, let's say, to any politics that would want to be responsible to an ideal of 
social justice or a just society' .176 
With these remarks in mind, all of which support my thesis of an 'unbreakable' 
thematics re: any notion of a younger and older (political) Derrida, let us now 
examine the precise way in which the rise of what is termed the 'new world order' 
after 1989 led Derrida to a deconstruction ofMarx(ism). For as I argue it is this 
deconstructive reading, continuous (as it is) with his earliest readings of 
metaphysics in deconstruction (and subsumed here under the generalised heading 
of a quasi-philosophy of the limit)', which best enables us to begin to re-think the 
logic of those (Eurocentric) economic, social, cultural, political, ethical and legal 
frameworks/ institutions which attempt to regulate our lives on an individual and 
communal basis and dictate our patterns of thought in ways over-determined by 
various ideological/political interests. Derrida herein offers the chance for a 
176 Lucy, Niall, Derrida Dictionary, op.cit, 2004, p.114. To emphasize the degree to which this 
logic of spectrality was already figured in his very earliest works - specifically here those of 
Husserl- one need only take this passage from Derrida's Specters o/Marx wherein he states: 
, ... the radical possibility of all spectrality should be sought in the direction that Husserl identifies, 
in such a surprising but forceful way, as an intentional but non-real [non-reelle} component of the 
phenomenological lived experience, namely, the noeme. Unlike the three other terms of the two 
correlations (noese-noeme, morphe,hule), this non-reality [non-reellite}, this intentional but non-
real inclusion of the noematic correlative is neither "in" the world nor "in" consciousness. But it is 
precisely the condition of any experience, any objectivity, any phenomenality, namely, of any 
noetico-noematic correlation, whether originary or modified. It is no longer regional. Without the 
non-real inclusion of this intentional component. .. the noeme is included without being a part ... one 
could not speak of any manifestation, of any phenomenality in general (that being-for-a 
consciousness, that appearing appearance which is neither consciousness nor the being that appears 
to it). Is not such an "irreality" [irreelite}, its independence both in relation to the world and in 
relation to the real stuff of ego logical subjectivity the very place of apparition, the essential, 
general, non-regional possibility of the specter'. Is it not also what inscribes the possibility of the 
other and of mourning right onto the phenomenality of the phenomenon?' Specters 0/ Marx. op.cit, 
1994, p. 189. 
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transformation of the new world order. 
Deconstruction, Marxism and the 'Logic ofHauntology' 
In the editor's introduction to Specters of Marx, Bernd Magnus and Stephen 
Cullenberg write: 
In the wake of the orgy of self-congratulations which followed the 1989 
crumbling of the Berlin Wall, the subsequent dissolution of the Soviet 
Union, and a series of confrontations perhaps forever to be captured best in 
Tiananmen Square in the image of a single individual blocking the path of an 
onrushing military tank, a wave of optimism engulfed the Western 
democratic States. This contagious optimism was best exemplified by the 
confidence and popularity of Francis Fukuyama's claim that the end of 
history was at hand, that the future - if that word could still be said to have 
the same meaning - was to become the global triumph of free market 
economies. I77 
This optimism however, clearly did not extend to all, and Magnus and Cullenberg 
write of a 'vague' and 'haunted' sense of foreboding that these huge international 
changes would for a long time to come result in transformations as 'malign as they 
were benign'. In this vein, many felt the proclamation of the death of Marxism 
associated with the fall of communism to be both too hasty and its reception too 
'homogenous' given the fact that these terms rightly referred to different things in 
different times and places (as well as to different thinkers). While a 'new world 
order' was undoubtedly being forged, and new ideological and political alliances 
fostered by various interested parties, the response to the changing social, political, 
philosophical and economic dimension(s) of the global community amongst 
scholars and intellectuals was by no means easily agreed upon. Certainly not all of 
177 Derrida, Jacques, Specters of Marx, op.cit, 1994, p.viii. 
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the scholars and intellectuals variously re-thinking the meaning of 'past verities' 
and developing new theoretical approaches agreed with Fukuyama's triumphalist 
vision of a global free market liberalism. In this context, many were asking: 'What 
remains of the socialist vision( s) after the [ communist] collapse in 1989?' Is there 
a future for Marx(ism)? Have we really reached the end of history? What about 
the failures and inequalities prevalent in such democratic, free market economies? 
Are we not in danger of fostering new' nationalisms' /' ethnocentrisms'? What 
disagreements will abound, and who will finally control the nature of theoretical 
and political discourse in the twenty first century? In particular, as Magnus and 
Cullenberg ask 'How will intellectuals in the Marxist tradition respond? .. What is 
living and what is dead in Marxism?' 178 
It was within this milieu that Derrida offered his first sustained meditation on the 
relationship between deconstruction and Marx(ism) at a conference entitled 
'Whither Marxism? Global Crises in International Perspective', his paper later 
being published as the elongated essay/book Specters of Marx: The State of Debt, 
the Work of Mourning & the New International. Elaborated in what might be 
termed a 'hauntological framework', at numerous levels Specters of Marx is all 
about spirits, ghosts, the dead living or the living dead; for example, the non-
contemporaneity of the present/presence with itself, semantic/conceptual 
instability, the spectral effect( s) of communicative structures, inheritance and 
178 Ibid, p.ix. 
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responsibility (to past and future generations) - all of which, as we have seen, have 
been constant themes in the Derridean corpus right from the start. What is once 
again uncovered here - this time conceived of in terms of a 'virtual space of 
spectrality' - is the dis-locating effects of the 'differential matrix' deconstructive 
of all realist-representationalist (which is to say totalising) discourse. It is just this 
'excessive space', this 'virtual space of spectrality', which Western metaphysics 
has sought to confine to the aesthetic/literary zone. For as Niall Lucy reminds us, 
it is 'literature' which is 'allowed to play games with reality, to speculate about 
things we know (for certain) could never exist or happen. Against this excessive 
space, the real world of real things and real events is all the better defined' .179 But 
for Derrida we are destined to live with ghosts, with spirits, and (recalling my 
arguments from Chapters One and Two) the generalised space of literature is an 
affirmative political condition (in the non-dogmatic sense) for all meaningful 
discourse, whereby from within the heterogeneity of our inheritance we are each 
called upon to make aporetic decisions without limits based on our own moral and 
aesthetic sensibilities (alone) in the face of the other out of respect for justice. The 
fact that there are no fixed identities - no totalitarianisms, no self-present identities 
- but only on-going process( es) of identification is a good thing, the incessant 
promise of change. We must, if we are to keep open the hope of infinite justice 
(the only condition of justice), remain open to another identity, to let others 'be' -
those past and still to come but not yet gathered together (as a self-nation, 
179 Lucy, Niall, Derrida Dictionary, op.cit, 2004, p.l13. 
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community or history, for example). 
It is just this sensitivity to the 'logic of hauntology', to infinite justice 'before the 
law', that Derrida sees affirmed in at least one ofMarx(ism)'s self-critical sprits, 
prompting him to argue that: 
Deconstruction has never had any sense or interest, in my view at least, 
except as a radicalisation, which is also in the tradition of a certain 
Marxism ... a radicalisation always indebted to the very thing it radicalises. 18o 
For Derrida this incalculable debt to Marx(ism) appears all the more urgent to 
explore' at a time when some have the audacity to neo-evangelise in the name of 
the ideal of a liberal democracy that has finally realized itself as the ideal of human 
history', not least because never before 
... have violence, inequality, exclusion, famine, and thus economic 
oppression affected as many human beings in the history of the earth and of 
humanity. Instead of singing the advent of the ideal of liberal democracy 
and of the capitalist market in the euphoric of the end of history, instead of 
celebrating the 'end of ideologies' and the end of the great emancipatory 
discourses, let us never neglect this obvious macroscopic fact, made up of 
innumerable singular sites of suffering: no degree of progress allows one to 
ignore that never before, in absolute figures, never before have so many men, 
women, and children been subjugated, starved, or exterminated on the 
earth. 181 
Of such human ( rights) catastrophes, Derrida says in a 1998 interview: 
I think of the millions of children who drown every year, of the nearly 50 per 
cent of women who are beaten or fall victim to sometimes murderous abuse 
(the 60 million disappeared women, the 30 million mutilated women), of the 
23 million infected with AIDS (of which 90 per cent are in Africa and to 
who the budget of AIDS research dedicates only 5 per cent of its resources, 
while therapy remains unavailable outside small occidental milieus, I think 
180 Derrida, Jacques, Specters of Marx, op.cit, 1994, p.92. 
181 Ibid, p.92. 
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of the selective infanticide of girls in India and of the monstrous conditions 
of child labour in many countries, and of the fact that there are, I believe, a 
billion illiterate people and 140 million uneducated children, I think of the 
maintenance of the death penalty and of the circumstances of its 
administration in the United States (the only Western democracy to do so 
and a country that no longer recognises the convention concerning children's 
rights and continues to execute punishment against minors even after they 
have reached adult age).182 
It is clear, then, that what is celebrated as the end point of human government - the 
universalisation of Western liberal (capitalist) democracy - is instituted in 'suspect 
and paradoxical conditions' and, rather than being 'dead and buried' as the 
dominant discourse of the 'new world order' would have it, the Marxist socio-
economic-political critique - or at least some of its (im)possibilities - has never 
been so necessary. Derrida again: 
Upon reading the Manifesto and a few other great works of Marx, I said to 
myself that I knew of few texts in the philosophical tradition, perhaps none, 
whose lesson seemed more urgent today, provided that one take into account 
what Marx and Engels themselves say (for example, in Engel's 'Preface' to 
the 1888 re-edition) about their own 'aging' and their intrinsically irreducible 
historicity. What other thinker has ever issued a similar warning in such an 
explicit fashion? Who has ever called for the transformation to come of his 
own theses? Not only in view of some progressive enrichment of 
knowledge, which would change nothing in the order of a system, but so as 
to take into account there, another account, the effects of rupture and 
restructuration? And so as to incorporate in advance, beyond any possible 
programming, the unpredictability of new knowledge, new techniques, and 
new political givens? No text in the tradition seems as lucid concerning the 
way in which the political is becoming worldwide, concerning the 
irreducibility of the technical and the media in the current of the most 
thinking thought - and this goes beyond the railroad and the newspapers of 
the time whose powers were analysed in such a comparable way in the 
Manifesto. And few texts have shed so much light on law, international law, 
and nationalism. 183 
182 Derrida, Jacques, 'Intellectual Courage: An Interview', op.cit, 1998. 
183 Derrida, Jacques, Specters of Marx, op.cit, 1994, p.13. 
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Although Derrida rejects 'official' 'dogmatic' Marxism (its 'systematic, 
metaphysical or ontological totality' with its fundamental concepts of labour, mode 
of production, social class and thus the whole history of its apparatusesY84, he will 
argue that in our current (postmodem) condition there is a political vacuum (in 
terms of a critique of capitalism) which, following the fall of communism, needs to 
be filled. This appears particularly important to address at a time when a new 
political landscape is being forged by the (virtual reality of the) tele-techno-media 
which demands new modes of representation and new forms of struggle. 
Crucially, however, this is a 'vacuum' not to be filled by another dogmatic 
'opposition' or by another foundationalist party-political organisation, but is rather 
an opening within the situation today of our ruling 'parliamentary-democracies-of-
the-Western-world' (wherever we are in a text already). Derrida is advocating 
neither a strategy of 'inversion' (i.e. orthodox Marxism) or one of' subversion' 
(i.e. anarchism), both of which Saul Newman reminds us are two sides of the same 
logic of 'place' . 185 As Derrida repeatedly asserts, deconstruction is not a political 
theory but a move to expose the limits of our so-called 'political reality' in a way 
which opens up its conceptual/discursive framework to the (infinite) possibility of 
transformation in a meaningful(l) world shorn of metaphysical foundations. As 
184 Derrida appends ' ... projected or real: the Internationals of the labor movement, the dictatorship 
of the proletariat, the single party, the State and finally the totalitarian monstrosity)'. Ibid, p.88. 
185 See: Newman, Saul, 'Derrida's De-construction of Authority'. Found at the Interactionist 
Information Exchange: Collaborative Authorship, Collective Intelligence, at http://info.interactivist. 
net!, p.3 (of 9). 
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Derrida argues: 
I think political theory is necessary, but I try to articulate this necessity of a 
political theory with something in politics or in friendship, in hospitality, 
which cannot for structural reasons, become the object of knowledge, of a 
theory, of a theoreme. 186 
What Derrida is (once again) trying to give voice to here is a 'politics of the 
impossible', one which dis-places (which is not, to re-iterate once again, 
destroying), the laws of what Caputo (following Derrida) describes as the 'two 
capitalisms', 'the one having to do with a cultural hegemony, the rule of European 
(style) "culture" emblematised by the European "capitals" (la capitale, the capital 
city), and the other the hegemony of economic capitalism (Ie capitale), the one 
criticised by Marx in Das Kapital' .187 Working against (without simply being 
opposed to) the limits of the politico-ideological hegemony of the 'new world 
order' and its media, Derrida argues that we must form an ethical and moral 
coalition of all those who are' done in or headed off by the dominant heading, 
every [ one] who is left out, de-posed, "de-capitated" by their race, income, gender, 
nationality, language, religion, or even species (animal rights) - in a nutshell, by 
their difference' .188 Here Derrida proposes (once again, in a certain spirit of 
Marx(ism)) what he calls an 'effective global solidarity' or a 'New International' 
of intellectuals and activists. This is not to be an organisation of International 
Socialists such as Marx envisaged, and it does not recognise itself in those states or 
international agencies dominated by certain stately powers. Similarly, but 
186 Bennington and Derrida, Politics of Friendship interview, op.cit, 1997. 
187 Caputo, John D., op.cit, 1997. p.119. 
188 Ibid, p.12!. 
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irreducible to certain humanitarian projects, this new kind of solidarity calls for a 
profound change in international law and its implementation; in our concepts of 
the state, the nation and citizenship, and has today what Derrida terms the 'figure 
of suffering and compassion' for the ten plagues of the global (or 'new world') 
order enumerated in Specters of Marx in the order which follows: 
1. Un-employment: Derrida argues that the 'more or less well-calculated 
deregulation of a new market, new technologies, new worldwide competitiveness, 
would no doubt, like labor or production, deserve another name today. All the 
more so in that tele-work inscribes there a new set of givens that perturbs both the 
methods of traditional calculation and the conceptual opposition between work and 
non-work, activity, employment, and their contrary' .189 What is needed in the face 
of the changing function of social inactivity, of non-work, of underemployment, is 
a new politics and another concept of un-employment itself suitable to these new 
forms of experience and calculation. 
2. Exclusion/expulsion: Here, Derrida points to the massive exclusion of homeless 
citizens from participation in the democratic life of States and the 
expulsion/deportation of exiles, immigrants etc ... from a 'national' territory. This 
heralds a new experience of frontiers and identity - national or civil - as 
inhospitable identitariansims flourish in a time of supposed freedom. 
189 Derrida, Jacques, Specters of Marx, op.cit, 1994, p.81. 
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3. Economic wars: both among the European community and between member 
states and Eastern European countries, between Europe and the United States, and 
between Europe, the US and Japan. Derrida argues here - with clear resonance for 
the political, legal and humanitarian wrangling surrounding the war in Iraq - that 
economic war controls everything, beginning with other wars, because it controls 
the practical interpretation and 'inconsistent and unequal application of 
. . 11 ,190 mternatlOna aw. 
4. Contradictions in the concepts, norms and reality of the 'free market ': here the 
example is of the barriers of protectionism and interventionist bidding wars of 
capitalist States seeking to protect their national interests from cheap labour, while, 
in turn, this cheap labour has no comparable social protection. 
5. The aggravation of the foreign debt: a major thread in Specters - and still a 
contentious issue for Western governments who in 2005 seemed reluctant to cancel 
third world debt completely. As Derrida argues, foreign debt and other connected 
mechanisms are 'starving or driving to despair a large portion of humanity' 191 and 
seems in conflict with the discourse of democratization or human rights which are 
supposedly being extended across the globe in the name of liberal capitalist 
democracy. 
190 Ibid, p.81. 
191 Ibid, p.82. 
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6. The arms and industry trade: Whether conventional 'arms', or those at the 
cutting edge of tele-technological sophistication, Derrida points out that the arms 
industry is inscribed in the normal regulation of the scientific research, economy, 
and socialisation of labour in Western democracies. As such they cannot be 
suspended or cut back without running major risks - including that of un-
employment. Furthermore, and exceeding drug-trafficking to which it is often 
allied, arms-trafficking remains both prolific and difficult to distinguish from 
'normal' commerce. 
7. The nuclear threat: As Derrida states 'The spread ("dissemination") of nuclear 
weapons, maintained by the very countries that say they want to protect themselves 
from it, is no longer even controllable, as was the case for a very long time, by 
statist structures. It exceeds not only statist control but every declared market' .192 
8. Inter-ethnic wars: Inter-ethic wars - Derrida queries whether there have ever 
been any other kind - are more frequent and are driven by what he calls an 
'archaic phantasm and concept " a 'primitive conceptual phantasm' of community, 
the nation-State, sovereignty, borders, native soil and blood. Though not without 
its resources, Derrida sees this archaism as increasingly outdated by tele-
technological dis-location; a dis-location which, in what is a critical point, is no 
less arche-originary than the archaism it has always dislodged: 'This process [of 
192 Ibid, p.82. 
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dis-location] is, moreover, the positive condition of the stabilization that it 
constantly relaunches. All stability in a place being but a stabilisation or a 
sedimentation, it will have to have been necessary that the local differance, the 
spacing of a dis-placement gives the movement its start. And gives place and 
gives rise [donne lieu]. All national rootedness, for example, is rooted first of all in 
the memory or the anxiety of a displaced - or displaceable - population. It is not 
only time that is "out of joint," but space, space in time, spacing' .193 Here 
Derrida's earlier more theoretical elaboration of the differential matrix and the 
generalised conceptual politics to which it gives rise (and upon which the geo-
political order is constituted) is 'fully present'. 
9. Mafia and drug cartels: Derrida points to the growing and undelimitable global 
power of the super-efficient and ~proper1y capitalist phantom-States that are the 
mafia and the drug cartels on every continent' including the former (so-called) 
socialist States of Eastem Europe. As he argues, these phantom states permeate 
the socio-economic fabric of society, the general circulation of capital and statist or 
inter-statist institutions. 
10. (And as Derrida says 'above all') we come to The present state of 
international law and of its institutions: Despite what he calls a 'fortunate 
perfectability' and 'undeniable progress,' Derrida points to two limits which affiict 
international institutions. The first (and most radical) is that in their norms, charter 
193 Ibid, pp.82-83. 
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and mission, these institutions depend on a certain historical culture. They cannot 
be dissociated from certain European philosophical concepts - most notably those 
of 'State' or 'national sovereignty' - which effect genealogical closure both 
theoretically and practically. The second limit, indissociable from the first, is that 
although supposedly universal, international law is effectively governed by 
particular nation States, as '[a ]lmost always their techno-economic and military 
power prepares and applies, in other words, carries the decision'. For example-
... whether it is a question of deliberations and resolutions of the United 
Nations or of the putting into practice or the 'enforcement' of these 
decisions: the incoherence, discontinuity, inequality of States before the law, 
the hegemony of certain States over military power in the service of 
international law, this is what, year after year, day after day, we are forced to 
acknowledge. 194 
Despite these limits, however, Derrida will argue that it is not a matter of seeking 
to disqualify international institutions but rather of affirming those who work 
within them in the direction of perfectibility and emancipation. While we must 
remain vigilant to the manipulations to which they are subject, such institutions 
can prove invaluable when, on 'humanitarian' grounds, they intervene at certain 
times in order to limit the sovereign powers of the State. 
I think it is now clear that Specters of Marx, as well as other works including 
Politics of Friendship 195, On Cosmopolitanism and Forgivenesi96 , and The Other 
194 Ibid, p.84. 
195 Derrida, Jacques, Politics a/Friendship. Verso, London and New York: 1997. 
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Heading197 , testify to what Richard Kearney and Simon Critchley call 
... Derrida' s characteristic readiness - in spite of persistently and 
perplexingly misguided charges of apathy and indifference - to tackle topics 
of major moral and political consequence for our times ... proof, if proof were 
needed, that deconstruction is not some obscure textual operation intimated 
in a mandarin prose style, but is a concrete intervention in contexts that is 
governed by an undeconstructable concern for justice. 198 
For Derrida is clearly not content, pace Fukuyama, to accept injustice as the price 
to pay for an ideal (of liberal capitalist democracy) which is here - almost. He is 
not content to accept the bloody (that is the worst) violence, suffering and human 
rights abuses of the 'new world order' as merely 'empirical shortcomings, 
contingent blights on the Ideas relentless progress' (that which, as John D. Caputo 
argues' admits of a gradual empirical approximation and constitutes the very 
essence of essentialism or idealism, of an idea in the Kantian sense, or of a 
Husserlian infinite task'199). Indeed, Derrida sees the task of intellectuals and 
activists of the 'New International' to be one of re-thinking our economies of 
knowledge in such a way that they are not orientated around identity, or 
determinate states ( of affairs), but around a messianic promise of the kind already 
developed (in this study) with reference to Kant (in Chapter Two). In Derrida's 
view it is the task of such 'postmodern resistance fighters' to produce 'new events, 
196 Derrida, Jacques, On Cosmopolitianism and Forgiveness. Translated by Mark Dooley and 
Michael Hughes and Edited by Simon Critchley and Richard Kearney. Routledge, London and New 
York: 2001. 
197 Derrida, Jacques, The Other Heading: Reflections on Today's Europe. Translated by Pascale-
Anne Brault and Michael B. Naas. Indiana University Press, Bloomington: 1992. 
198 Critchley, Simon and Richard Kearney, Introduction to Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness, 
op.cit 2001, p.viii. 
199 Caputo, John D., 'Without Sovereignty, Without Being: The Coming God And Derrida's 
Democracy to Come', Journal for Culture and Religion Theory 4.3, August 2003, published on-line 
at www.jcrt.orglarchives/0..J..3/caputo. 
141 
new effective forms of political action/practice, organisation, and so forth,200, 
which simultaneously involves a profound re-thinking of those outdated 
philosophical/conceptual foundations upon which Western (parliamentary) liberal 
democracies have been instituted; a strategy of resistance orientated through a 
dream of Europe which would simultaneously serve to transform the world in 
more radically democratising and emancipating ways. With these remarks in mind 
I would thus like to follow Derrida as, with 'hope, fear and trembling', he seeks to 
re-politicize the Left in Europe and re-figure our European inheritance in accord 
with another heading (or the other of the heading) co-extensive with an abyssal 
(quasi-) logic which re-invigorates the twin discourse of democracy and 
emancipation in radically new (and yet paradoxically the oldest) ways in line with 
a new thinking of friendship, hospitality and justice (and by analogy the law). 
Derrida will here point to the deconstructing effects of capitalism itself which, he 
argues, serves to uncover an enabling aporetic (ethico-political) condition which 
moves beyond modernity's (and post-modernity's) totalising habits of thought, 
beyond the ends of history itself, towards a fairer, freer and more peaceful world 
(before two 0' clock). 
Democracy in Crisis: Globalisation, Counter-Globalisation 
Some twelve years on from Specters of Marx wherein Derrida first enumerated the 
'ten plagues of the new world order', in an interview with Giavanna Borradori in 
200 Derrida, Jacques, Specters olMarx, op.cit, 1994, p.89. 
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2003 entitled' Auto-immunity: Real and Symbolic Suicides', it appears, in 
Derrida's eyes at least, that little has changed in what he terms here the 'paradox of 
globalisation'. On the one hand, Derrida acknowledges, for the better, that 
globalisation is taking place: discourse, knowledge and models are transmitted 
better and faster. Democracy thus has more of a chance. He goes on: 
Recent movements towards democratisation in Eastern Europe owe a great 
deal, almost everything perhaps, to tele-technology, to the communication of 
models, norms, images, information products, and so on. Non-governmental 
institutions are more numerous and better known or recognised. Look at the 
effort to institute the International Criminal Tribuna1. 201 
But, on the other hand, in remarks that will be familiar to us by now, Derrida will 
argue that globalisation is still not taking place, that is to say: 
... in an age where it is in the interest of some to speak about globalisation 
and celebrate its benefits, the disparities between human societies, the social 
and economic inequalities, have probably never been greater and more 
spectacular ... in the history of humanity. Though the discourse in favour of 
globalisation insists on the transparency made possible by tele-technologies, 
the opening of borders and of markets, the levelling of the playing fields and 
the equality of opportunity, there has never been in the history of humanity, 
in absolute numbers, so many inequalities, so many cases of malnutrition, 
ecological disaster, or rampant epidemics.202 
For Derrida reminds us once more that there remain vast technological inequalities 
(only 5% of the world population has access to the internet for example), and 
unprecedented numbers of people are still being oppressed by working conditions 
or unable to find the work they desire. It remains the case that only certain 
countries and certain classes benefit fully from globalisation; namely, wealthy 
201 Borradori, Giovanna (Ed), Philosophy in a Time of Terror. Uniyersity of Chicago Press, 
Chicago: 2004, p.123. 
202 Ibid, p.121. 
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northern countries who hold the capital and control the instruments of economic 
decision making (the G8, IMF, World Bank etc ... ). Thus it is that Derrida will 
describe globalisation as a simulacrum: 
... a rhetorical artifice or weapon that dissimulates a growing imbalance, a 
new opacity, a garrulous and hypermediatized noncommunication, a 
tremendous accumulation of wealth, means of production, tele-technology, 
and sophisticated military weapons, and the appropriation of all these powers 
by a small number of states or international corporations. 203 
For Derrida, in this the twenty first century, globalisation continues to take place 
for better and for worse and, in the light of the latter, he repeats with some urgency 
(not least in the light of recent world events) the call to tackle the contradictions 
and inequalities of western societies and their democratising and emancipating 
rhetoric. At a time when the juridico-political space of democracy is changing and 
operating at an unprecedented speed and rhythm, when democracy itself seems to 
be suffering from an auto-immune crisis (not least) with the 'return of the 
religious' on the world scene, it is imperative, as he argues, that intellectuals, 
writers, scholars, professors, artists and journalists, stand together against the un-
necessary violence of total ising (and thus terroristic) discourse - that of Bush no 
less than Bin Laden - and re-think the (metaphysical-philosophical) foundations 
upon which traditional political and ethical thinking has been based. In this course 
of action Derrida will argue that whatever will have been put under the title 
'September 11' will have 'been at once a sign and a ... [very high] ... to pay, without 
203 Ibid, p.l23. 
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any possible redemption or salvation for its victims' .204 For in Derrida's view 
'September 11' and the so-called 'war on terror', far from confrrming the moral 
and political legitimacy of an international alliance (new International in the non-
Derridean sense) defending the values of liberal democracy, revealed once again 
that this liberal democracy was defined not by the United Nations of the world but 
by the US, a US which was prepared to suspend these same democratic values in 
order to serve its own national interests - all in the name of 'international justice'. 
Apart from being highly selective - Niall Lucy asks why no-one has felt the need 
to organise (to give but two of his examples) a 'coalition of the willing' into a war 
with Russia over its treatment of the Chechens, or why the USA or any other 
nation didn't feel it necessary to liberate 'the others' under the Pinochet regime -
these actions seem to disavow the extent to which 'September 11' was both highly 
predictable, and was the result of the actions of the US (and its allies) who 
welcomed, armed, trained and provided the technology for the twin towers attack. 
Furthermore, the response of the US administration has failed to be attentive 
enough to the fact that its impoverishing, pillaging, disenfranchising movements 
across the globe have themselves allowed the terrorists to justify their actions and 
tum back upon the USA its own logic in terms of its definition of terrorism (the 
US itself open to accusations of economic, social, environmental terrorism, for 
example). It may benefit George Bush to unproblematically declare a 'war on 
terror', but this strange 'war without war', which has no identifiable enemy, which 
204 Ibid, p.118. 
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is (in part) the product of the same 'liberal democratic' regime that now seeks to 
counter it, and which is fuelled by religious rhetoric on both sides, can only serve 
the worst violence and prevent any future global solidarity from being fostered. 
The question therefore becomes: from where can resistance be organised, what is 
the future for democracy when we can no longer be assured of the credentials of 
what goes under this name? 
A New Europe: Qui, Qui ... 
In an article published in Le Monde diplomatique entitled 'Enlightenment Past and 
Still to Come'205 Derrida will argue that Europe today has a unique responsibility 
to take up what is a critical role (in both sense of this term) in the counter-
globalisation movement, situtated, as it is, between what he calls the two dominant 
politico-theological hegemonies of our time. That is: 
On the one side, the only great European-style 'democratic' power in the 
world that still has the death penalty in its juridical system and, despite the 
separation in principle between the church and state, a fundamental biblical 
(and primarily Christian) reference in its official political discourse and the 
discourse of its political leaders. 'God Bless America', the reference to 'evil 
doers' or to the 'axis of evil', and the first rallying cry (which was later 
retracted) of 'infinite justice', would be a few signs among so many others. 
And facing them, on the other side, an 'enemy' that identifies itself as 
Islamic, Islamic extremist or fundamentalist, even if this does not necessarily 
represent authentic Islam and all Muslims are far from identifying with it. 
No more, in fact, than all Christians in the world identify with the United 
State's fundamentally Christian professions of faith. 206 
205 Derrida, Jacques, 'Enlightenment Past and Still to Come', op.cit, 2004. 
206 Derrida, Jacques in Giovanna BorradoIi Philosophy in a Time of Te"or, op.cit, 2003, p.117. 
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For Derrida frrmly believes that beyond the 'economism' and 'monetarism' which 
he sees dominating the new European spirit, the Left in Europe can move beyond 
the 'nuances of adjustment' and the 'rhetorical changes' of a pragmatic realism of 
the kind favoured by British New Labour and French Socialism and mount a more 
vigilant political and social resistance to the manifest dangers of globalisation 
(encapsulated in the 'ten plagues'). For without what he says is the slightest sense 
of European nationalism or much confidence in the European Union as we 
currently know it, Derrida will nevertheless argue that our European heritage (our 
inheritance) is 'irreplaceable and vital for the future of the world'. He goes on: 
... everything that can be deconstructed from European tradition does not 
prevent Europe, precisely because of what has happened here, because of the 
contradictions of this little continent and the enormous guilt that once passed 
through its culture (totalitarianism, Nazism, genocides, the Shoah, 
colonisation et decolonisation, etc ... ) the geo-political situation that is ours, 
Europe, another Europe but with the same memory, from (and in any case 
this is my hope) gathering together against both the American policy of 
hegemony (the Wolfowitz, Cheney, Rumsfeld etc ... connection) and against 
Arab Islamic theocracy without Enlightenment and without a political future 
(but lets not neglect the contradictions and heterogeneouses of the two 
ensembles and let us ally ourselves with those who resist from inside of both 
these blocks ... ) Its not about hoping for a Europe that would be another 
military superpower, protecting its market and acting as a counterweight to 
other blocs, but of a Europe that would sow the seeds of an alternative world 
politics, which for me is the only possible way OUt.207 
Derrida will argue that as Europeans, we thus have a 'stack' of common 
experiences, traditions and achievements which have helped foster a unique 
political consciousness and sense of duty and which enables us, exemplarily, to re-
figure an idea of Europe as the protagonist of a new radically more democratising 
:;07 Derrida, Jacques, 'I am at war with myself, op.cit, 2004, p.6. 
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and emancipating world politics, a new global solidarity without limits. In the first 
place, in terms of 'our' tradition, the 'project of the Enlightenment' which, in 
principle, promoted the separation between the religious and the political- though 
incomplete and in need of revision - identifies Europe (once again, at least in 
principle) as the only secular actor on the world stage. This Europe or European 
Enlightenment, pace Marx, contains within its promise the inherent possibility of a 
discourse and a politics different from current American rhetoric or Islamic 
fundamentalism, or indeed the rampant nationalisms of the Balkan states - a 
crucial proposition if we consider what Derrida has to say about the 'return of the 
religious' on the world scene. Moreover, Derrida will argue that 'we Europeans' 
(which he uses as a conjunction here), should take heart from the fact that Europe 
has already solved two important contemporary political problems (however 
unsatisfactory and in need of revision they remain): supranational political order 
(the European Union), and social justice (the European welfare state), opening the 
space for a new (qualified) cosmopolitanism to be imagined which could be 
defended on the basis of international law. For our experiences in the twentieth 
century in terms of both world war and decolonisation have already taught us some 
important lessons. W orId War Two (and not least the Holocaust) taught Europeans 
that national sovereignty must sometimes be restricted in order to restrain military 
power as well as consolidating the need for new forms of supra-national co-
operation. We are reminded here also (and not least) of the moral (quasi-) 
foundation of politics and a certain 'heightened sensitivity for injuries to personal 
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and bodily integrity' 208 which finds expression, among other things, in the fact that 
the European council and the European Union require applicant states to renounce 
the death penalty. At the same time, in terms of decolonisation, the experience of 
large European nations of the rise and decline of colonisation has meant European 
powers have had to adopt a 'reflexive distance' both to themselves, and have had 
to take in the perspective of the colonised, accounting for the violence of a 
deracinating modernisation. 
In this respect, then, Derrida is neither rejecting his Enlightenment heritage or the 
idea of Europe as the source and leading purveyor of Enlightenment ideals; rather, 
as he argues in The Other Heading, we need to go beyond that idea in the name of 
an other Europe, 'less Eurocentric and more open to its other than it has been in the 
past'. Derrida asks: 
What if Europe were this: the opening onto a history for which the changing 
of the heading, the relation to the other heading or the other of the heading, is 
experienced as always possible? An opening and a non-exclusion for which 
Europe would in some ways be responsible? For which Europe would be in 
a constitutive way, this very responsibility? As if the very concept of 
responsibility were responsible, right up to its emancipation, for a European 
birth certificate?209 
What Derrida has in mind here is an 'alternative world politics' elaborated in what 
is called the' aporia of the demos' which, dis-placing the theory and practice of 
208 TIlls quote is taken from a joint essay/letter written by Derrida and Habermas on the future of 
Europe in the light of events in Iraq and the deracinating movement of an 'imposing and uprooting· 
modernisationlglobalisation process. Dated Friday June 6, 2003 this letter is translated into English 
and published on-line at AldiborontiphoscophomioAnunpronoucibleblog.htm, originally appearing 
in the newspaper Frankfurter Allegmeine Zeitung (F AZ). 
209 Derrida, Jacques, The Other Heading, op.cit, 1992, p.l? 
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'sovereignty', would mark the beginning (without foundationism) of a 'new' 
Enlightenment rationality elaborated in accord with a 'new' morality - namely 
attention to and affirmation of otherness, the new, the other (the Other and the 
other in me). In the best 'spirit' of the Enlightenment this would be a move 
towards a new 'secular faith' which would serve to demystify all totalising 
political theology and its 'sovereign subject', challenging the metaphysical 
presupposition(s) of our modern (liberal) democracies and the tradition to which 
they are heir. Of this tradition, Caputo will also argue: 
Imagine ... a symbiosis ... among the soul, the state and the universe. That is a 
venerable and prestigious promise that goes back as far as Plato's republic, 
one that has guided our thinking ever since antiquity. Just as there is but one 
God in Heaven, the Father (Sic) Almighty, creator of heaven and earth, 
governing the universe, so the analogy goes there is but one King governing 
the state (and one father governing the family) and so on, finally, each man 
(sic) is the lord of his own actions. We modem democrats congratulate 
ourselves on having revolutionised this schema, having turned it upside 
down, by ridding it of its top down power structure. We have shown the 
King the door (or even handed him his head) and replaced him with a 
constitutional democracy, according to which power rises from the bottom 
up. We have gradually gotten around to giving the vote to every adult 
citizen, regardless of race or gender, propertied or not. Let there be no 
mistake that was no little achievement for which we are grateful and which, 
even today, is far from finished. We have even gotten around to God and 
made God a lot more gender sensitive and egalitarian and much less 
patriarchal. So the revolution has seemed more or less complete, at least in 
principle. But the truth is [my italics], while we have inverted the old 
schema, turning it on its head, by giving power to the people, we have not 
slipped free of its most basic presupposition, that of sovereignty itsel£ which 
goes unchallenged. Modem democracies have considered the revolution 
complete - at least in principle, as one will never be finished making this 
actually work - if they repopulate the sovereign centre with the people, 
running the lines of power from bottom up ... even though they separate 
church and state, modern democracies, spawned in the 'Enlightenment', are 
run by the light of what Kant called 'autonomy'. Autonomy means 
answering only to a law (nomos) that you give yourself (autos) which is the 
only way to be 'rational' for Kant, which means not allow your reason to be 
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overwhelmed by an alien power. That model is the secularised cousin of a 
theological image of God Almighty, the brightest light, the most autonomous 
agent, and the most serene and sovereign freedom of all. 210 
I quote at length Caputo's succinct remarks not only for their clarity but because 
they are absolutely critical for understanding Derrida's vision of a new (world) 
Europe and a new world politics which has the potential to transform the state of 
the world today (in every sense). For as Caputo reminds us once more, 'while they 
have shifted the rule (kratia) from a sovereign one or few to the people (demos), 
no mean achievement, our modern democracies have left the space of sovereignty 
and autonomy undisturbed. So now mighty nation-states stride the earth where 
once mighty Kings inspired fear and trembling - and having the power to inspire 
fear and trembling, to terrorise, is built into the idea of sovereignty' .211 Indeed this 
is one of the reasons why Derrida will suggest that George Bush's declared 'war 
on terror' is oxymoronic. 
For the difficulty seems to be that the theory and practice of (the concept of) 
'sovereignty', as it underpins our modem-style democracies post-modernity, 
appears incompatible with a true or radical democracy, indeed the European 
promise of democracy: freedom and equality for all. For Derrida will argue that if 
democracy is allegedly concerned to facilitate difference and exposure to multiple 
perspectives and outlooks, if democracy is the name for an open-ness to what is to 
come, then there is a paradoxical sense in which democracy itself never arrives; is 
210 Caputo, John D., 'Without Sovereignty', op.cit, 2003. 
21 J Ibid. 
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not substantiated or made 'real' in the form of any historical format such as the 
Westminster system. Democracy is not only im-possible, but it lives off its im-
possiblity (between life and death) in its infiniteness openness to the other. This 
democracy-to-come is nothing more than afaith in the in-coming (of the other); 
the 'I don't know what'. In other words, and continuous with Derrida's 
deconstructive readings ofHusserl and Saussure given in Chapter One, a 
democracy-to-come is the very experience of the impossibility of closing a 
structural genesis (i.e. all structures, all meanings, etc ... remain radically unstable 
and contingent constructions interminably open to revision). There is then, as 
Derrida argues, something very un-democratic about the traditional concept of 
sovereignty. 
What Derrida is here describing under the quasi-concept212 of a 'democracy-to-
come' is what he calls - in the book of the same name - a new 'politics of 
friendship' or, rather, a new political experience in friendship which takes in the 
originary synthesis of language, time and the other and helps deconstruct the 
'massive bulk' of political theory, in particular those concepts - such as 
sovereignty exemplarily here, but also power, representation - which are 
fundamental to our (still too modem-metaphysical) idea of politics. For despite 
their associate rhetoric of freedom and equality such concepts, and the old 
(implicit) 'model of friendship' they invoke, are in fact ideological, hierarchical, 
212 Quasi-concept because it is no thing and no-one. 
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and (un-necessarily) violently exclusive of difference and otherness. Given that 
the geo-political (world) order is largely founded on this old (European) model of 
politics and friendship, the significance ofDerrida's deconstructive reading(s) here 
for the' social bond', for notions such as the state, territory, the nation-state (as 
well as the concepts mentioned above) is huge. So, given this significance and in 
order to underline the thesis that Derrida's political and politicising writings from 
'beginning' to 'end' offer us the chance for a 'better' world to come (and come ... ) 
- which is to say, according to his criteria and my own a more radically 
democratising and emancipating one - let us now briefly follow the exact nature of 
Derrida's thinking on these issues as he advocates a new politics of friendship in 
line with a democracy-to-come which, in the case of Europe exemplarily here, is 
an altogether more hospitable relation to the other. Indeed we shall then follow 
Derrida's exergue on the concept of 'hospitality' such that his battery of terms -
politics, friendship, democracy and hospitality - bespeak of an aporetical 
conditional unconditionality which demands a re-cognition and re-negotiation (in 
the name of an infinite justice propounded in a certain European - and not least 
Marxian - spirit); of the meanings of laws, rights, conventions, borders as they 
function in those European liberal democracies of the 'new world order' . 
In an interview with Geoffrey Bennington at the Centre for Modem French 
Thought on the subject of politics, friendship, democracy and hospitality (the basis 
for the book Politics of Friendship) Derrida argues as follows: 
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Friendship has been an apparently marginal concept within the field of 
politics and of political philosophy for centuries ... it is marginal in the usual 
taxonomies of concepts. You can't find the concept of friendship there: 
usually it is left to ethics or psychology or morals, but it is not considered a 
political concept as government, or sovereignty, or citizenship may be 
considered political. But as soon as you read the canonical texts in political 
theory starting with Plato or Aristotle you discover that friendship plays an 
organising role in the definition of justice, democracy even. 213 
Indeed, without seeking to homogenise or reify the concept of friendship, Derrida 
will argue that while it is not exactly the same in ancient Greece, in the Middle 
Ages, and today, there are some 'permanent features' that are analysable and 
formalisable from a political point of view; a certain 'model offriendship' which 
underwrites our 'traditional' definition of politics and its 'institutions'. Nominally, 
Derrida states that it is first of all a model based on the friendship between two 
young men, mortals, who have a contract according to which one will survive the 
other, one will be the heir of the other, and they will agree politically. As he 
argues, this excludes not only all friendship between a man and a woman, but 
between a woman and another woman. Thus it is that Derrida will argue that, as a 
consequence, brotherhood orfraternily is the figure of this canonical friendship 
and has a number of cultural and historical premises: 
It comes from Greece, but it also comes from the Christian model in which 
brotherhood or fraternity is essential. Men are all brothers because they are 
sons of God, and you can find the ethics of this concept in even an 
apparently secular concept of friendship and politics. In the French 
Revolution this is the foundation of the Declaration of the Rights of Man. 
Fraternity was the object of a terrible debate in France at the time, and 
fraternity appears, between equality and liberty, as one of the foundations of 
the republic. So you have to deal here with what I would call a phallocentric 
~13 Derrida, Jacques and Geoffrey Bennington, Politics of Friendship interview, op.cit, 1997. 
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or phallogocentric concept of friendship. 214 
Of course this is not to say that a woman could not have the experience of 
friendship with a man or with another woman, but rather that within this 
culture/society by which this 'prevalent canon was considered legitimate, 
accredited, then there was no voice, no discourse, no possibility of acknowledging 
these excluded possibilities' .215 All the concepts which are fundamental to the 
canonical definition of politics (' of the state, the relation to autochthony in Greece, 
to the territory, the nation-state, filiation, representation, sovereignty', even the 
idea of democracy itself) 216 had to agree with the privilege granted to friendship as 
brotherhood, which means 'of course the family, the familial schema, filiation, it 
means brother, no different, and it makes no difference ... ' .217 Given this fact, and 
in line with my earlier remarks vis a vis the quasi-concept of a democracy-to-come 
Derrida asks: 
Now is it possible to think of a democracy which would be, if not adjusted, 
then at least articulated with another concept of friendship, another 
experience of friendship which wouldn't simply be dependent on or 
subordinate to, what I call the prevalent canonical concept of friendship 
(phallogocentric, male, and so forth) ... A democracy which is so strange that 
it is no longer simply reducible to citizenship, to the organisation of a regime 
for a given society as nation-state ... can we think of a democracy beyond the 
limits of the classical political model of the nation-state and its borders? Is it 
possible to think differently this double injunction of equality for everyone 
and respect for singularity beyond the limits of classical politics and classical 
friendship.zl8 
~14 Ibid. 
215 Ibid. 
216 Ibid. 
217 Ibid. 
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In the aporia of the demos Derrida gives voice to what he calls an unconditional 
injunction: I have to welcome the other whoever he or she is unconditionally, 
without asking for a document, a name, a context or a passport: 
That is the very first opening of my relation to the other: to open my space, 
my home - my house, my language, my culture, my nation, my state, and 
myself. I don't have to open it, because it is open, it is open before I make a 
decision about it: then I have to try and keep it open or try to keep it open 
unconditionally [my italics]. 219 
Derrida does not deny that such unconditionality is 'rather frightening'; remaining 
open to the 'other' risks both the best and the worst happening. Remaining open I 
am risking displacement, even destruction of everything I hold dear, which is why 
we have to condition this unconditionality, to organise what is called here 
'hospitality' - which means laws, rights, conventions, borders, immigration laws 
and so forth. The debates around these issues appear to condition the extent to 
which we should welcome the Other: 
That's the problem: hospitality should be neither assimilation, acculturation, 
nor simply the occupation of my space by the Other. That's why it has to be 
negotiated at every instant, and the decision for hospitality, the best rule for 
this negotiation, has to be invented at every second with all the risks 
involved, and it is risky. Hospitality ... has to be re-invented at every second, 
it is something without a pre-given rule. This is what we have to invent - a 
new language for instance. When two people who don't share the same 
language meet, what should they do? They have to translate, but translation 
is an invention, to invent a new way of translating in which translation 
doesn't go one way but both ways, and how can we do that? That's the 
aporia, and this political, the new form - but it had always been the form - of 
politics, but today it has, because of the development of communication, of 
crossing borders, of tele-communications, it has new forms of urgency. 220 
219 Ibid. 
220 Ibid. 
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F or on the one hand, because the powers of the media and tele-technologies _ 
which today shape our experience of the world more than ever - go beyond state 
power, become international, Derrida will argue that this at once confirms the 
traditional structure of politics and at the same time deconstructs it - this is what 
he calls (one of) the' deconstructing effects of capitalism itself. 221 As he has 
already shown, opening the channels of translation and communication on a global 
scale means that the space for democracy in postmodernity is both globalised 
(opened to the other like never before - which is a good thing), and is always 
potentially monopolised by various governmental and non-governmental agencies 
(in particular multi-national corporations) which can propagate the techno-
economic-political (and often military) interests ofa 'hegemonic few'. While 
Derrida will speak of the 'progress of cosmopolitanism' which can be celebrated, 
as would be any access to citizenship - in this case 'world' citizenship - at the 
same time Derrida will argue that citizenship is also a limit; that of the 'nation-
state'. Indeed, his reservations with regard to a so-called 'world state' are well 
documented. In this regard he thus argues: 
I believe we should thus, beyond the old Greco-Christian cosmopolitical 
ideal (the Stoics, Saint Paul, Kant), see the coming of a universal alliance or 
solidarity that extends beyond the internationality of nation-states and thus 
beyond citizenship. This was one of the major themes of Specters afMarx 
and other texts. We are always led back to the same aporia: how to decide 
between, on the one hand, the positive and salutary role played by the 'state' 
form (the sovereignty of the nation-state) and, thus, by democratic 
citizenship in providing protection against certain kinds of international 
violence (the market, the concentration of world capital, as well as 'terrorist' 
violence and the proliferation of weapons) and, on the other hand, the 
221 Ibid. 
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negative or limiting effects of a state whose sovereignty remains a 
theological legacy, a state that closes its borders to non-citizens, and so 
forth?222 
The challenge for Europe, then, beyond the functional imperative of the creation of 
a common economic and currency area which has driven reforms forward but is 
now exhausted, is to continue to exercise 'our' political responsibility and establish 
a European public whose identity is born out of the recognition of differences - the 
mutual acknowledgement of the Other in its otherness - so as to limit the 
damaging effects of globalisation while remaining aware of the necessary but 
insufficient and endlessly revisable nature of' our' governing codes. In this task 
Derrida, along with Jurgen Habermas to whose letter on the necessary counter-
hegemonic role of Europe on the world stage he is co-signatory, finds two 
particular dates in recent 'history' to be particularly instructive: 
The day on which the newspapers informed their astonished readers of the 
oath of loyalty to Bush, to which the Spanish Prime Minister had invited 
European governments willing to go to war behind the backs of their other 
European colleagues: but no less 15 February 2003, when the protesting 
masses in London and Rome, Madrid and Barcelona, Berlin and Paris 
reacted to this surprising coup. The simultaneous nature of these 
overwhelming demonstrations - the largest since the end of the Second 
World War - might be regarded with hindsight as entering the history books 
as marking the birth of a European public. 223 
Such an intensified collaboration would no longer be founded on tolerance 
towards other member states/citizens and non-member states/citizens, but on the 
Levinasian inspired ethico-political space of the decision. For as Peter Corey 
222 Derrida, Jacques in Giovanna Borradori, Philosophy in a Time ojTerror, op.cit 2003, p.12.t. 
223 Habermas and Derrida letter, op.cit, 2003. 
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reminds us in his excellent essay, 'Totality and Ambivalence'224, Western tolerance 
has been the foundation of ethics, of so called 'human rights'. Nevertheless, as 
Derrida argues, this is (and was) a limited form of tolerant 'hospitality' which is 
always on the side of the strongest and which all too easily becomes intolerance 
once the 'tolerated' group is believed to have broken the conditions it was 
supposed to live under. We must accept, of course, as Derrida does, that some 
political, legal and religious forms of organisation must be inhospitable to some -
otherwise they would lose their very identity or singularity such as it 'is', if it 'is'. 
However, if we are conscious of the kind of unconditional hospitality outlined 
above we will be acutely aware of the extent to which these forms are limited and 
exclusive. As Corey again reminds us, we must live in constant tension (the aporia 
of the demos) between the conditional form of tolerance and practice found in the 
law and so on, and the unconditional imperative of absolute hospitality. We must 
be Socratic ally suspicious of all those who seek to instantiate' a law' (economic, 
social, juridical, religious) in the name of a particular group, party, nation, 
corporation etc, which is to say in the name of' the law', at the expense of justice. 
This is a Derridean 'new Europe' in which we must remain ever vigilant of all 
attempts of one nation or a group of nations to set the course of Europe such that 
the world would become a European super-state with Paris, London or Berlin at 
the head of affairs, making decisions reflecting their own (one-sided) national 
:24 Corey, Peter, Totality and Ambivalence: Postmodem Response to Globalisation and the 
American Empire', http://W\ ... w.cutsci.ysu.edu/voegelinlEVS/2004O/020Papers/Corey200-.".htm. 
2004. 
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interestslbeliefs/customs. As Caputo argues, effectively paraphrasing (in a slightly 
more congenial way) Derrida's argument in The Other Heading: 
That is what Derrida would have Europe avoid, and this by way of biting the 
bullet of the impossible. That means, on the one hand, learning to cultivate 
difference while avoiding both 'dispersion' and 'monopoly' ... either pure 
unity or pure multiplicity is a 'synonym of death' ... either way a catastrophe. 
On the one hand, Europe needs to avoid dispersion because it is constant 
danger of deteriorating into a myriad of nationalist idioms and self-enclosed 
idiolects, into a European 'apartheid'. On the other hand, Europeans need to 
cultivate cooperation while avoiding 'monopoly', a translation of their 
differences into a single overarching standardisation which circulates across 
the lines of a trans-national tele-technology. That would wipe out national 
difference by establishing a uniform grid of intelligibility, a trans-national 
cultural capital, a central switchboard, a central power, a capital that is not a 
particular city or metropolis. Such a world would be generically Anglo-
American or NATO-ese; it would speak AmericanlEnglish, the new lingua 
franca, and it would be driven by a European science that stretches from 
Copernicus, Galileo, and Isaac Newton to M.I.T, and Silicon Valley. For 
this world 'politics' is perhaps no longer an adequate term; it would be rather 
a 'quasi-politics of the tele-techno-scientific world, the virtual world' .225 
Furthermore, and despite being irreducible to a new military super-power, 
Derrida's 'responsible Europe' would maintain a unified military force and a 
specific strategic culture sufficient for autonomous European interventions that 
would be motivated and deliberated in Europe. The US led war in Iraq has, once 
again, only consolidated the long foreseen awareness of the failure of the common 
European foreign policy_ Only such a force would be able to mount a credible 
challenge to American 'hard power' in the service of international institutions and 
new international law no longer immunising themselves against the very 
democracy they are meant to promote. Derrida dreams of a new United Nations 
based in Europe (as the name for that 'alliance' responsible for the heading of the 
225 Caputo, John D., Deconstruction in a Nutshell, op.cit, 1997, p.1l9-120. 
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other and the other of the heading) which would orient itself around the promise of 
a democracy-to-come; a United Nations free of the hegemonic influence of its 
most powerful members and with a 'wholly other' Security Council. As Caputo so 
precisely argues in this respect, the existing United Nation's Security Council's 
principle function has been to insure the security of the 'most powerful few against 
the democratic many in the General Assembly ... [serving] ... to secure the 
sovereignty of the five permanent members. Why just these five? Because they 
were winners of the last world war. Might makes right. The strongest reason, la 
raison du plus fort, prevails, not the strongest reason'. 226 
Of course (and without wishing to privilege the juridical sphere, international law 
and its institutions, even if he believes in them more than ever), Derrida reminds us 
that among the international institutions that matter most today there is more than 
the United Nations. Apart from political bodies such as the G8, Derrida and 
Habermas together argue that at world economic summits and within the 
institutions of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, Europe must 
bring to bear its influence in the design of a future world domestic policy. They 
ask why Europe, if it has managed to deal with those contemporary problems of 
supra-national order and the European welfare state, should not also take on the 
challenge of 'taming capitalism, posing itself the challenge of defining and 
furthering a cosmopolitan order on the basis of international law against 
~:C6 Caputo, John D., 'Without Sovereignty', op.cit, 2003. 
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competitive designs [Entwuerfe], to' ?27 A contemporary situation in which such 
an alliance might intervene and bring to bear international pressure being the 
disenfranchisement of peasant farmers in the Chinese provinces currently facing a 
'land grab' policy instituted by the Chinese government bent on the expansion of 
trade, industry and housing. Beaten and stripped of their assets, these people are 
left homeless, jobless and poverty stricken, to suffer the fate of being barely 
noticed by either their own countrymen, the legal system there, or the international 
order who seem happy to accept the fruits of such an inhumane process of 
usurpation. In effect, it us up to a core Europe - which must not consolidate itself 
into a miniature Europe of course - to act as what Derrida and Habermas call a 
'locomotive' in order to hasten the authorisation of the European entity (without 
beginning and without end) to act in external affairs and prove that in a global 
society it is not only complex [ military] divisions which count, but the gentle 
power of negotiation agendas, [international] relations and economic advantages. 
In a statement echoing Derrida's commentary on Carl Schmitt the two signatories 
state 'In this world the sharpening division of politics into the alternative, as stupid 
.. I b ddt' 228 as It IS cost y, etween war an peace oes no pay. 
227 Derrida and Habennas letter, op.cit, 2003. 
228 Ibid. 
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Concluding Remarks 
In this chapter I have sought to argue that Derrida's later work, characterised as it 
is by a more overt intervention in ethical and political matters, is entirely 
consistent with and indeed, to put it stronger, is governed by his very earliest work 
on Hussed and Saussure and which inaugurated his thinking of the 'beginning of 
historicity' and 'post-historical man'. For having brought to theoretical 
consciousness the 'fact' that all meaning is constructed through the originary 
synthesis of language, time and the other, remaining always and forever 
(structurally) 'to come', Derrida uncovered, right at and from the start, the ethical 
relation to the other (always more than an other) which opens the ethico-political 
space of the decision constitutive of our 'meaningful' world. Thus it is that the 
concept of the political is both broadened to cover all conceptual/discursive 
meaning, and is transformed from its more conventional sense given that political 
theory has generally relied on the theory and practice of a certain 'sovereignty' 
practised in the security of the logos. 
Derrida's work promises - hopefully/perhaps - to have a profound impact upon 
our Western liberal democratic societies which, after the end of modernity's 
history (principally the collapse of the Capitalist and Marxist grand-narratives) are 
faced with the rampant omnibus of modern-style globalisation shorn of its 
emancipatory and democratic content. Derrida shows that, after Marx, 'we' must 
work today to intervene in concrete and urgent situations and ask questions about 
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the future of liberal capitalist democracies in a juridico-political space increasingly 
shaped by the powers of the tele-techno-media and dominated by the rhetoric of 
the world's strongest nations - not least the political theology of the United States 
- which auto-immunises itself against the very democracy it is meant to uphold in 
the name of an international justice it cannot help but betray. Derrida argues that 
we must urgently invent new forms of action and struggle to counter the 
inequalities and manifest injustices of a paradoxical globalisation as articulated in 
his call for a new international of intellectuals and activists who might help to 
develop new 'imaginative' concepts of sovereignty, the state, the citizen, new 
international institutions and new international laws. Critically, Europe has a 
central (without being centralising) role in this process given that its common 
experiences, traditions and achievements have endowed ('we Europeans') with a 
unique political consciousness and sense of duty to think 'reason'; to think new 
ways of 'being' together, other-wise. As Derrida points out, the birth of a 
European public, a European 'identity' which constitutes its sense of 'self out of 
respect for difference and otherness, is vital in fostering a more democratising and 
emancipating civic solidarity mindful of the need for the continual revision and 
improvement of all laws, institutions, organisations (political, economic, social, 
religious) in the face of infinite justice; a Europe with the military force and 
diplomatic powers in the service of such new international institutions and 
international law to regulate the manifest injustices and paradoxes of globalisation 
in the international order. The space is opened up here for a different public 
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discussion of world issues without it collapsing into either binaries or dialectics 
between good and evil, war and peace, democracy and non-democracy; here we 
are all encouraged to take a more active role in terms of the decisions we make, 
and the pressure we bring to bear on the legitimacy of our governing codes. It is 
not easy, there is no mandate which says this is the path we must take, it is a task 
always forged in aporia (the very condition of the demos). But, recalling my 
arguments in Chapter Two, 'we' (who else?) have the power to counter-sign 
differently; to literally change the world for what appears to be, in Derrida's view 
as well as my own, the better. To repeat: 
We will not change the world before two o'clock, but what I am saying is 
that we have to. 
J D "d 229 acques errl a. 
229 Derrida, Jacques and Geoffrey Bennington, Politics of Friendship interview, op.cit. 1997. 
165 
Chapter Four: 
Baudrillard and Derrida: At the Limits 
of Thought. 
Facing a world that is unintelligible and problematic, our task is clear: we must 
make that world even more unintelligible, even more enigmatic. 
Jean Baudrillard230 
In this fourth and final chapter my intention is to offer a comparative analysis of 
Jacques Derrida's work with that of his fellow postmodern 'quasi-philosopher of 
the limit', Jean Baudrillard. For despite assertions by such theorists as, for 
example, Christopher Norris, that the corpus of both theorists is irreconcilable 
and/or impossible to compare in such a way, I follow Rex Butler and Philip 
Jenkins in suggesting that an interesting, genuine and illuminating comparison 
between Derrida' s conception of 'metaphysics in deconstruction' and Baudrillard' s 
'radical thought' can be made within the remit of this thesis. 231 My contention will 
be that while being necessarily understood 'on their own terms' (in accordance 
with their own idiosyncratic elaborations of a deconstructive logic) both 
substantial similarities and differences are identifiable which I here appropriate for 
the purposes outlined below - though ultimately to justify my assertion that 
230 Baudrillard, Jean, The Vital Illusion. Columbia Press, New York: 2000, p.83. 
231 Of Derrida' s deconstructive thought Norris will argue in Deconstruction: Theory and Practice 
(op.cit, 1999) 'Nothing could be further from Baudrillard's tout court dismissal ofpbilosophy and 
Marxism alike as mere episodes in a self -deluding history of thought whose final chapter is the 
dawning recognition that all concepts, truth-claims, categories of value, etc. come down to so many 
optional variants on an age-old (ultimately Platonist) delusion of epistemological grandeur'. 
(p.157). 
166 
Derrida's just is the best way to navigate the postmodem condition and with which 
conclusion I will, in 'the end', conclude. 
In the order in which it is presented here, after a general overview of what I wish 
to establish as Baudrillard' s position, I continue by arguing that both Derrida and 
Baudrillard uncover a similar deconstructive logic!movement of' delimitation and 
excess' which proves to be the paradoxical (aporetic) condition of possibility and 
impossibility of all metaphysical/foundationalist thought (modern, postmodern, or 
whatever). After all, it is for this reason that Derrida and Baudrillard are amongst 
that group of thinkers called 'post-structuralist' or 'quasi-philosophers of the 
limit', thinkers who, as Rex Butler argues, were the 'first to think this, who first 
saw the advance of knowledge not simply as a matter of empirical argument and 
refutation, but bound up with the closure of thought, not so much the end of 
thought as what is excluded to allow it to reach this end and thus why it is always 
open to a certain future' ?32 Butler goes on, underlining his point:: 
If there is anything in common to the various thinkers called post-
structuralist, we would say that it is this notion of thought as doubling, as 
continuing even in the absence of any external standards of judgment outside 
of the world and its systems ... In each it is not a matter simply of proposing 
an alternative to the system under investigation, but rather of pushing it to its 
limit. It is at this point, they speculate, that the system will tum against 
itself, that a certain outside to the system will open up or will show itself to 
have made the system possible ... and [thus]. .. finally impossible ... from the 
b . . 233 very egmmng. 
232 Butler, Rex, Jean Baudrillard: The Illusion a/the Real. Sage Publication Ltd, London and 
California: 1999. 
233 Ibid, p.65. 
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Accordingly, it is from this 'post-structuralist' underpinning as proposed by Butler 
that both Derrida and Baudrillard's 'postmodem' theorisations must indeed be 
understood in terms of their respective attempts to push against the limits of 
contemporary discourse/systematic closure. 
However, that said, I intend to go on to argue that despite these' similarities' and 
commonalities with respect to Derrida and Baudrillard's deconstructive thinking, 
their respective analyses of our current postmodem condition and, in particular, 
their capacity for envisaging a radically more democratising and emancipating 
future for our self-creations and human solidarities can and does, at times, differ 
markedly. For while Derrida (apropos Chapters Two and Three) continues to hold 
out the (messianic) hope for such a future without beginnings and ends, 
Baudrillard increasingly adopts a position of (at best) radical irony and (at worst) 
open hostility towards even the very idea of a lost (quasi-) universal which he 
considers to have become absorbed in the 'black hole' of an all encompassing 
global techno-structure wherein the universal and its 'expressions' (human rights, 
freedom, international law, etc.) have become little more than spectacles wherein 
'All liberties fade before the mere liberation of exchange' .234 As Paul Corey 
remarks, supplementing Butler, while Baudrillard and Derrida do indeed 'share 
similar understandings of the general phenomenon of globalisation ... 
~34 Corey, Paul, 'Totality and AmbiYalence', op.cit, 2004-. 
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[they] ... arrive at remarkably different conclusions' .235 Here, going beyond Corey 
and indeed those few others who have made a DerridalBaudrillard comparison, I 
will argue that it is precisely the attitude ofDerrida and Baudrillard towards 
Europe and America - generally un-remarked - which proves so instructive for the 
comparative analysis of their visions for the future of the new world order, and for 
our individual and collective hopes and dreams. 
The Chapter has two parts. In the first I begin, as noted already, by way of a 
general overview ofBaudrillard's 'deconstructive thought' in order to provide a 
(quasi) foundation for a comparison with Derrida's oeuvre which allows the merits 
of their respective projects to be laid bare. Here, I follow Baudrillard's arguments 
in his book The Vital Illusion as the quasi-logic articulated there arguably repeats 
(this is my 'thesis') the same deconstructive movement that informs Baudrillard' s 
entire oeuvre, and in particular his ethical and political position. In Part Two I 
follow Derrida and Baudrillard's respective - and I argue very similar -
articulation of the logic of differance and their subsequent engagement with the 
'law' and the secret, before moving on to examine the ways in which their 
respective attitudes to our tele-techno-media age indicates a divergence in their 
ethico-political strategies and in particular their hopes (or lack thereof) for our 
future self-creations and human solidarities to develop in more democratising and 
emancipating ways past the end of history's ends. As already noted, no such 
comparison ofDerrida and Baudrillard yet exists. 
235 Ibid. 
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Part One: Jean Baudrillard: Strategies of Resistance 
Baudrillard's Evolution: Life, Death and the (Moral) Universe 
In Chapter One of The Vital Illusion entitled 'The Final Solution', Baudrillard 
charts, 'hypothetically' as he puts it, the movement of our species from the earliest 
life of our cells towards what he anticipates to be an absolute death. So far, so 
apocalyptic it would seem. However, absolute death is understood by Baudrillard 
in a particular and peculiar way, as not the end of the individual human being but 
rather as 'a regression toward a state of minimal differentiation among living 
beings, ofa pure repetition of identical beings,.236 The meaning of this is by no 
means obvious but its unpacking is absolutely crucial because it provides both an 
accessible 'way in' to some difficult Baudrillardian arguments concerning 
simulation, reversibility, reproductive technology, reality, virtuality, illusion, and 
so on (thus providing the opportunity to grasp the significance ofBaudrillard's 
position for economies of knowledge and about how we understand our 
contemporary world and how he compares to Derrida), and it is an 'opening' 
approach that, so far as I am aware, has hitherto not been undertaken in the 
literature: a new Baudrillard! 
Speaking of the beginning of the 'human evolutionary process,' then, Baudrillard 
states: 
Contrary to everything that seems obvious and 'natural', nature's first 
creatures were immortal. It was only by obtaining the power to die, by dint 
of constant struggle, that we became the living beings we are today. Blindly 
~36 Baudrillard, Jean, The Vital Illusion, op.cit, 2000, p.6. 
170 
we dream of overcoming death through immortali}1' when all the time 
immortality is the most horrific of possible fates. 23 238 
Again, Baudrillard's somewhat peculiar argument needs heavy glossing/reading. 
For his point is that the move to mortality in the evolution of the biosphere is 
marked by the move of immortal beings from the absolute continuity found in the 
subdivision of the same toward the possibility of birth and death. Let us follow 
Baudrillard again here as all becomes clearer: 
[So] the egg becomes fertilised by a sperm and specialised sex cells make 
their appearance. The resulting entity is no longer a copy of either one of the 
pair that engendered it; rather, it is a new and singular combination. There is 
a shift from pure and simple reproduction to procreation: the first two will 
die for the first time, and the third for the first time will be born. We reach 
the stage of beings that are sexed, differentiated, and mortal. The earlier 
order of the virus - of immortal beings - is perpetuated, but henceforth this 
world of deathless beings is contained inside the world of mortals. In 
evolutionary terms, the victory goes to beings that are mortal and distinct 
from one another: the victory goes to US?39 
The victory, however, turns out to be short lived. The game isn't over. Reversion 
is always possible. Encoded in the earliest life of our cells, immortality reappears 
on the horizon, driving what he calls the 'enormous enterprise' we as living beings 
appear to be undertaking today; namely, 
... a project to reconstruct a homogeneous and uniformly consistent universe 
- an artificial continuum this time - that unfolds within a technological and 
mechanical medium, extending over our vast information network, where we 
are in the process of building a perfect clone, an identical copy of our world, 
a virtual artefact that opens up the prospect of endless reproduction ... This is 
the revenge taken on mortal and sexed beings by immortal and 
237 Ibid, p.6. 
238 As Baudrillard argues for Sigmund Freud the death drive is precisely 'this nostalgia for a state 
before the appearance of individuality and sexual differentiation, a state in which we lived before 
we became mortal and distinct from one another'. Ibid, p.6. 
239 Ibid, p.2. 
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undifferentiated life forms. This is what could be called the final solution. 240 
The result of this 'pathological involution' of the evolutionary process is thus the 
'dis-information' of our species through the cancelling of differences; the result of 
which leads him to question the scientific myth of progress as a step forward. 
So: Baudrillard's hypothesis is that the human race, unable to face its own 
diversity (its mortality), its own complexity, its own radical difference, its own 
alterity, is involved in a kind of revisionism. But maybe, he muses, this 
revisionism can be seen as an adventure or 'heroic test' in order to see what part of 
so called 'human nature' survives the artificialisation of living beings taken to its 
limits: 
If we discover that not everything can be cloned, simulated, programmed, 
genetically and neurologically managed, then whatever survives could truly 
be called 'human', some inalienable and indestructible human quality could 
finally be identified. Of course, there is always the risk, in this experimental 
adventure, that nothing will pass the test - that the human will be perfectly 
d' d 241 era lcate . 
The question for Baudrillard thus becomes that of whether by taking such an 
artificial course our species is, in fact, hastening its own decline according to some 
collective, suicidal impulse. For once humanity has rid itself of all its vicissitudes, 
its negative traits - our desires, neuroses, dreams, handicaps, viruses, frenzies, our 
unconscious (even sexuality is cited by Baudrillard) - then what makes us unique 
as living beings is usurped in the perfection of the model: 
240 Ibid, p.8. 
241 Ibid, pp.15-16. 
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Life becomes sheer survival when it is reduced to the lowest common 
denominator, to the genome, the genetic inheritance - where it is the 
perpetual movement of DNA codes that drives life, and where the distinctive 
marks of the human fade before the metonymic eternity of cells. The worst 
of it is that living beings engendered by their own genetic formulae doubtless 
will not survive this process of reduction. That which lives by the code and 
survives by the codes will die by them. 242 
Thus it is that Baudrillard wonders whether Nietzsche might have been right after 
all and that the human race, left to its own devices, is capable only of redoubling 
itself in its efforts to destroy itself 
And, Baudrillard continues musing, it would seem that perhaps nowhere does the 
threatened disappearance of 'the human' under the weight of its own simulation 
resonate more than in the discourse of 'human rights' - a discourse much 
employed on the contemporary world-scene. For the hegemony of the idea of the 
human - defined here as a modem, rational, Western being - is seen by 
Baudrillard as threatening both the specificity of the inhuman and that within the 
human which is said to be inhuman i.e. that which is resistant to 'interpretation' in 
its secrecy or seduction. For Baudrillard sees the impulse to annex nature, 
animals, other races and cultures whereby everything 'is assigned a place within an 
evolutionist and hegemonic anthropology', 243 as representing the victory of a 
'monothought of the human ... as defined by the West, under the sign of the 
universal and democracy'. 244 This situation leaves us, paradoxically enough 
242 Ibid, p.20. 
243 Ibid, p.24. 
244 Ibid, p.24. 
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according to Baudrillard, in a position where we now witness the supposed 
'improvement' of human rights at the same time as the irruption of their increased 
violation. 
For all of those who may still have faith in culture to preserve us from what is an 
anathema to Baudrillard, and which informs his 'political' position - the thus 
stated 'hell of the Same' - Baudrillard has some bad news: 
It is culture than clones us, mental cloning anticipates any biological cloning. 
It is the matrix of acquired traits that, today, clones us culturally under the 
sign of monothought - and it is all the innate differences that are annulled, 
inexorably by ideas, by ways of life, by the cultural context. Through school 
systems, media, culture, and mass information, singular beings become 
identical copies of one another. It is this kind of cloning - social cloning, the 
industrial reproduction of things and people - that makes possible the 
biological conception of the genome and of genetic cloning, which only 
further sanctions the cloning of human conduct and human cognition. 245 
Thus it is that Baudrillard will argue that mass destruction is endemic in Western 
culture. For we must understand that before Europe and America perpetuated the 
holocaust on cultures around the world qua globalisation, they achieved the same 
effect on themselves. As Gerry Coulter puts this same point in a discussion on 
Baudrillard and Agamben, 'How many regional dialects were sacrificed on the 
altar of the French and German "national" languages? How many aboriginal cults 
h I · . ?,246 savagely destroyed by t e European sett er socletles. 
245 Ibid p.25. 
246 Coulter, Gerry, Introduction to 'Fonn of Life' by Giorgio Agamben, published as 'Intersections 
and Divergences in Contemporary Theory: Baudrillard and Agamben on Politics and the Daunting 
Questions of Our Time'. Published on-line in the International Journal ofBaudrillard Studies at 
http://www.ubishops.calbaudrillardstudieslvoI2 _ 2/agarnben.htrnl. July, 2005. 
174 
Yet, it is not all doom and gloom for Baudrillard, for he goes on to argue that this 
phenomenon offers us the chance to call into question the basic elements of 
millenarian morality. And while he recognises that such self-analysis may take 
some time given our moralists and biologists are not yet at the point where they 
can recognise the fundamental role played by the death drive in both the human 
individual and in the human race as a whole, when it is completed Baudrillard 
expects that this fatal enterprise will reveal something that radical philosophers 
already know; namely, that 
... there is no morality to oppose to this immoral desire, this technological 
desire for immortality. There are no laws of nature and no moral law that 
would be their manifestation. The notion of such a law springs from an 
idealised vision of the world, one that is perpetuated ... by science itself. 
There are no natural rights of the individual, or of the species, from the point 
of view of an ideal definition. Thus there is no interdiction that could be 
founded on a division between good and evil. 247 
Although at first glance this may seem like rather less than good news, for 
Baudrillard this insight brings into relief a 'moral universe' dissimulated by the 
hegemony of the good qua the mono-thought of the human. In what he describes 
as 'this traditional universe', there was still a balance of Good and Evil according 
to a 'dialectical relation that more or less insured tension and equilibrium in the 
moral universe' .248 On this telling there is no supremecy of Good over Evil or 
vice versa, and indeed it is when this symmetrical relationship is broken that the 
homogenising force of the Same is unleashed in its accumulative frenzy. 
247 Baudrillard, Jean, The VitalIllusion, op.cit, 2000, pp.27-28. 
248 Baudrillard, Jean, 'The Spirit of Terrorism'. Le Monde, November 2001. Translated into 
English by Dr. Rachel Blou1. See 
http://slash.autonomedia.orgiartic1e.pl?sid=01l1111411753229&mode=7threshold= 
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Baudrillard again: 
This symmetry is broken as soon as there is a total extrapolation of the Good 
(an hegemony of the positive) over any form of negativity, an exclusion of 
death, of any potential adversarial force; the absolute triumph of the Good. 
From there, the equilibrium is broken, and it is as if Evil [of the same] 
regained an invisible autonomy, developing then in exponential fashion. 249 
As Baudrillard goes on to argue in a similar vein in his 2001 essay, 'The Spirit of 
Terrorism', it is exactly this breakdown which has happened in the political order 
with the failure/erasure of communism and the global triumph of liberal 
capitalism, whereby 'a fantastical enemy appeared, diffused over the whole planet, 
infiltrating everywhere as a virus, surging from every interstice of power. 
Islam' .250 It is in this context that Baudrillard argues that Islam can be read as the 
ironic (reversible) embodiment of that greatly more powerful force that resides 
everywhere and in each of us; that is, a fundamental impulse to deny any system if 
such a system is (apparently) close to perfection or absolute supremacy. The more 
the system is globally concentrated to constitute one network the more it becomes 
vulnerable at a single point to a challenge to its generalised system of exchange by 
an irreducible alterity that must always resist: 
When the situation is thus monopolised by global power, when one deals 
with this formidable condensation of all functions through technocratic 
machinery and absolute ideological hegemony (pensee unique) what other 
way is there, than a terrorist reversal of the situation ... It is the system itself 
that has created the objective conditions for this brutal distortion. By taking 
all the cards to itself, it forces the Other to change the rules of the §ame. 
And the new rules are ferocious, because the stakes are ferocious. 2 1 
249 Ibid, p.7. 
250 Ibid, p. 7. 
251 Ibid, p.4. 
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It is thus (hopefully) ironic that there now exists a situation where Western 
hegemony of the Good and the positive accomplishments of Western economic 
expansion and technological advancement have been met by equally negative 
reactions as Evil develops exponentially: the West has engendered its own 
destruction at the limits of its own perfection. 
For Baudrillard, then, the result of the 'terrorist act' - exemplified par excellence 
in the attack on the Twin towers on September Eleventh 2001 - is consequently to 
introduce an irreducible singularity into the homogenising exchange circuit. 
Terror against terror. It is as if, he muses, again - musing being very much a 
favoured tone ofBaudrillard's works - every 'domination seeking' phenomenon 
was the creator of its own antibody, becoming the architect of their own 
disappearance - impotent against the automatic (silent) reversal of its own power. 
And for Baudrillard this situation is nothing less than a World War, a war 
irreducible to the phenomenon of the opposition of America and Islam for 
example, whose very oppositionality only serves to promote the illusion of a 
visible conflict and an attainable solution (through force). For for Baudrillard this 
'fundamental antagonism' is nothing less than a triumphant globalisation fighting 
with itself. He explains: 
In this way it is indeed a World War, not the third one, but the fourth and 
only truly World War, as it has as stakes globalisation itself. The first two 
World Wars were classic wars. The first ended European supremacy and the 
colonial era. The second ended Nazism. The third, which did happen, as a 
dissuasive Cold War, ended communism. From one war to the other, one 
went further each time toward a unique world order. Today the latter, 
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virtually accomplished, is confronted by antagonistic forces, diffused in the 
very heart of the global, in all its actual convulsions. Fractal war in which all 
cells, all singularities revolt as antibodies do. It is a conflict so unfathomable 
that, from time to time, one must preserve the idea of war through 
spectacular productions such as the Gulf (production) and today 
Afghanistan's. But the fourth World War is everywhere. It is that which 
haunts every global order, every hegemonic domination; - if Islam 
dominated the world, terrorism would fight against it. For it is the world 
itself which resists domination. 252 
This last remark must be underlined for it captures the very 'essence' of 
Baudrillard's thinking which is always - and this needs to be stressed again given 
its lack of visibility in many studies - thought against the dictatorship of the same, 
of the identical, the cloned, the perfect one, the monolith(ic). And here the world 
is on his side, breaking and resisting the domination of the one and only. The 
world dies of sameness, it lives through different deaths. It is thus absolutely 
critical for understanding the quasi-logic ofBaudrillard's radical thought as he 
seeks to uncover what he calls the 'greatly more radical illusion of the world' 
beneath the illusion of the Real qua contemporary hyper-reality (the 'more real 
than real') that we get this point. In his essay 'The Murder of the Real', Baudrillard 
articulates his notion of 'radical thought' and of radical difference against closure 
thus: 
I am well aware that all of this is metaphorical. But we are not interested in 
generating one more truth. We are trying to recover the traces of the illusion, 
that is to say, the vestiges of the original crime against negativity ... Against 
the extermination of evil, of death, of illusion, against this Perfect Crime, we 
must fight for the criminal imperfection of the world. Against this artificial 
paradise of technicity and virtuality, against the attempt to build a world 
completely positive, rational, and true, we must save the traces of the illusory 
252 Ibid, pp.5~. My italics. 
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world's definitive opacity and mystery. 253 
We have arrived here at the 'key thought' ofBaudrillard's position, a position he 
puts forward in varying wefts and weaves, creating those radical figures of 
'opposition to the same' that pattern his texts, not least in The Perfect Crime 
(1996); namely, that the value of thought lies not in its convergences with 'truth' 
but in the immeasurable divergences which separate it from 'truth'; indeed our 
very consciousness (as consciousness oj) results from a challenging of reality -
that is, from what he terms' a bias towards the objective illusoriness of the world 
rather than its reality' .254 He explains: 
This challenging is more vital for our survival and the survival of the species 
than the belief in reality and existence, which is of the order of otherworldy 
spiritual consolation. Our world is as it is, and it is no more real for that. 
'Man's most powerful instinct is to come into conflict with the truth and, 
therefore, with the real. ,255 
For Baudrillard, then, our everyday and thus commonplace 'belief in reality' (a 
fundamentally religious belief he thinks) is thus a failing of both understanding 
and of common sense; it is the last refuge of 'moral zealots' and 'apostles of 
rationality' who, in reducing their own lives to an accumulation of facts and 
evidence, causes and effects, vent contempt on both themselves and others. In this 
'divine fallacy' the real and the rational do nothing less than seek to close the 
opening of an originary communicative exchange that functions as a condition for 
253 Baudrillard, Jean, The Vital Illusion, op.cit, 2000, p.74. My italics. 
254 Taken from an extract of Baudril1ard's The Perfoct Crime (Verso, London and New York: 
1996), and reproduced in the Second Edition of The Selected Writings of Jean Baudrillard. Edited 
and Introduced by Mark Poster. Polity Press and Blackwell Publishers, Cambridge and Oxford: 
2001, p.266. 
~~s ~-- Ibid, p.266. 
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thought and being: The aim of such discourses is the death of thought itself. 
Accordingly, Baudrillard desires an oppositional, heterogeneous life - a life of 
radical illusion/radical alterity, a radicality that is unalienable, interminable. And, 
ironically, 'natural': despite the thrust of our culture of and for the same, for 
closure against all differences, all excesses, life wants to be, and just is, 
disobedience to conformity. Life is, Real life is, excessive of all constraints. 
So, from this argument, from this Baudrillardian premise, this quasi-foundation, 
this position, let us now follow him as he traces this effacement of originary 
difference (crucially analogous, as we will later see, with Derrida's notion of 
differance) by way of his analysis of what he calls 'communication'. For it is here 
that Baudrillard will juxtapose our 'human communication' as it has come to be 
ordinarily understood with those more 'interesting relations' issuing from the 
mode of challenge, seduction and play, the latter making livelier things come into 
existence, and the former producing more of the same by putting things that 
already exist in contact with each other. This will lead by extension to an 
examination of the space left open for effective political resistance (if any) in our 
discursive landscape, and the strategies one might employ to exacerbate the 
reversible logic inherent in every system in its drive towards closure. 
180 
In a Spin: Re-Thinking Communication in the 'Symbolic/Semiotic Spiral' 
For Baudrillard the 'common sense' idea of communication that most of us work 
with is a massively misleading, paradoxical one. The tracing of the argument to 
this effect can begin by considering his assertion that in our techno-mediascape, 
where communication appears to have developed exponentially through the 
development and proliferation of our semiotic, our mass media and our cybernetic 
paradigms, there is actually less and less communication taking place. This is 
because, on Baudrillard's account, what such communicative paradigms efface is 
the violence of the initial communicative opening that is the condition of 
possibility (and impossibility) of all forms of communication. That is to say, that 
when communication is reduced to the production and circulation of meaning, 
something essential to communication is lost; is disavowed. Accordingly, for 
Baudrillard the very fact that linguistic communication can and does occur but that 
it always needs supplementing, clarifying, elaborating and repeating in its 
'uncertainty', is proof of this violent, arbitrary communicative opening and its co-
extensive symbolic exchange as (de-) constructive of all meaningful thought. 
It is just this 'deconstructive movement' - cast in his work in terms of the 
symbolic-semiotic spiral - that Baudrillard therefore seeks to articulate with his 
idea of reversibility, a movement perhaps best illustrated with reference to his use 
of Marcel Mauss's elaboration of gift exchange in The Gift (Mauss, 1925). For 
what Baudrillard finds in Mauss's gift exchange theory is an exchange which 
operates outside of the code of rationality and its attendant transcendental subject, 
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and whose challenge results in an endless cyclical process of exchange/reversal. 
For the reciprocal obligation identified by Mauss in symbolic cultures and 
maintained by sacrifice and ritual (in certain American tribes for example) has 
nothing whatsoever to do with the re-paying of a debt (the 'normal' economic 
relation), but rather with assuring the continuation of exchange per se. For this 
reason the object exchanged has no value independent of the ceaseless movement 
of reversal, a movement which consequently operates not only without reference to 
meaning but, more radically, without reference to fixed difference as such. 256 The 
challenge of 'the gift and counter-gift' thus manifests itself in the way in which the 
experience of the other gives rise to an interminable cycle of exchange irreducible 
to the logic of identity (the 'hell of the same') yet without which identity and 
concomitantly communication itself (as reply to) would never get under way. 
Now, Baudrillard's point here - as throughout his work - is not (as certain 
Baudrillard commentators and critics have wrongly assumed and agued) to 
privilege primitive cultures as such, nor to advocate one type of communication 
(the symbolic) at the expense of another (the semiotic) - as critics such as Jean 
Francois Lyotard257 and William Merrin258 are prone to do - but rather, as his idea 
~56 To re-iterate, the symbolic being no-thing ontic (not belonging to the realm of Being) but 
standing as a form of exchange. 
257 As Philip Jenkins argues in Jean Baudrillard: Deconstruction andAlterity (tmpublished PhD, 
University of Bristol, 2001), for Baudrillard, Lyotard is symptomatic of those critics who have been 
'too ready to reduce symbolic exchange to the description of an exchange of gifts between pre-
existing, separate and finite terms (subjects), that is, to a discontinuous paradigm ... In reducing 
symbolic exchange to this literal reading Lyotard fails to grasp how the symbolic is operative as an 
analogy whose purpose is to articulate a circulation and opening that deconstructs precisely the 
discontinuity of the subject/object binary that structures his own comments'. (p.72). 
182 
of the symbolic-semiotic spiral suggests, to give expression to the typically 
obscured or unknown but, nevertheless, irreducible movement of 'delimitation and 
excess' which is nothing less than the irreducibility of time and alterity to 
figuration (i.e. the always failing to capture in any figure the totality: things always 
escape our artificial exchange economies). And in Baudrillard's view the 
attempted effacement of this irreducibility or radical singularity (by which nothing 
is ever absolutely 'the same' and so cannot be exhaustively exchanged), is nothing 
less than a 'perfect crime' against communication itself. In a key passage 
Baudrillard clarifies all of this as follows: 
Our common language tries, by discursive means, to inscribe reality in a 
meaning, in a form of reciprocal exchange. But today language is confronted 
by the hegemonic fantasy of a global and perpetual communication - the 
New Order, the new cyberspace of language - where the ultrasimplification 
of digital languages prevails over the figural complexity of natural 
languages. With binary coding and decoding the symbolic dimension of 
language is lost; the materiality, the multiplicity, and the magic of language 
are erased At the extreme limit of computation and the coding and cloning 
of human thought (artificial intelligence), language as a medium of symbolic 
exchange becomes a definitively useless function. 259 
258 I quote from Jenkins succinct remarks once more to gain clarity on this issue. He states of 
Merrin's arguable mis-reading of Baudrillard on this point 'in his attempt to locate Baudrillard's 
theory of communication (and his work as a whole) within the Durkheimian tradition ... Merrin 
tends to set up the very binary logic that the symbolic in fact deconstructs. Instead of operating as a 
general condition ofim-possibility, the symbolic is presented simply as a "more personal, human 
and social" form of exchange that is superseded by the mass media, "a poor substitute for human 
contact." Despite his accurate exposition of Baudrillard's reading of symbolic exchange, Merrin 
fails to explain the correlation between the content of the symbolic as a form of communication and 
its inalienability. In this way, the irreducbility of symbolic exchange becomes equated with the 
inalienability of a privileged (and more genuine?) form of communication that is "lost" in modem 
society. Not only does this smack of primitive idealism (rejoining Lyotard's critique). but it also 
means that Merrin has difficulty in explaining what it is about the symbolic that makes it "fatal": 
what it is about the symbolic that cannot be obliterated? .. [It] is only when the symbolic is 
understood as a general condition of im-possiblity (articulated metaphorically in terms of gift 
exchange) that these shortcomings can be resolved'. (Ibid, 2001. p.68.) 
259 Baudrillard, Jean, The T 'ital IllUSion, op.cit, 2000, p.69. My italics. 
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The hope for radical critique, which 'relies', in a sense, on acknowledging the 
protean possibility of symbolic exchange as forever uncapturable, thus comes, as 
always for Baudrillard, from the imperfection of the (perfect) crime (here) against 
language, whose evidence comes from unsettling language itself: there can be no 
definitive (metaphysical) closure that exhausts in our communications (in the 
semiotic) the always in excess symbolic exchange that, in the end, tirelessly and 
inexhaustively unsettles everything, reopens every attempted closure: the symbolic 
as the saviour of interminable openness. Accordingly, for Baudrillard the strongest 
resistance - the 'counter destructive' moment - to the destructive virtualisation of 
language comes from the' singularity, the irreducibility, the vernacularity of all 
languages,260 which are still' alive and kicking' and which remain, in all their 
stubborn, radical singularity and un-cooptability, the best guarantee against the 
global extermination of meaning, of meanings - of the guarantee against 
monolithic closure - of differences. 
The whole question of how such 'resistance' is played out socially, politically and 
economically, however, is complicated in Baudrillard's theories by his argument 
as to the disappearance of the space for, and hence the possibility of, collective 
'political' action, thereby questioning, it would seem, the possibility of 
overthrowing the 'new world order' as he construes it with all its manifest 
injustices, its inequalities and its drive towards that criminal state of the monolithic 
and homogenous same which negates alternatives, negates radical 
260 Ibid, p.69. 
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otherness/alterity, and to which he is so utterly opposed. As Chris Rojek points 
out in this context in his essay 'Baudrillard and Politics,261 (Forget Baudrillard, 
1993), it is not now a question of the masses, for example, being prone to fascist 
manipulation or of communism somehow raising the consciousness of the masses 
into resistance. No, this is too old a story. For as constituted as terminals/multiple 
networks, the private sphere ceases to be the stage where the drama of the subject 
at odds with his/her objects and with his/her image is played out, and, where most 
of what passes for post-war politics has been concerned to show the gap between 
the personal and the political and to promote a realignment between the two for the 
purpose of moral advancement or social improvement, Baudrillard sees only the 
play of the signifier as the point of resistance: of potential 'reverse'. Citing as an 
example the events in Paris in May 1968, Rojek points to the poverty of the well-
meaning politics of the Left which, dedicated to liberating the masses, found itself 
incapable of escaping the vortex of simulation in which the sign continuously 
promised more than it could deliver - May '68 perhaps - against its express 
intentions, thereby coming to signal (perhaps) the end of collectivism as such. 
Yet it is not the case (as Baudrillard's commentators such as Christopher Norris all 
too often and all too wrongly assume) that in denying the old space of politics in 
today's world Baudrillard has no 'political interest' Gust as it is not true that 
261 Rojek, Chris, 'Baudrillard and Politics'. In Forget Baudrillard? Routledge, London and Ne\v 
York: 1993. 
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Baudrillard has no 'ethical interest'). 262 For the argument being put here - and 
which I hope is already being made 'convincingly' / 'attractively' - is that 
Baudrillard is ethically and politically engaged throughout. So why the common 
misunderstanding by otherwise sophisticated commentators and critics? Well, 
such a denial ofBaudrillard's political interest arises, I think, in misunderstanding 
the nature of his self-declared nihilism which is taken to oversimply mean that he 
denies all meaning whatsoever and therefore must lack any substantive 
ethical/political position. 263 For this not only does not follow but is 'absolutely' 
not the case: Baudrillard' s work is one which seeks to come to grips with the 
pathological over-production of meaning in 'Western' societies in which 'we' are 
both literally and metaphorically killing ourselves, co-extensively seeking to 
examine the way in which our traditional political concepts and categories have 
emptied themselves out and thus pushed us beyond contemporary understandings 
of the state and politics - and thus resistance as it is conventionally understood. 
262 This tends to result from the view exemplified by Christopher Norris and supported by the likes 
of Alan Sokal that Baudrillard is a 'reality-denying irrationalist'. I refer you to Norris' remarks on 
Baudril1ard's corpus quoted on page 166 of this thesis (see fn. 231). Along these lines Alan 
Callincicos, drawing his own political implications of such views, will speak ofBaudrillard's work 
as likely to 'license a kind of intellectual dandyism' which abandons the kind of critical inquiry 
needed to critique late capitalism in favour of a banal media theory. For Callincicos therefore, 
Baudrillard's work thus does little more than underwrite the intellectual and political dominance of 
the new western middle c1ass( es) and add to the 'political disillusionment of societies most 
articulate members'. (Callum G. Brown, Postmodernism for Historians. Pearson Education Ltd, 
Harlow: 2005, p.166). 
263 As Baudrillard says of the misunderstandings surrounding his nihilist labelling 'What I do is 
more of a thought experiment which tries to explore an unknown field by other rules. This doesn't 
mean it's nihilistic in the sense in which nihilism means there are no longer any values, no longer a 
reality, but only signs ... But if you take nihilism in the strong sense of a nothing-based thinking, a 
thinking which might start out from the axiom "why is there nothing rather than something?" -
overturning the fundamental philosophical question, the question of being: "Why is there 
something rather than nothing?" - then I don't mind being called a nihilist.' This quote was taken 
from Baudrillard' s Paroxysm: lntenliews with Philippe Petit. Verso, London and New York: 1998, 
p.34. 
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And this ever-present 'engagement' can be further seen if we examine the now 
well worn but still useful example of the events surrounding '9/11' (indeed '9/11' 
as Event). For here we can effectively grasp Baudrillard's current arguments (i.e., 
most recently rearticulated long-term position) surrounding what he terms the 
trans-political and the possibility of resistance to the dominant system such that 
we can open the way for a discussion of such issues as the 'hell of power', the 
aestheticisation of culture, and Baudrillard' s identification of America as the 
privileged site of resistance to the homogenising forces of contemporary hyper-
reality. So far as I am aware no commentators have argued the Baudrillardian 
'political' in this way, and certainly not as a prelude to a comparison with Derrida. 
Baudrillard and the Politics of Terror 
Baudrillard sees the value - not it must be emphasised the justification264 - of the 
September 11 attack, then, as being an 'irreducible, singular, and irrevocable 
challenge',265 a challenge all the more significant in that it affects 'the system' 
from the inside, adapting to the logic of sign exchange and sign value. Using the 
banality of American everyday life as a 'mask and double game', Baudrillard 
argues that the terrorists used Western planes, computer networks and the media 
(combined with their own demise) to produce a spectacle of terror designed to 
264 As Baudrillard argues in Der Spiegel in 2002 'I do not praise murderous attacks - that would be 
idiotic. Terrorism is not a contemporary from of revolution against oppression and capitalism ... I 
have glorified nothing, accused nobody, justified nothing. One should not confuse the messenger 
with the message. 1 have endeavoured to analyse the process through which the unbounded 
expansion of globalisation creates the condition for its own destruction'. 
265 This quote comes from Baudrillard's 2001 article 'The Spirit of Terrorism', op.cit, 2001. 
187 
push the system into overdrive and hence (potentially) bring about its own 
extermination: a hyperreal act confronts a hyperreal system. In other words, cast 
in terms of the symbolic-semiotic spiral repeated across Baudrillard' s oeuvre (see 
my previous remarks on communication), the terrorist act operates through 
semiotic process( es), escalating them, creating reversive forces within the system; 
causing it to collapse at the point of perfection: the invulnerable American land 
mass. Ironically - and Baudrillard's irony is at the 'essence' of his thought - it is 
the semiotic (qua the productivist economy of meaning), striving as it does to 
produce a world of non-events, that itself produces a desire for precisely an event 
of maximum consequence, a fateful event symbolically rebalancing the scales of 
destiny as Evil reappears to haunt the conscience of the (self-declared) Good. 
In terms of its 'event-ness', September 11 thus becomes both a non-event - it is 
quickly assimilated into and recuperated within the codes/models used to 
represent/control it (9/11 'now happened' in the same way as the Gulf War 'now 
happened', i.e. as an event enclosing a radical difference) - and what Baudrillard 
describes as an absolute event qua a reversive symbolic event after which the 
system can never quite function in exactly the same way again. That is to say - to 
unpack the argument here - that the problem for the West in responding to this 
event is that it cannot directly exchange anything with the terrorists, not only 
because it cannot reciprocate with its own death, but because acknowledging the 
challenge as such would admit an irrecoverable singularity into the homogenising 
188 
logic of the global capitalist machine. Refusing to accept the master's gift of life 
in exchange for their servitude (to put this in a Hegelian register), and in the face 
of the paralysis of the Western response, the terrorist threat to the global system 
subsequently becomes incalculable. The American led coalition is therefore forced 
into a simulation of war and security as a strategy of deterrence and as a 'face 
saving' exercise designed to reassert control and reinstate the illusion of power, 
winning back the public imagination which remains fascinated by the terrorist 
spectacle, replaying incessantly the humiliating moment(s) of the twin towers 
collapse when the seat of virtual (and actual) capitalism took a direct hit. The 
terrorists wager is that this strategy will prove fatal. As Baudrillard articulates all 
of this in 'The Spirit of Terrorism', the performative genius of the terrorist 
spectacle is to provide a condensed image of the West's social and political 
processes wherein the very derision of the situation (of the terrorist act), as well as 
the piled up violence of power,jlips over against it, magnifying simultaneously 
both the system's violence and the symbolic violence it can never access or 
control. 
And, in the light of the American led reaction to the 9/11 suicide attacks, argues 
Baudrillard, it would seem that the terrorist wager is working, events seem to have 
unfolded very much according to the terrorist script. As Douglas Kellner 
pertinently affirms in his 2005 article 'Baudrillard, Globalisation, and Terrorism': 
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For the majority of us, the Bush administration did what Baudrillard said the 
terrorists would want them to do, in terms of an overreaction to the 9/11 
attack that would melt the initial sympathy for the US and that would win 
recruits for the terrorists reacting against the excess of violence and 
aggression of the US response.266 
It has thus become obvious to all but the most interested parties, Baudrillard goes 
on, that the most recent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq (like the first Gulf War) were 
won in advance, and were therefore not 'wars' in any meaningful sense. 267 As 
William Merrin says of the Afghan conflict in 'Total Screen: 9/11 and the Gulf 
War Reloaded': 
Beginning on 7th October with a cruise missile and bombing assault on 
Kabul, the war would always suffer from being a TV repeat of the Gulf War, 
lacking the spectacle, footage and novelty, upon a country that, as the 
Captain of the USS Enterprise admitted was 'not a target-rich environment'. 
As one General commented, the military action involved 'turning big bits of 
rubble into small bits of rubble'. Bombed, ramshackle, training camps, 
already-razed Afghan cities, mountain warfare, and a ground offensive 
mostly conducted with Afghani, Northern Alliance fighters, televisually 
indistinguishable from the Taliban they opposed (and often once been), came 
a poor second to the real-time, hyper visible spectacle of the imploding Twin 
Towers. American attempts to stage-manage the media spectacle of war and 
manufacture more dramatic footage of the commando raids noticeably 
backfired. 268 
266 Kellner, Douglas, 'Baudrillard, Globalisation and Terrorism: Some Comments on Recent 
Adventures of the Image and Spectacle on the Occasion of Baudrillard's 75th Birthday'. Published 
on-line at the International Journal ofBaudrillard Studies, Vo12, January 2005, p.3. Found at 
http:///www.ubishops.ca/baudrillardstudieslvoI2_1/kellner.htm. 
267 That is, in the sense both of being a one-sided war with the outcome decided in advance, and-
relatedly - being largely played out in the media theatre and through virtual representations. 
268 Merrin, William, 'Total Screen 9/11 and the Gulf war Reloaded'. Published in the International 
Journal ofBaudrillard Studies, Ibid, Vol. 2, No.2, July 2005, pp.15-16. Published on-line at 
http://www.ubishops.calbaudrillardstudieslvoI2_2/merrin.htm. 
190 
In this perceptive article, Merrin argues it was this failure that led to the (re)turn to 
Iraq in early 2003; a country it was thought would offer a more visible and 
traditional target for Western military power and one capable of restoring 
American pride. However, the allied (U.S. led) operation, 'shock and awe', failed 
to do either. As with the Afghan conflict, the stage-managed fall of Saddam' s 
statue in the centre of Baghdad and the picture of a dishevelled, elderly dictator 
paraded before the world's media, hardly rivalled the impact value of the World 
Trade Centre collapse. Combined with the very public failure to find weapons of 
mass destruction, the visible absence of a plan for post-war Iraq, and continuing 
violence, looting and insurgency, what was very much designed to be a public 
relations victory turned into a show of bad conscience for the West. And for 
Baudrillard nowhere was and is this bad conscience more in evidence than in the 
various prisoner abuse scandals. As he argues in the opening gambit of his essay, 
'War Porn': 
World Trade Centre: shock treatment of power, humiliation inflicted on 
power, but from the outside. With the images of the Baghdad prisons, it is 
worse, it is the humiliation, symbolic and completely fatal, which the world 
power inflicts on itself - the Americans in this particular case - the shock 
treatment of shame and bad conscience. This is what binds together the two 
events ... Before both a worldwide violent reaction: in the first case a feeling 
of wonder, in the second, a feeling of abj ection. 269 
While Baudrillard sees September 11th as providing' exhilarating images of a 
major event', he sees the images coming out of Abu Ghraib and the like as the very 
opposite, a 'non-event of obscene banality, the degradation, atrocious but banal, 
269 Baudrillard, Jean, 'War Porn', published in International Journal ofBaudrillard Studies, Vo1.2, 
No.1, January 2005, p.l. See http://www/ubishops.calbaudrillardstudies/vo12_2/merrin.htm. 
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not only of the victims, but of the amateur scriptwriters of this parody of 
violence' .270 The American attempt to symbolically humiliate the other qua an 
irrecuperable excess which refuses domestication into an indifferent world order 
turns itself into what Baudrillard will describe as a 'grotesque infantile reality-
show, in a desperate simulacrum of power ... a power henceforth without aim, 
without purpose, without plausible enemy, in total impunity' .271 In other words, 
rather than inflicting humiliation on the victims or others, America humiliates 
itself He goes on: 
These images are as murderous for America as those of the World Trade 
Center flames. Nevertheless, America in itself is not on trial, and it is 
useless to charge the Americans: the infernal machine exploded in literally 
suicidal acts. In fact, the Americans have been overtaken by their own 
power. They do not have the means to control it. And now we are part of 
this power. The bad conscience of the entire West is crystallised in the burst 
of sadistic laughter of the American soldiers, as it is behind the construction 
of the Israeli wall. This is where the truth of these images lies; this is what 
they are full of: the excessiveness of a power designating itself as abject and 
hi 272 pornograp c. 
But while Baudrillard speaks of the 'truth of these images', he is keen to point out 
that 'truth' is not veracity. Whether these pictures of prisoner abuse are true or 
false remains somewhat uncertain. But the point he is making is that it is their 
import which counts; the manner in which they are definitively integrated into the 
war. Thus they don't represent the war anymore - they involve neither distance, 
perception nor judgment - rather, precisely because of this their specific violence 
adds to the specific violence of the war. And so the typical Baudrillardian trope of 
270 Ibid, p.2. 
271 Ibid, p.2. 
272 Ibid, pp.2-3. 
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reversibility gets articulated again, here is that 'reversing irony'; the irony of our 
aestheticised culture: that the same techno-media apparatus that enabled the 
Western military to control, produce and direct coverage of the war, ultimately 
proves self-defeating. As Baudrillard tellingly states: 'There exists in all of 
this ... an immanent justice of the image: those who live by the spectacle will die by 
the spectacle. Do you want to acquire power through the image? Then you will 
perish by the return of the image,.273 And so it is that no matter how many soldiers 
are tried and convicted of the abuse of the Iraqi prisoners in their care, the damage 
has been done: America has electrocuted itself 
Now all of this is very, very clearly 'political,274: in fact, Baudrillard's work is 
politically saturated - just as Derrida's is. And so, to develop this (novel) reading 
of what I argue is his quite overt and unmistakable political position further, I now 
want to consider his political theorisations on the 'global and the universal'. For 
as he makes clear in the article, 'Our Society'S Judgment and Punishment', all of 
what has just been examined is evidence of the ignominy of a lost universal whose 
light is extinguished under the hegemonic movement of globalisation in our trans-
political universe. And it is to Baudrillard' s distinction between the' global and 
273 Ibid, p.3. Such passages clearly demonstrate that Baudrillard was heavily influenced by 
Situationists such as Guy Debord, whose concept of the 'society of the spectacle' has such 
resonance here. However, as my outline of Baudrillard's position already suggests, unlike the 
Situationists, Baudrillard holds out no hope for a hermeneutics which might find a reality under 
a~pearances. 
2 4 Thus directly refuting arguments which either see Baudrillard's work as effectively apolitical 
(Norris and Sokal for example) or uncritically compliant with bourgeois ideology (Callincicos in 
particular here). See page 186 of this thesis (fn.262) for a reminder of their comments to this effect. 
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the universal' to which I would now like to tum in order to further elucidate the 
possibility (if any) he leaves open for some kind of organised resistance to the 
homogenising forces of Western integrism (the transpolitical being the condition 
engendered by the global, logistical attempt to eliminate the time and space to 
resist). 
The Global and the Universal 
As Baudrillard explains in his essay 'The Global and the Universal', globalisation 
and universality are not equivalent terms - the former pertains to techniques, the 
market, tourism and information, the latter to values: to human rights, freedoms 
and democratisation. And whereas globalisation (led by the USA 'everywhere') 
currently seems irreversible, the universal (universal 'human' aspirations) now 
appear to be almost an endangered species. He puts it this way: 'The globalisation 
of [relative] exchange puts and end to the universalisation of [absolute] values. It 
is the triumph of monothought over universal thought'. 275 In Baudrillard's view, 
democracy and human rights now circulate like any other global product - oil or 
capital - and their expansion corresponds to their weakest definition. As Paul 
Corey perceptively remarks in this context, 'what actually expands is the spectacle 
of universal democracy, human rights, and freedom, but not reality. Liberty is 
275 Baudrillard, Jean, 'The Global and the Universal'. Published on-line at The European Graduate 
School Website, http://www _ egs.edU/faculty/baudrillard/baudrillard-the-global-and-the-
universal.html, p.l, 2006. 
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reduced to the free exchange of wealth and information' .276 
For Baudrillard it is the American way of life - which 'we Europeans' think of as 
naIve and/ or culturally worthless - which provides us with a graphic 
representation of the end of our values - only prophesised in 'our' countries - on 
'the grand scale that the geographical and mental dimensions of utopia can give to 
it' .277 No chann, no seduction here - just the absolute fascination of the 
disappearance of all aesthetic and critical forms of life in the 'irradiation of an 
objectless neutrality ... insane circulation without desire' .278 As Baudrillard 
cogently puts it: 
It is not just the aesthetics of decor (of nature or architecture) that vanishes 
into thin air, but the aesthetics of bodies and languages, of everything that 
forms the Europeans - especially the Latin Europeans - mental and social 
habitus, the pathos and rhetoric of social relations, the dramatisation of 
speech, the subtle play of language, the aura of make-up and artificial 
gesture. The whole aesthetic and rhetorical system of seduction, of taste, of 
charm, of theatre, but also of contradictions, of violence always 
reappropriated by speech, by play, by distance, by artifice. Our universe is 
never desert-like, always theatrical. Always ambiguous. Always cultural 
and faintly ridiculous in its hereditary culutrality.279 
Without a hint of European nostalgia - or nostalgia for Europe - Baudrillard' s 
America is thus described as a 'stunning fusion of a radical lack of culture and 
natural beauty, of the wonder of nature and the absolute simulacrum,28o (by-
passing the in-between stage of universal mediating values). The monumentality 
276 Corey, Paul, 'Totality and Ambivalence', op.cit, 2004. 
277 Baudrillard, Jean,America. Verso, London and New York: 1999 (this translation), p.98. 
278 Ibid, p. 124. 
279 Ibid, p.124. 
280 Ibid, p.126. 
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of the landscape reminds humanity that it is just one in a series of signifying 
systems, while the apocalyptic state of speed, noise and over-consumption of 
American cities attests to the empty experience of contemporary hyper-reality. As 
Baudrillard states in his travelogue, America, 'In such a place one lets oneself drift 
freely while still retaining - even at the most extreme limits - a sense of 
simulation' .281 America, here, is the name of that strange destiny wherein 
everything is fated to appear as simulation. Baudrillard brilliantly and concisely 
captures this: 
Landscapes as photography, women as sexual scenario, thoughts as writing, 
terrorism as fashion and the media, events as television ... You wonder 
whether the world itself isn't just here to serve as advertising copy in some 
other world. When the only physical beauty is created by plastic surgery, the 
only urban beauty by landscape surgery, the only opinion by opinion poll 
surgery ... and now, with genetic engineering, along comes plastic surgery for 
the whole human species. 282 
All this is evidence, for Baudrillard, of the tragedy of a utopian dream made 
reality: 'In the heartland of wealth and liberation, you always hear the same 
question: What are you doing after the orgy? What do you do when everything is 
available - sex, flowers, the stereotypes of life and death? This is America's 
problem, and, through America, it has become the whole world's problem'. 283 
When everything becomes art (art is liberated) then art disappears (think 
Duchamp's urinal). When everything becomes sexual (sex is liberated) then 
sexual potency loses its force (think pornography). Taking the social as a case in 
281 Ibid, p.26. 
282 Ibid, p.32. My italics. 
283 Ibid, p.30. 
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point, the problem is no longer cast in terms of representation, objective needs or 
desires, truth, and so on. It is no longer a problem of alienation - which assumes a 
now implausible human nature and eternal essence. The problem is simply the 
excess of information; it is this which Baudrillard sees as leading 'us' to the 
condition of 'saturation and entropy'. As we have already seen in relation to the 
Gulf 'wares) without war' (as virtual wares) won in advance): 'when knowledge, 
through its models, anticipates the event, in other words, when the event (or 
opinion) is preceded by its degraded form (or its simulated form) its energy is 
entirely absorbed into the void' .284 As Baudrillard succinctly puts it in Fatal 
Strategies: 
Such is our destiny as the polled, the informed, the measured, confronted 
with the anticipated verification of our behaviour, absorbed by this 
permanent refraction, we are never again confronted with our own will or 
with that of the other. We are no longer even alienated, for there is no more 
other; the scene of the other, like that of the social and political, has 
disappeared. Each individual is forced into the undivided coherence of 
statistics. Extraversion without appeal, like uncertainty. 285 
Baudrillard continues in this vein. The obscenity proper to polls and the like 
derives not from the betrayal of some 'secret opinion', or the intimacy of a desire, 
or the violation of some sacred right to privacy, but from statistical exhibitionism 
(or what he describes as the continual voyeurism of the group spying on itself): 'at 
every moment it must know what it wants, what it thinks, it must see itself in 
numbers on a video screen, decipher its temperature curves, in a sort of 
284 Baudrillard, Jean, Fatal Strategies. Translated by Philip Beitchman and W.G.J. Niesluchowski. 
Semiotext(e)lPluto, New York: 199O(b), p.91. 
285 Ibid, p.90. 
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hypochondrical mania ... ,286 Thus over-informed, over-fed the social becomes 
obese with itself. 
And so to the irony. Again. For for Baudrillard this socialisation process, this 
obsession with the manifest visibility of the social, actually works to disguise the 
fact that government policy is desocialising, disenfranchising and (de )ejecting~ that 
the social order is contracting at this level of obesity to include only economic 
exchange, technology, the sophisticated and the innovative. Expanding on this 
process of ex-communication Baudrillard writes: 
... as it intensifies these sectors, entire zones are' disintensified', sometimes 
not even that: dumping grounds, wastelands, new deserts for the new poor, 
like the deserts you see forming around nucleur power stations or 
motorways. Nothing will be done to save them and perhaps nothing can be 
done, since enfranchisement, emancipation, and expansion have already 
taken place. There are none of the elements here for a future revolution; what 
we see are merely the inescapable results of an orgy of power, and the 
irreversible concentration of the world that has followed upon its extension. 
The only remaining question is this: what situation will result from this 
" d" fi hi ?287 progressIve lsen ranc sement .... 
Baudrillard's answer seems to include both a certain violence which (as seen in 
Iraq and Afghanistan) proves ultimately self-defeating, and a kind of menopause 
resulting from a lack of new frontiers. That is to say: 'a conservative image-
conscious management of things, steady, unambitious performativity with no 
thought of the future, austerity and physical training, business and jogging, the end 
of the mad whirl and ... the restoration ofa sort of naturalist utopia of the enterprise 
286 Ibid, p.90. 
287 Baudrillard, Jean, America, op.cit, 1999, p.1l3. 
198 
and a bio-sociological conservation of the race' .288 And the upshot is again clear: 
the American cult of individualism, exercised through the discourse of freedom 
and human rights, leads ultimately to banality, materialism, greed and the 
atomisation of social life. Here anomie, paranoia, social fragmentation, structural 
poverty, the decline of civitas and civility, corruption and corporatism, lie beneath 
the surface of the 'winning smile'. 
Yet there is, however, in the Baudrillardian schema - as my earlier remarks on 
reversibility and so on attest - actually room for optimism, room for resistance, 
some joy to be found in all of this - albeit an optimism not of a conventional type. 
Irony again. For William Bogard has also commented, despite the obvious 
injustices of simulation society (that is, despite of the attempt, by all the various 
interested parties, to figure time and alterity absolutely) at the same time anything 
does still remain possible, nothing is foreclosed, the world 'can be enchanted even 
in its banal simulation' ?89 And, crucially for my purposes at this juncture, 
Baudrillard's America is where we are to find this seduction re-introduced (albeit a 
cool seduction) if we are going to find it anywhere. He argues: 
I think that each of us can resist. I don't get the impression there could be 
any organised political resistance as such. It would always be an exception, 
and whatever you do will always be 'exceptional' in that sense. A work of 
art is a singularity, and all these singularities can create holes, interstices, 
voids et cetera, in the metastatic fullness of culture. But I don't see them 
coalescing, combining into a kind of anti-power that could invest the 
288 Ibid, p.1l7. . 
289 Kellner, Douglas (Ed). Baudrillard: A Critical Reader. Blackwell PublIshers. Oxford: 1995, 
p.326. 
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other.290 
The injunction is this then: 'Y ou have to look either to the achievement, by 
saturation and concentration - by the system's excess of positivity - of a critical 
mass, and then it's no longer the negative but the more positive-than-positive that 
produces the upheaval; or to singularities, perfectly anomalous objects or events, 
which are neither inside nor outside [the system]' .291 
Taking some examples already touched upon and concerning, first, the 'reversing 
irony' of the obesity and transparency of the system, Baudrillard will speak about 
AIDS, cancer, computer viruses and so on as phenomena which he thinks may 
save us from the afore mentioned 'hell of the Same'. For to repeat, Baudrillard 
sees the attempt to constitute the system into one network, into one homogenous 
feed-back loop where all differences are accommodated and positioned in a 
'technized, banalized, upholstered, zero degree culture', as inevitably leaving the 
system open to attack. Working (again ironically) through the system and turning 
its own logic back against it, such viruses and the like speak ultimately of the 
failure to institute a perfect, glitch-free system, and, forcing the system into 
hysteria, shows the frailty of all simulation models (shows them as precisely 
simulations). What else can account for the fury met by spotty American 
adolescents who manage to hack into the American militaries top secret 
files/programs, and who are threatened with the kind of jail terms normally 
290 Baudrillard, Jean, The Perfect Crime, op.cit, 1992, p.2. 
291 Baudrillard, Jean, Paroxysm, op.cit 1998, p.63. 
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reserved for mass murderers? And it is this same logic that is used by modem 
terrorism which exploits the interconnectedness of contemporary society, its over-
determination and de-territorialisation - as well as its own 'media' - to induce 
incredibly frightening effects by even the smallest, most random of gestures 
(wherein the terrorist does not even have to do anything - a hapless individual 
leaving their lunch on the tube on the way to work can induce the same effects as 
an actual terrorist attack). 
In this same context of the 'obesity of the system', Baudrillard also talks of the 
scandalous resistance of 'the masses' as a nameless, faceless no-thing-ness which 
increases exponentially at the same time as the social and information. As Victoria 
Grace admirably summarises, the problem for the consensual order is that these 
'silent majorities' 
... do not respond to the simulation of the social and of the meaningful with 
the seriousness and responsibility required to sustain the appearance of a 
credible politics ... there is no longer 'any social signified to give force to the 
political signifier' (SSM: 19). Rather than playing the game and responding 
to this imperative to produce meaning, to produce rational communication, 
the masses ... resist. .. and take the hyperlogic of the play of signs to its most 
banal. Surveys, polls, referenda, tests remain the only way in which the 
silent majority makes its appearance, but in terms of a simulated mode of 
apparition, not in terms of a sociality where meaning flows from one pole to 
another ... The silent mass refuses to be spoken of as well as to speak. And 
yet the demand is that they speak, that they participate ... Everywhere the 
masses are encouraged to speak, they are urged to live socially, electorally, 
organisationally, sexually, in participation, in festival, in free speech' ... But 
the mass absorbs all efforts to engage in this fabricated sociality, dispersing 
the signs of politics, sexuality, festivity, talk in a 
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meaningless void; more information produces more masses. 292 
In other words, the production of meaning has increased at a rate that has not been 
matched by the demand for meaning, such that 'power' is revealed as nothing but 
an 'empty simulacrum' - existing only to conceal the fact that the real is no longer 
real - whilst the social only exists for those on the left and the right who can still 
point to those not 'assimilated into the smooth functionality of hyperreallife' 293 
(Grace also points to the never-employed, to gangs, to drug and alcohol abusers, to 
pregnant mothers, single parents, etc). And, for Baudrillard, it is precisely these 
groups which provide evidence of the 'virulent disruption and tearing of simulated 
life,294, and thus the impossibility of totally neutralising and excluding the Other 
through the logic of sign-value. 
I think it is therefore clear that what Baudrillard is always searching for is that 
certain seduction which interfaces with simulation where alterity and incongruity, 
play and obscurity distort the floating circuit of pure, seemingly stable and reliable 
surface images which the masses (not least) are meant to 'buy in to' or, even 
better, demand. Baudrillard therefore seeks out, everywhere, opposition and 
opacity where consensus and transparency are 'the norm'. In terms of singularity, 
this may mean exalting, say, singular buildings which float as if in a vacuum, 
anticipating future developments, challenging their surrounding architecture or 
292 Grace, Victoria, Baudrillard's Challenge: afominist reading. Routledge, London and New 
York: 2000, p.l 03. 
293 Ibid, p.104. 
294 Ibid, p.104. 
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environment. Or, perhaps reading familiar texts or narratives backwards or 
sideways/paratactically (for example interpreting one's life not from what star sign 
you were born under but what star sign you are somehow fated to die under, or 
reading anagrammatically - or however).295 Using the feminine as an example at 
this juncture, the point is not to seek another fixed (feminist) identity which 
remains caught within the same productivist, assimilist logic of the system, but 
rather to seduce and be seduced, challenging the masculine (i.e. productivist 
ontology) to constantly reveal itself as the illusion it is so to ensure that in the drive 
to make things intelligible and true the greatly more radical illusion of the world 
shines through in the vertiginous play of the appearance and disappearance of 
meaning (either of which in isolation prove truly unbearable). 
This, I think, I would argue, is Baudrillard's overtly radicaL overtly political 
position that commentators such as Norris et aZ 296 have failed to adumbrate and/or 
disregard/deny/not see, from which basis I now move on to examine what I 
consider to be - quite justifiably I think - the manifest similarities and differences 
between Baudrillard' s general position and that of Derrida' s as I see it with a view 
- established at the outset and guiding this whole chapter - to arguing that despite 
295 As Baudrillard will suggest in the closing pages of The Illusion o/the End (polity Press, 
Cambridge: 1994): 'Might we not transpose language games on to social and historical phenomena: 
anagrams, acrostics, spoonerisms, rhyme, strophe and catastrophe? Not just the major figures of 
metaphor and metonymy, but the instant, puerile, fonnalistic games, the heteroclite tropes which 
are the delight of a vulgar imagination? Are there spoonerisms, or an anagrammatic history (where 
meaning is dismembered and scattered to the winds, like the name of God in the anagram). rhyming 
forms of political action or events which can be read in either direction?' (p.177, translation by 
Chris Turner). 
296 Again see page 176, fn.262. 
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the merits ofBaudrillard's strategy/position (arguably one of the most radical in 
contemporary 'postmodem' thought) Derrida's way ofre-figuring our self-
creations and human solidarities post-modernity in the hope of fostering a fairer, 
freer, and more peaceful world is more promising ... that in this comparison 
between Baudrillard and Derrida Derrida 'wins' for the types of reasons I now 
'argue' for. 
Part Two: Derrida and Baudrillard: A Fatal 
Comparison? 
When undertaking the detailed comparison ofDerrida's radical thought with that 
of Baudrillard' s in order to try and justify my argument that Derrida's just is the 
best way to navigate the postmodem condition, what was immediately striking to 
me were the similarities between their respective quasi-logics; similarities which I 
now use - against the above analyses ofBaudrillard - as the basis to identify what 
remain as important differences between the two men not least, as my opening 
remarks in this chapter suggest, with respect to their hopes for a more 
democratising and emancipating future to come. And here I want to argue that 
Derrida and Baudrillard both undertake readings of metaphysics-in-deconstruction 
which reveal the aporetic condition of im-possibility of all foundationalist thinking 
(modern, postmodern or whatever) qua an originary experience of time and alterity 
which resists, absolutely, all attempts at a totalltotalising figuration while at the 
same time allowing figuration to occur. What Baudrillard registers in terms of the 
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repeated inter-articulation of the symbolic and semiotic finds its analogy in 
Derrida's quasi-logic of differance which, to recapitulate, Derrida describes as 
follows: 
Differance points to a relationship - a relation to what is other, to what 
differs in the sense of alterity, to the singularity of the other - but 'at the 
same time' also relates to what is to come, to that which will occur in ways 
which are inappropriate, unforeseen ... it is a thought which wishes to yield to 
the immanence of what is coming or about to come: to the event, and 
therefore to experience itself, insofar as it too has an inevitable tendency, 'at 
the same time' and in the light of 'the same time', to appropriate whatever is 
going to happen: the economy and the an economy of the other, saving and 
dispensing, both at once.297 
What both Derrida and Baudrillard arguably demonstrate in their own ways 
therefore, is the failure of the transcendental gesture constitutive of Western 
metaphysics to attain closure; what they both show is that the world is never 
present (pre-sent) in even the finest grained analyses, but always remains to be 
thought - interminably. In this vein - and tellingly - both Derrida and Baudrillard 
have recourse to the aporia of the law298 in order to identify that which exceeds all 
fixed determination, and a relatively brief summary of their arguments here proves 
a useful 'heuristic device' for the wider comparative analysis of their respective 
positions to then be attempted and with which I bring my argument to a non (de-
finitive) closure ... 
297 Derrida, Jacques, Margins a/Philosophy. Harvester Wheatsheaf, Herts: 1982, 1996, p.203. 
298 I am much indebted (once again) here to Philip Jenkins who, in his doctoral thesis on 
Baudrillard states: 'An analysis of Derrida and Baudrillard's deconstruction of the law offers an 
effective means of engaging with this logic of differance. For both writers conceive of the law in 
terms of the irreducibility of time and of singularity to its legislative gesture (I). that is, as the 
perpetual deferral of the law'. However, while some of the arguments presented here will repeat 
Jenkins' thematics my originality - I hope -lies here within the wider comparison between the two 
theorists to which the initial presentation of these arguments vis a vis the law give rise. I thus 
acknowledge the debt, as it were, but hope to take it up in a singular fashion. 
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Before the Law: The Secret Passage 
As I hope my preceding chapters - wherein I read the form and content of 
Derrida's oeuvre - make clear, when Derrida speaks of the aporia of the law he is 
effectively casting in a juridical problematic the same irresolvable tension between 
the empirical and the transcendental as articulated in his earliest deconstructive 
readings of HusserI and Saussure. And, as I said when analysing this, this aporia 
in-forms everything which comes thereafter. Indeed, as Derrida argues in his 
roundtable discussion with John D. Caputo et ai, this aporetic tension is evidenced 
in the equally valid but forever incommensurable demands made on us by both the 
law and justice whereby, to again recapitulate, the very im-possibility of justice 
drives the constitutions and institutions of the law - their eternal quest for 
improvement and transformation. F or whereas positive law can (and must) be 
deconstructed, justice remains the un-deconstructable condition of possibility and 
impossibility of judgment and thus of 'law'. And of course, to speak: of justice, 
says Derrida, is not a matter of legal knowledge. He goes on: 
Ajudge, if he wants to be just, cannot content himselfwith applying the law. 
He has to reinvent the law each time. If he wants to be responsible, to make a 
decision, he has not simply to apply the law, as a coded program, to a given 
case, but to reinvent in a singular situation a new relationship~ that means 
that justice cannot be reduced to a calculation of sanctions, punishments, or 
rewards. That may be right or in agreement with the law, but that is not 
justice. Justice, if it has to do with the other, with the infinite distance of the 
other, is always unequal to the other, is always incalculable. You cannot 
1 1 . . 299 ca cu ate Justtce. 
299 Jacques Derrida in conversation at the Villanova Roundtable, in Caputo, John D .. 
Deconstruction in a Nutshell, op.cit, 1997, p.17. 
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The 'aporia of the law' - its promise - thus reminds us that judgments are only 
ever tokens of the law and never the law itself (Justice) which unfailingly and 
interminably exceeds the sum of all and every' one' of its empirical instantiations. 
The very notion of' Just law' remains forever undecidable, haunted by an excess it 
can neither figure nor control (the law here standing in for all positive 
determinations). And it is precisely this thinking on the irreducibility of the 'in 
excess' to definitive figuration - to fixity (and especially any infinite/absolute fix) 
- which also finds itself cast in terms of the Law and its excess in Baudrillard's 
work - though this time it is not articulated in terms of the logic of jurisprudence. 
For Baudrillard, too, the Law (I) serves to institute a discontinuous form of 
exchange which opens up the space of meaning, depth and truth by establishing a 
universal limit. Formalised as signifier/signified, exchange value/use value, this 
legislative gesture creates the illusion of an objective reality, of knower and 
known, rigorously and violently excluding its own constitutive excess. However, 
in the same way that for Derrida the law is perpetually deferred in the name of a 
never satiated Justice, so for Baudrillard the law is haunted by what it must 
disavow in order to appear as the law, a disavowed which returns (always 
potentially, all too infrequently in actuality!) to undermine its authority. It is thus 
that Baudrillard has recourse to the logic of the rule which he shows to be the laws 
founding im-possibility. 
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F or whereas the law is shown by Baudrillard to be an instance based on an 
irreversible continuity, involving constraints and prohibitions, he sees the rule as 
concerning cycles, the recurrence of conventional procedures, and involving 
obligations. The rule is thus a circular, seductive gaming space which requires 
neither interpretation nor production but simply observance. Playing on an 
immanent sequence of arbitrary signs (as opposed to the law's transcendent 
sequence of necessary signs) the game is kept going by the challenge and the 
stakes involved with that challenge, and so is dominated by a relation of two or 
more reversible elements. And while the election of the rule does not put an end to 
the Law - as with Derrida it is not a case of disrespecting or leaving the law behind 
as such - the necessary co-implication of rule and law marks the perpetual 
differance of the legislative gesture. 
F or both Derrida and Baudrillard the aporia of the law consequently becomes a 
question of a healthy respect for 'the secret' - phrased in Derrida's work in terms 
of 'the unpresentable' and the 'sacred' and in Baudrillard's terms of the hypothesis 
of a secret pre-destination of the world. In the former (as I have shown in Chapter 
Two through Derrida's deconstructive reading of Kant), the nature of any secret is 
that it must remain unpresentable, absolutely singular - in other words be 
irreducible to positive determination (in the form of the law or whatever). Thus 
Derrida will speak of the necessity of keeping our economies of knowledge open 
and remaining aware of those discourses - religious or secular and 'both of a 
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metaphysical kind' - which claim to know the secret; the answer, the 'final 
solution'. It is in a vein similar to this that Baudrillard will speak of a fatal 
unfurling of necessity in excess of the rational and closed order of causality _ 
including objective contingency. In Baudrillard's view, as Zygmunt Bauman 
tellingly puts it in 'The Sweet Smell of Decomposition' , 'there is no law that links 
action to outcome, there is no clear prescription [of] what one should do in order to 
attain the result one wishes. This world offers no certainty - but no despair either; 
only the joy of a right move and the grief of a failed one' .300 In both Derrida and 
Baudrillard it is therefore important to 'know' that while we cannot escape the law 
we inescapably pass through that secret passage which shakes up our received 
wisdom(s) and calls us toward a certain 'experience of the impossible' (which, as 
Derrida remarks, is probably the best definition of deconstruction). 
As a consequence, attentive to the excessive natures of time and alterity that 
always exceed our timing (our taming) both Derrida and Baudrillard are naturally 
concerned with the manner in which our experience of time and otherness is 
ordered (or better still, 'domesticated') in our current postmodem condition. Thus 
I now turn - with these remarks on the 'law' still in mind - to examine their 
respective attitudes to what they call the actu-virtual and arti-factual nature of our 
experience of the world. And this is crucial to register. For the importance of this 
comparison (their singular views on the subject having already been examined in 
the course of this thesis) lies in the fact that in their respective discussions of the 
300 Bauman, Zygmunt, 'The Sweet Smell of Decomposition' , in Forget Baudrillard.?, op.cit 1993. 
p.38. 
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shaping powers of the tele-techno-media crucial differences begin to 'emerge' (in 
particular ethico-political differences) which do mark a sharp divergence in their 
respective democratic and emancipatory hopes and desires for the future, this 
divergence - their dis-similarity - finding expression in their contrasting views on 
what Baudrillard calls - to recall- the 'global' and the 'universal'. The upshot 
will be that two very different ways of being-in-the-world, two very different 
'modes of resistance' to the homogenising logic of the Same will emerge. I will 
now essay these differences in order to then give, in summary form, the 'result' of 
my DerridalBaudrillard comparison vis a vis the thesis I've been at pains to argue. 
The Tele-Techno-Media Age: The Beginning Or the End of Freedom and 
Equality? 
In the opening gambit of Echographies of the Television, co-produced with 
Bernard Stiegler, Derrida writes: 
'" Today, more than ever before, to think one's time, especially when one 
takes the risk or chance of speaking publicly about it, is to register, in order 
to bring it into play, the fact that the time of this very speaking is artificially 
produced. It is an artefact. In its very happening, the time of this public 
gesture is calculated, constrained, 'formatted', 'initialised' by a media 
apparatus ... This would deserve almost infinite analysis. Who today would 
think his time and who, above all, would speak about it, I'd like to know, 
without first paying some attention to a public space and therefore to a 
political present which is constantly transformed, in its structure and its 
content, by the teletechnology of what is so confusingly called information 
. . 301 
or commumcatlOn. 
301 Derrida, Jacques and Bernard Stiegler, Echographies of Television, Polity Press, Cambridge: 
2005, p.3. 
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And indeed it is just this concern with the artificial (re-) production of our time( s) 
that leads Baudrillard to speak of our living in a universe of integral reality: our 
inter-active, virtual simulation-world. But whereas Derrida's Echographies is a 
book written with the aim of encouraging a positive, critical engagement with our 
tele-technologies, one cannot help but be left with a much bleaker picture of our 
arti-factual and actu-virtual condition in Baudrillard's work - as book titles such as 
The Evil Demon of Imagel02 and The Transparency of Evit03 tellingly suggest. 
Take this series of remarks on the tele-techno-media age from the 'Evil Demon' 
essay as a typical example: 
The immense majority of present day photographs, cinematic and television 
images are thought to bear witness to the world with a naive resemblance 
and a touch stoning fidelity. We have spontaneous confidence in our 
realism. We are wrong. They only seem to resemble things, to resemble 
reality, events, faces. Or rather, they really do conform, but their conformity 
. d' b l' 1 304 IS Ia 0 1ca ... 
For some time now, in the diabolical relation between reality and 
images ... the image has taken over and imposed its own immanent, 
ephemeral logic; an immoral logic without depth, beyond good and evil, 
beyond truth and falsity; a logic of the extermination of its own referent, a 
logic of the explosion of meaning in which the message disappears on the 
horizon of the medium. In this regard, we all remain incredibly naive: we 
always look for a good use of the image, that is to say a moral, meaningful, 
pedagogic or iJiformational usage, without seeing that the image in a sense 
revolts against good usage, that it is the conductor neither of meaning nor 
d · . 305 goo mtentlOns ... 
302 Baudrillard, Jean, The Evil Demon o/Images. Left Bank Books: 1987. 
303 Baudrillard, Jean, The Transparency o/Evil. Translated by James Benedict. Verso, London and 
New York: 1999(d). 
304 Extract from Baudrillard's The Evil Demon o/Images, op.cit, reproduced in The Continental 
Aesthetics Reader. Edited by Clive Cazeaux. Routledge, London and New York: lO()(), p.4-+-+. 
305 Ibid, p.448. My italics. 
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And this is why, as a radical European theorist 'abroad' - and for all the manifest 
injustice and inequalities he finds in his America - 'hyperreal America' remains 
for Baudrillard more 'true to the state of things today' than any nostalgic 
'European mind-set'. For as Baudrillard argues in Paroxysm306, in America,from 
the outset, you are in a transpolitical sphere of the medium and the screen which 
exempts you - for better or for worse - from any social realism. As he goes on, 
whatever you think of this 'hegemony of the medium over there', at least it is a 
social 'fact'. By way of contrast, in our 'traditional world' (i.e. our European 
world of history and linear temporality, high culture and intellectualism) 'we' 
retain the 'sentimental cult of the message' (whether this message be ideological, 
political, psychological or cultural) whose time has now passed. And so while 
America may serve as an alibi for the European mind as it seeks to comfort itself 
that this high culture shelters us from the banality, the superficiality and the 
brashness of a zero-sum signification society, in fact America is the 'truth' of a 
generalised loss of values in the West raised to the Nth power (i. e. where the real is 
more real than real, the fat fatter than fat). This is not to say that Baudrillard sees 
Europe turning into America but that (hyper) modern America, having been born 
out of a rupture with Europe, now appears on Europe's horizons to haunt its bluff, 
good conscience as, by media injection, it spreads to all latitudes and countries qua 
the disappearance of the referent and the triumph of globalisation over a now 
defunct universalisation. 
306 Baudrillard, Jean, Paroxysm, op.cit, 1998. 
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Accordingly, though at this point it is hard to argue with much of what Baudrillard 
has to say about Europe I cannot (will not!) accept that, qfter Derrida, we are 
unable to re-think the European spirit of the universal in are-worked ethico-
political space (albeit one transformed in our actu-virtual, arti-factual age) which 
might enable us to utilize the potential benefits of globalisation while minimizing 
its potentially harmful effects - thus leaving the way open for the rehabilitation of 
a European project. For beginning at that point where I contend that (my) Derrida 
converges with Baudrillard, it is difficult, taking two recent essays written by 
Baudrillard on the subject of France/Europe - namely 'The Pyres of Autumn' 307 
and 'Holy Europe,308 - to disagree with few of the sentiments found therein. In 
the first article, written in the aftermath of the Paris riots over jobs and 
immigration in the Autumn of2005, Baudrillard talks of the collapse of the 
'French model,309 before our very eyes, 'not just under external assault - acts of 
terrorism, Africans storming the barbed wire at Melilla - but also from within'. 310 
And no longer finding France an 'exception' within Europe, Baudrillard regards its 
collapse as symptomatic of the decline of Europe as a whole - a decline which 
forms the backdrop of the riots themselves. Of this downward spiral he states: 
The first conclusion to be drawn from the autumn riots annuls all the pious 
official homilies. A society which is itself disintegrating has no chance of 
integrating its immigrants, who are at once the products and savage analysts 
307 Baudrillard, Jean, 'The Pyres of Autwnn', in New Left Review. Issue 37, Jan-Feb 2006. 
Published on-line at http://www.newleftreview.netlNLR2710l.shtml. 
308 Baudrillard, Jean, 'Holy Europe', in New Left Review. Issue 33, May-June 2005. Published on-
line at http://www.newleftreview.netlNLR26702.shtmI. 
309 By which I take him to mean the 'French model' of social justice. 
310 Baudrillard, Jean, 'The Pyres of Autwnn', op.cit, p.l. 
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of its decay. The harsh reality is that the rest of us, too, are faced with a 
crisis of identity and disinheritance; the fissures of the banalities are merely 
symptoms of the dissociation of a society at odds with itself. 'Integration' is 
the official line. But integration into what? The sorry spectacle of 
'successful' integration - into a banalized, technized, upholstered way of 
life, carefully shielded from self-questioning - is that of we French 
ourselves. To talk of 'integration' in the name of some identifiable notion of 
France is merely to signal its lack.311 
In this 'unequal bargain of democracy', faced with its own absence or loss of 
reality, Baudrillard prophesises that France (and other countries) will soon be 
defined so/ely by the foreign bodies which haunt its periphery but who are now -
and this is vitally important for Baudrillard - ejecting it from itself. As he argues: 
'It is their violent interpellation that reveals what has been coming apart, and so 
offers the possibility for awareness. If French - if European - society were to 
succeed in 'integrating' them, it would in its own eyes cease to exist' .312 Invoking 
his previous arguments vis a vis the drip feeding of the' American model' to the 
rest of the world and the resistance it provokes, Baudrillard continues in what 
should be a familiar language and a familiar vein by now: 
Yet French or European discrimination is only the micro-model of a 
worldwide divide which, under the ironical sign of glob ali sation, is bringing 
two irreconcilable universes face to face. The same analysis ... reprised at 
global level. International terrorism is but a symptom of the split personality 
of a world power at odds with itself. As to finding a solution, the same 
delusion applies at every level, from the banlieues to the House of Islam: 
The fantasy that raising the rest of the world to Western living standards will 
settle matters. The fracture is far deeper than that. Even if the assembled 
Western powers really wanted to close it - which there is every reason to 
doubt - they could not. The very mechanisms of their own survival and 
superiority would prevent them; mechanisms which, through all the pious 
talk of universal values, serve only to reinforce Western power and so to 
311 Ibid, p.l. 
312 Ibid, p.l. 
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format the threat of a coalition of forces that dream of destroying it.313 
And indeed Baudrillard finds this same episode - the resistance of Paris rioters to 
the homogenising, banalising movement of globalisation - to be connected to 
another recent episode in the European Union which forms the basis of the second 
essay I briefly examine here - 'Holy Europe' - in that the recent 'No vote' in the 
2005 EU referendum represents for Baudrillard the move from feelings of 
disaffiliation to defiance among large swathes of the European populace. He 
argues: 
All the excluded, the disaffiliated, whether from the banlieues, immigrants or 
'native born' at one point or another tum their disaffection into defiance and 
go on the offensive. It is their only way to stop being humiliated, discarded 
or taken in hand. 314 
Of the 'No vote' in the referendum, Baudrillard finds most intriguing the No that 
lies behind the official No: that is, beyond political reason. For Baudrillard this is 
a No that resists - and a very dangerous No at that - as the manic mobilisation of 
the authorities behind the Yes campaign testifies. As he states, 'Such defensive 
panic is a sure sign ofa corpse in the wardrobe,.315 In Baudrillard's view the 'No 
vote' is an instinctive reaction to what the referendum was aboutfrom the start: the 
ratification of an infallible, universal Holy Europe which did not dream it would 
provoke such a hostile challenge. Thus he argues that the No vote is less a No to 
Europe as such and more a resounding No to an unquestionable Yes to the 
consensual order. Indeed the real puzzle for Baudrillard is why there has not been 
313 Ibid, p.2. 
314 Ibid, p.2. 
315 Baudrillard, Jean. 'Holy Europe', op.cit, 2005, p.l. 
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an even bigger and/or a more violent reaction against what he calls such 'mindless 
yes-ism'. He goes on: 
The No reflex does not require a political consciousness. It is an automatic 
return of fire against the coalition of all those who are on the side of 
Universal good, while the rest are relegated to the twilight of History. What 
the forces of Good failed to anticipate were the perverse effects of their 
superiority. Since Maastricht and the 2005 elections, political correctness-
whether of the right or the left - has not wanted to know about this silent 
dissidence. 316 
In other words - and repeating briefly an argument which, again, we should be 
familiar with by now but expressed in a slightly different register - the No vote is 
not a work of a negative or critical thought, but simply a check to a hegemonic 
principle imposed from on high to which the will of the people is a matter of 
indifference and the population regarded as simply manipulable masses to be 
deployed as alibis for whatever political project is on the agenda. The authorities 
are therefore quite right to be wary of referenda and direct expressions of the 
political will, given that this chance of genuine representation might contradict the 
official party line. After all, Baudrillard says, 'Parliaments are normally charged 
with laundering the operation of ratifying Europe on the quiet,317, this being 
nowhere better exemplified than in the decision to go to war with Iraq without 
widespread public support. Such incidents only confirm for Baudrillard the 
breakdown of the democratic principle of representation and democracy under the 
weight of a vast simulation model which works not from the people and citizens 
towards the authorities (as if it ever did!) but in reverse: from the authorities down 
316 Ibid, p.l. My italics. 
317 Ibid p.2. 
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by 'booby trapped consultation and the circular game of question and answer, 
where the question only answers Yes to itself318 - the Yes being no longer an 
answer, but the content of the question itself; the constant injunction to vote itself 
appearing in this context to be merely an attempt to save the appearance of the 
representation system precisely because it is the opposite of real representation -
the forced induction of decisions taken 'in the name of the people' even when, 
secretly, the people think the exact opposite. Crucially concludes Baudrillard (for 
the purposes of this thesis) this referendum is no more than an episode (as Europe 
itself is only one more episode amongst others) on the road to a greater loss of 
collective sovereignty: 'Behind the figure of the passive or manipulated voter 
stands that of the hostage-citizen, taken capture by the ruling powers; in other 
words a democratic form of state terror'. 319 
I think that it should now be clear that much of what Baudrillard has to say here 
also coincides with many ofDerrida's concerns: the propensity of the state for 
terror, the danger of sovereignty, the exclusionist logic of a certain concept of 
democracy, the problems surrounding systems of representation, and so on. Yet it 
also seems to me that Baudrillard' s dismissal of the universal per se fails to 
recognize the possibilities of a fairer, freer, more peaceful world (I can hear 
Baudrillard's guffaws now!), a chance Derrida just refuses to give up on and, I 
think, rightly so. For while Derrida recognizes that a certain Western capitalist, 
318 Ibid, p.2. 
319 Ibid, p.2. 
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imperialist spirit has indeed been destructive - leading to (World) wars, 
imperialism, colonisation, genocides and the like - he cannot foreclose on another 
messianic (and most importantly) European spirit which promises not the 
elimination of all otherness but a new world order infinitely open to otherness; a 
world where universal human rights, international law, freedom and equality are 
opened anew in the aporia of the demos. While for Baudrillard the impossibility 
of accommodating all differences - or better, singularities - is symptomatic of the 
fallacy of an impotent universal320 in the face of an immoral globalisation process 
(arguing that the other can only ever be a source of confrontation and non-
assimilation), for Derrida this very impossibility is the im-possible source of ethics 
and responsibility; an ethico-political opening which has the opportunity to form 
the axioms of new and more radical systems of law, politics, economics and values 
(on a local, national and international level) whereby these 'institutions' remain 
forever to be made and remade in the name ofa never satiated Justice. And while, 
for Baudrillard, globalisation leads only to the 'xeroxisation of values' , to the 
inevitable 'hell of the Same', for Derrida globalisation takes place for better as 
well as for worse: democracy and human rights stand a better chance of being 
realised where globalisation occurs (he claims that the movement toward 
democratisation in Eastern Europe owes almost everything 'to television, to the 
320 'Impotent' because, to remind ourselves, Baudrillard thinks that the globalisa~on of exc.~~e 
has put an end to absolute values, where hmnan rights and the like are reduced to commodiues·, 
little more than empty rhetoric in the service of an indifferent globalisation process. 
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communication of models, norms, images, informational products, and so on,).321 
And whereas for Baudrillard all this amounts to little more than the victory of a 
'banal', 'technicised', 'upholstered' way of life whose only relief is in momentary, 
largely singular bouts of resistance, for Derrida, as a man of the left, the 'export' of 
such models, images and informational products are only dangerous if they are not 
accompanied by an awareness of the artifactuality of all that is produced. By an 
awareness that actuality 'is not given but actively produced, sifted, invested, 
performatively interpreted by numerous apparatus which are factitious or 
artificial, hierarchizing and selective, always in the service of forces and interests 
to which "subjects" and agents ... producers and consumers of actuality ... are never 
. . gh' 322 senSItIve enou . 
Concluding Remarks 
In this chapter I have attempted to give an overview of the always already political 
and politicising position of Jean Baudrillard - perhaps the other most radical 
postmodernlpoststructuralist thinker of our times - in order to examine both the 
similarities and differences between his and Derrida's work(s) with a view to 
arguing that, despite Baudrillard' s searing analysis and 'suggestions', Derrida' s 
still is the best way to navigate our postmodern condition after the end of history's 
ends. For while I regard Baudrillard's texts as fantastically useful (not to mention 
incredibly interesting and provocative for those attempting to think our times) I 
321 Corey, Paul, 'Totality and Ambivalence', op.cit, 2004. 
322 Derrida, Jacques and Bernard Stiegler, Echographies, op.cit, 2005, p.3. 
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have sought to demonstrate that a number of his presuppositions remain rather 
weak and suspect. For whereas in my readings ofDerrida I perceive a strong, 
critically minded post-historical, post-modem sUbjectivity capable of being 
developed in and for our postmodern age - that is to say for our contemporary 
world such that we experience it in our actu-virtual and arti-factual condition - I 
find Baudrillard's ruminations and musings on the relative paralysis of the subject 
in the virtual world (towards which, he argues, we are moving ever closer) 
pessimistic and too dismissive of radical possibilities by comparison. Some of 
this, it has to be said, is due to the strategy or the position Baudrillard adopts 
whereby he writes less about what is actually going on here and now (though of 
course, as we have seen, he does do this) and more in a prophetic, exaggerated, 
hyperbolic, and increasingly fragmented style of what may possibly happen if 
(what he sees as) the worse trends of our current condition are actualised. Yet it 
cannot be denied that in the face of liberal capitalist democracies such as they 
function imperfectly in our present world order, Baudrillard holds out little hope 
for significant emancipatory or democratic changes in terms either of our self-
creations or human solidarities. Against the immense simulation models that he 
sees enveloping our lives, shaping our experiences and ultimately destroying 
meaning and critical thinking through the paradoxical overproduction of meaning, 
Baudrillard only anticipates certain internal malfunctions of the system, singular 
and fleeting bouts of resistance that are quickly forgotten or incorporated back 
within the logic of a system which can be shaken but, ultimately it would seem, 
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not significantly changed - the apocalypse is behind us; the weightlessness of the 
system seemingly absorbs every challenge. 
Thus I would wish to conclude that, while sharing many of the same fundamental 
insight into what this thesis refers to throughout as the differential matrix (i.e. 
empirical-transcendental differ-a-nce), Baudrillard fails to adequately seize the 
opportunity Derrida both helps provide and grasp for a re-thinking of our post-
historical, post-industrial, post-modem self-creations and human solidarities in 
more exciting democratising and emancipating ways. While certain concepts of 
the state, sovereignty, friendship, subjectivity, democracy, emancipation, tolerance 
etc ... are demonstrated by both Derrida and Baudrillard to be inadequate and in 
need of serious revision post-modernity, it is Derrida who most cogently and 
coherently develops the conceptual tools for imagining a 'brave new world' in 
which, having re-thought our inheritance on a theoretical and practical level, new 
and more radically free and fair, future orientated subjectivities and collective 
enterprises could be imagined in a new world order without beginnings and 
without ends. 
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Conclusion: A Certain Appearance in 
its Favour. 
I began this thesis with the following reply given by Derrida in a 2002 interview to 
the question: 'What are the central questions philosophy came into existence to 
answer?' To remind ourselves, he replied: 
First of all, how to handle one's life and live well together - which is also 
politics. This is what was addressed in Greek philosophy, and from the 
beginning philosophy and politics were deeply intertwined. We are living 
beings who believe we have the capacity to change life, and we place 
ourselves above animals ... we have the ability to make decisions and 
organize our lives. Philosophy poses the question: what should we do to 
have the best possible lives? I'm afraid we haven't made much progress in 
arriving at an answer to this question. 323 
I end this thesis 'without closure': that is, in a way which attempts to bring the 
threads of the argument(s) presented here (and laid bare in the abstract) together in 
order to support my abiding belief - as a postmodernlpost-structural woman of the 
left - that by taking a gamble on embracing our (current) aporetic condition - as 
grasped through Derrida's theoretical and practical theorisations - we might look 
forward to a fairer, freer, more peaceful world after the end of history's ends and 
that this motive was clearly Derrida's from the very 'political' beginning. Thus it 
is that, in my opinion at least, questions on 'how to handle one's own life and live 
well together' and 'what we should do to have the best possible lives' are 
323 Taken from a transcript of an interview with Kristine McKenna for LA Weekly. Noy 2002. The 
interview reproduced in full in Screenplay and Essays on the Film: Derrida, op.cit, 2005, p.119. 
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'answered' exemplarily - if de-finitively - in Derrida's texts in what amounts to an 
infinite negotiation with, and respect for, the other. 
One of the chief aims of this thesis - and one undoubtedly conditioned by my 
predominantly historical 'training' rather than any predominantly philosophical 
background/training (though the two, of course, are irrevocably intertwined) - has 
been to grasp, with an ironical historical consciousness working itself out in 
'postist' ways, the sheer epoch-changing nature of the Derridean inheritance as I 
see it. As my introductory remarks to this thesis suggested, I felt, early on, that 
there was an unfortunate gap in the literature in the sense of a really wide-ranging 
examination of the Derridean corpus which struck the right balance between 
establishing the 'quasi-' philosophical basis ofDerrida's deconstructive thinking-
read in this thesis (chiefly) through Kant, Marx, Saussure and Husserl - and 
investigating his co-extensive concrete interventions in what are traditionally 
regarded as more practical and overtly political concerns; i.e., immigration, human 
rights, terrorism and such like- though of course Derrida shows that the two strata 
(the theoretical and the practical) are fundamentally interfaced and that this 
distinction is itself simplistic and problematical. 
Indeed part of what attracted me to an examination of Elizabeth Deeds Ermarth's 
work - in conjunction and comparison with Derrida's - was the impression that the 
reading of her Sequel to History had on my sensibilities so far as fostering my 
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belief that we are in a new post-historical, post-modern age; an age/epoch opening 
us up to the possibility of potentially more democratising and emancipating ways 
of thinking and being-in-the-world. And while I concluded in Chapter Two that 
Ermarth's theorisations ultimately fell short (both ontologically and ethico-
politically) of providing 'us' with the best conceptual tools for navigating our (still 
too metaphysical) arti-factual and actu-virtual postmodern condition, I felt that the 
seismic shift in consciousness she was describing was very much to the point in 
thinking through our times. 
And indeed it was this concern with thinking (through) our times - in every sense 
of this word - that led me to compare (in Chapter Four) Derrida's oeuvre with that 
of fellow quasi-philosopher of the limit, Jean Baudrillard. For Baudrillard's work 
on simulation, reversibility, the symbolic-semiotic spiral, the 'hell of the Same' 
and so on, struck a chord with my own (and Derrida's) interest in the ways in 
which our experience of the postmodern world is structured and controlled in still 
too foundational ways and to which we remain too insensitive as critical beings. 
In particular I felt - despite sharing a discomfort with the whole 'postist' 
phenomenon generally - that in conjunction with Derrida' s theorisations, 
Baudrillard's work really enables us to grasp that excess of time and alterity which 
escapes all attempts at closure (modern, postmodem or whatever) and which 
therefore leaves the future open in the name of a radical otherness that always 
resists incorporation - hence my classification of both men as postmodem 
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resistance fighters. And while I have eventually come to the conclusion that 
Baudrillard's thematics remain just too pessimistic and thus in a way, slightly 
irrelevant, so far as translating this irreducible excess into imagining strong 
postmodern subjectivities and collective enterprises, I nevertheless regard the 
readings ofBaudrillard as presented in this thesis to be both new/original and 
useful in helping us comprehend the stakes involved in taking a chance on 
embracing our aporetic condition vis a vis re-formulating our self-creations and 
human solidarities in (potentially) more democratising and emancipating ways. 
But it is to Derrida that I always return and especially to his vision for a 'brave 
new world' which may emerge out of this 'age of the aporia'; an age or condition I 
have argued that Derrida sought to bring to consciousness from his very earliest 
work (Origins of Geometry, Of Grammatology, Margins of Philosophy, Writing 
and Difference). For as I showed in Chapter One, what Derrida therein developed 
was a quasi-philosophy of language which de-naturalises what is conditioned by 
history, institutions and society, and opens the (aporetic) ethico-political space for 
new self-creations and human solidarities to be imagined without foundation; that 
is construed and defended on a moral/aesthetic basis alone. And while for , 
Derrida (and contra Ermarth) this never meant that such self-creations and human 
solidarities will necessarily work themselves out in more democratising and 
emancipating ways (as if by some analogous law of physics say) Derrida clearly 
does believe that the deconstructive movement he helps uncover best lends itself to 
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a more open, plural, friendship-based relation to the Other (which is to say at the 
same time the other in me). For while Derrida is not some hopelessly naIve 
utopian - he speaks in the LA Weekly in 2002 of the human animals capacity for 
cruelty and the pleasure that can result from making the other suffer - he 
nevertheless argues that such a seemingly negative drive, such a violent relation to 
the other, can be transformed (at a lower level of violence) into something 
beautiful and sublime; an aggressive energy which can be handled and negotiated 
in philosophy and thinking in more interesting, less despicable ways. This is the 
basis for the kind of critical thinking I believe Derrida to espouse - a challenge to 
both oneself and the other to argue, to fight, to negotiate, to be passionate about 
ones moral/aesthetic values/choices without resorting to killing or humiliating or 
closing the door to the other (that is, also, to the future) in the name of some 
inalienable rights or foundationalist/totalising beliefs. 
Thus, as I argued in Chapter Two, Derrida opens the way for developing greatly 
more radical postmodern subjectivities which are substantially more sensitive to 
their surrounding technical conditions and open to re-thinking our various 
economies without blind recourse to old, radioactive habits of thought. That is to 
say, in the first place, less narcissistic (without being non-narcissistic) 
subjectivities that are more or less 'comprehensive, generous, open, extensive'. In 
contradistinction to modernity's sovereign subject and its history (for which it 
remains, as Ermarth argues, a constitutive alibi), the postmodern subject recognises 
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itself to be 'thrown' into an inherently foundationless, inter -textual discursive 
landscape which preceded its 'birth' and will survive its 'death', wherein the 
'history of meaning' is transformed into a 'politics of memory' - 'a situation 
which has no omniscient narrator or supersensible deity to guide or take 
responsibility for the idiomatic (without of course being quite idiomatic) path to be 
forged' .324 It is thus that I argue that this kind of liminal subjectivity is beyond the 
end of history's ends and is therefore the existential embodiment of the affirmation 
of life. To put this another way, such affirmative subjectivities rejoice in the 
heterogeneity of an inheritance (always more than one) which impels one to 'filter, 
select, criticise' in the face of the secret which says 'read me, will you ever be up 
to it'. These are subjectivities which just are happy to live with the endless 
drawing and re-drawing of boundaries, with the infinite injunction to read and re-
read others infinitely and not de-finitively~ to let a little newness enter the wor1d~ 
meeting the challenge of the other not with hostility or fantasies of 'property, 
appropriation and colonial imposition' but with respect, grace, humility and 
humour - even when critical or polemical. It is to this kind of self-creation that, 
after Derrida, 1 attribute the axiom: 'I inherit, therefore, 1 am ... yes, yes ... ' 
And, crucially for this thesis, it is this postmodern, post-historical subjectivitl25 to 
which 1 think Derrida, supremely, gives voice, a voice working itself out beyond 
the ends of endist history, which I conclude best enables us to re-figure our 
324 See page 94 of this thesis. 
325 Once again, always more than one. 
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understandings of Western liberal capitalist democracies and their modern-
metaphysical conceptual genealogy in more democratising and emancipating ways. 
Derrida offers 'us' a real, practical opportunity via his conception of a new global 
solidarity; the risk and the chance of fostering a fairer, freer and more peaceful 
world. As I have argued in Chapter Three, the ethico-political space of the 
decision uncovered through his early writings surrounding the' differential matrix' 
subsequently translates, by way ofDerrida's meditation on various spirits of 
Marxism, into a hauntological quasi-logic which sets forth a deconstructive 
reading of capitalism, its media and self-justifying ideology; in the process 
undercutting the theory and practice of a certain sovereignty practiced in the 
security of the logos. As shown, Derrida will argue, after Marx, that this hyper-
relativist aporetic space of the decision - which he shows to be nothing less than 
the aporia of the demos - has the potential to inaugurate (in the best of all possible 
Derridean-type worlds) a new Enlightenment rationality elaborated in accord with 
a new morality (on an individual and communal level), namely attention to and 
affirmation of otherness, the new and the other leading, ideally, to the de-
mystification of all totalising political theology and its sovereign subject and 
thereby challenging the very basis of our modem liberal capitalist democracies and 
the tradition to which we are heir. 
In this elaboration ofDerrida's ethical and political concerns, as demonstrated in 
this study present 'from the beginning', the above task is one which Derrida 
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regards 'we Europeans' as being particularly suited to given our common 
experiences, traditions and actions; these things, he argues, have endowed 'us' 
with a unique political consciousness and sense of duty to think 'reason' and new 
ways of being together other-wise. And, crucially for the moral/aesthetic 
positioning of this thesis regarding its own vision for a brave new post-
metaphysical world, in pointing to all of the manifest injustices and inequalities 
still present in the world today (famine, war, human rights abuses to name but a 
few) Derrida is keen to argue that this is not a challenge we can afford to refuse or 
put off. To recap, in a (certain) Marxist spirit, Derrida argues that we must 
endeavour, here and now, in concrete and urgent situations, to question liberal 
capitalist democracies such as they operate in a juridico-political space 
increasingly shaped by the powers of the tele-techno-media and over-determined 
by the world's strongest nations for whom 'might means right'. Thus it is that 
Derrida (with Habermas) calls upon Europe as a whole to take a central role in 
fostering a more democratic and emancipating civic solidarity which might be 
translated onto the world stage in terms of global solidarity (in the form of a New 
International) ever sensitive to the need for the continual improvement of all laws, 
institutions and organisations in the name of an infinite justice. As I have argued it 
is this Europe, endowed with the military force and diplomatic powers set to work 
in the service of new international institutions and new international law which 
Derrida hopes may help regulate and remedy the manifest injustices and paradoxes 
of globalisation in the international order and thereby literally change the world for 
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the better (from a radical, pluralistic left wing point of view). Once again, all of 
this represents for Derrida both a risk and a chance of the best and the worst 
happening, but is a risk and a chance which with Derrida, I concur in thinking it to 
be one well worth taking. 
But if all of this isn't to remain at an impossibly abstract level several times 
removed from most peoples everyday concerns, that is, if the 'real' benefits of 
Derrida's kind of textual praxis (on a theoretical and practical level) are to be felt 
(as I see them from my position stated at the outset) then I think that in both 
academia and the media things have to change. In the closing remarks of this 
thesis, I would like to sum up what, after Derrida and from my perspective, what 
needs to be done. 
In the first place, as far as Derrida and academia (and the intelligentsia) is 
concerned, I think that what he has to say about the teaching of philosophy, about 
critical thinking and intellectual courage in particular, is more important/relevant 
today than it has ever been - albeit several decades after much of the sentiment 
found therein was first expressed. It was in 1975 that Derrida helped found the 
'Research Group for the Teaching of Philosophy' , which tried - and ultimately 
failed - to persuade (then) colleagues and French citizens of the need for 
philosophy - philosophy proper and philosophy across borders - to be taught in 
schools earlier than the last grade of high school (earlier than 16 or 17 years old). 
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It seems to me that the kind of quasi-philosophical deconstructive thinking Derrida 
advocates is, even when recognised, still too poorly developed in the education 
system as a whole and, at least from a British perspective, remains at best marginal 
even at university level. In the essay 'Once Again From the Top: Of the Right to 
Philosophy,326, Derrida spoke of the need to give secondary teachers at junior and 
senior level, whatever the disciplines they were preparing to teach, an 
understanding of philosophy during their years of training - and I take him to 
mean not just the obligatory dose of 'pseudo-theory' so often packaged under the 
aegis of' Study' and or 'Learning Skills'. For Derrida it remained a question of 
making philosophy popular (ironic, perhaps, given his infamous 'difficulty') while 
at the same time addressing the paradoxes surrounding this terms and the 
importance of isolating both the specificity of philosophy and the inter-disciplinary 
relations between philosophy and its other - these questions remaining for him in-
dissociable from the great question of democracy-to-come (in Europe and 
elsewhere). 
What Derrida advocates - and not just in philosophy but also in departments of 
literature, religion, law, history and the rest (though as the absolute source of 
legitimation philosophy remains exemplary) - are programs which are 'open-
ended, porous, experimental, non-programmable, vigilant, self-questioning, self-
326 Derrida, Jacques, 'Once Again From the Top: Of the Right to Philosophy'. in Points. translated 
by Peggy Kamuf, op.cit, 1995. 
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revising, exposed to their other, inventive of the other' ?27 Thus, for example, it is 
not difficult to see how Derrida's quasi-philosophical thought impacts on the way 
law is conceived and taught (with his remarks on justice and the law); or history -
with his remarks on messianicity and 'the other heading' - or political theory-
with his deconstruction of traditional concepts of sovereignty and friendship, and 
so on. But, of course, that these subjects all share a common, interchangeable 
conceptual heritage is what makes cross disciplinary awareness, investigation and 
co-operation particularly important, a factor motivating Derrida's dream of a 
writing that would 'inhabit the distance between the departmental academic 
specialities of philosophy or literature or law, or architecture, or religious 
studies ... something absolutely new, absolutely singular and unprecedented' .328 I 
believe that not enough progress in this area has yet been made at either secondary 
school, college or university levels given what this thesis has shown, following 
Derrida, to be the stakes involved in re-thinking old philosophical/metaphysical 
habits of thought. 
And in pressing for such changes this is where (after Derrida once again) 
intellectuals must have courage, including the courage to redefine the figure of the 
intellectual subject itself in a public space (as we have already seen and argued) 
profoundly transformed by tele-technology and the media. As Derrida makes clear 
in his very last interview with Le Monde, the intellectual he envisaged must resist 
327 Caputo, John D., Deconstruction in a Nutshell, op.cit, 1997, p.70. 
328 Ibid, p.69. 
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populist pressures and concerns, resist the sensationalism of some media 
intellectuals and the demands from various politico-economic lobbies and continue 
to remain sensitive to the way the development and proliferation of technics 
conditions the arguments and in-particular our relation to the other. This is not to 
say, once again, that Derrida thinks we should avoid the media; rather, as I argue 
in Chapters Two and Three, Derrida thinks the media should be diversified: 
always, always, 'more than one'. After all, only if we open, and keep open, the 
(ethico-political) space for new kinds of discussion about contemporary issues of 
all kinds - racial, sexual, religious, humanitarian, economic, social, etc ... - within 
which the media along with academia has a vital role to play - can we hope to 
raise to consciousness the radically more democratising and emancipating 
possibilities for our self-creations and human solidarities to which Derrida, 
exemplary in my opinion, gives voice. Indeed helping to keep such a discursive 
space open has been the main aim of this study: Derrida neither warrants nor 
knows of, nor ever wanted, a purely 'academic thesis'. 
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